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Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers 
16-1276 
Ruling Below: Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (C.A.9 (Cal.), 2017) 
Former employee brought action against employer for violation of whistleblower protection 
provision of Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California, Edward M. Chen, J., denied employer's 
motion to dismiss and certified interlocutory appeal. Employer appealed. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
Question Presented: Whether the anti-retaliation provision for “whistleblowers” in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 extends to individuals who have 
not reported alleged misconduct to the Securities and Exchange Commission and thus fall 
outside the act’s definition of “whistleblower.” 
 
Paul SOMERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
DIGITAL REALTY TRUST INC., a Maryland corporation; Ellen Jacobs, Defendants-
Appellants. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
Decided on March 8, 2017 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This appeal presents an issue of securities law 
that has divided the federal district and circuit 
courts. It results from a last-minute addition 
to the anti-retaliation protections of the 
Dodd-Frank Act (“DFA”) to extend 
protection to those who make disclosures 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other 
laws, rules, and regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii). The underlying issue is 
whether, in using the term “whistleblower,” 
Congress intended to limit protections to 
those who come within DFA's formal 
definition, which would include only those 
who disclose information to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). See 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). If so, it would exclude 
those, like the plaintiff in this case, who were 
fired after making internal disclosures of 
alleged unlawful activity. 
 
The Fifth Circuit was the first to weigh in on 
the question and strictly applied DFA's 
definition of “whistleblower” to the *1047 
later anti-retaliation provision, so as to 
require dismissal of the plaintiff's action in 
that case because he did not make his 
disclosures to the SEC. Asadi v. G.E. Energy 
(USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 
2013). It therefore rejected the SEC's 
regulation adopting a contrary interpretation. 
Id. at 630. 
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The Second Circuit, viewing the statute itself 
as ambiguous, applied Chevron deference to 
the SEC's regulation. Berman v. 
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d 
Cir. 2015). That regulation, in effect, 
interprets the provision to extend protections 
to all those who make disclosures of 
suspected violations, whether the disclosures 
are made internally or to the SEC. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.21F-2. 
 
The district court in this case followed the 
Second Circuit's approach, denied 
Defendant's motion to dismiss, and certified 
an interlocutory appeal. We agree with the 
district court that the regulation is consistent 
with Congress's overall purpose to protect 
those who report violations internally as well 
as those who report to the government. This 
intent is reflected in the language of the 
specific statutory subdivision in question, 
which explicitly references internal reporting 
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange 
Act”). In view of that language, and the 
overall operation of the statute, we conclude 
that the SEC regulation correctly reflects 
congressional intent to provide protection for 
those who make internal disclosures as well 
as to those who make disclosures to the SEC. 
We therefore affirm. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, Paul Somers, was 
employed as a Vice President by Defendant-
Appellant, Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (“Digital 
Realty”), from 2010 to 2014. According to 
Somers's complaint in district court, he made 
several reports to senior management 
regarding possible securities law violations 
by the company, soon after which the 
company fired him. Somers was not able to 
report his concerns to the SEC before Digital 
Realty terminated his employment. 
 
Somers subsequently sued Digital Realty, 
alleging violations of various state and 
federal laws, including Section 21F of the 
Exchange Act. That section, entitled 
“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and 
Protection,” includes the anti-retaliation 
protections created by DFA. Digital Realty 
sought to dismiss the DFA claim on the 
ground that, because Somers only reported 
the possible violations internally and not to 
the SEC, he was not a “whistleblower” 
entitled to DFA's protections. 
 
The district court, in a published opinion, 
denied Digital Realty's motion to dismiss the 
DFA claim. The court conducted an 
extensive analysis of the statutory text, DFA's 
legislative history, and the procedural and 
practical implications of harmonizing the 
narrow definition of “whistleblower” with 
the broad protections of the anti-retaliation 
provision. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., 119 
F.Supp.3d 1088, 1100–05 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
The court observed that “[a]t bottom, it is 
difficult to find a clear and simple way to read 
the statutory provisions of Section 21F in 
perfect harmony with one another.” Id. at 
1104. Having analyzed the tension between 
the definition and anti-retaliation provisions, 
the district court deferred to the SEC's 
interpretation that individuals who report 
internally only are nonetheless protected 
from retaliation under DFA. Id. at 1106. The 
district court certified the DFA question for 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b), id. at 1108, and we subsequently 
granted Digital Realty's Petition for 
Permission to Appeal. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The case must be seen against the 
background of twenty-first century statutes to 
curb securities abuses. Congress enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, following a 
major financial scandal. Its purpose was “[t]o 
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safeguard investors in public companies and 
restore trust in the financial markets 
following the collapse of Enron 
Corporation.” Lawson v. FMR LLC, ––– 
U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1158, 1161, 188 
L.Ed.2d 158 (2014). As a key part of its 
safeguards, Sarbanes-Oxley requires internal 
reporting by lawyers working for public 
companies. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245. This is in 
addition to internal reporting by auditors, 
which was already mandated by the 
Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b). 
Further, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that 
companies maintain internal compliance 
systems that include procedures for 
employees to anonymously report concerns 
about accounting or auditing matters. See 15 
U.S.C. § 78-j-1(m)(4), 7262. It also provides 
protections to these and other 
“whistleblower” employees in the event that 
companies retaliate against them. 18 U.S.C. § 
1514A(a). Sarbanes-Oxley expressly protects 
those who lawfully provide information to 
federal agencies, Congress, or “a person with 
supervisory authority over the employee.” Id. 
Like Sarbanes-Oxley, DFA was passed in the 
wake of a financial scandal—the subprime 
mortgage bubble and subsequent market 
collapse of 2008. See Samuel C. Leifer, Note, 
Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 121, 
129–30 (2014) (discussing the mortgage 
crisis and Congress's response). In enacting 
DFA, Congress said the main purposes 
included “promot[ing] the financial stability 
of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the 
financial system” and “protect[ing] 
consumers from abusive financial services 
practices.” Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1376 (2010). DFA provided new 
incentives and employment protections for 
whistleblowers by adding Section 21F to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 
21F defines a whistleblower as, “any 
individual who provides, or 2 or more 
individuals acting jointly who provide, 
information relating to a violation of the 
securities laws to the Commission, in a 
manner established, by rule or regulation, by 
the Commission.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
This definition thus describes only those who 
report information to the SEC. 
 
The anti-retaliation provision in question in 
this case is found in a later subsection of 
Section 21F. It provides broad protections 
and states: 
No employer may discharge, demote, 
suspend, threaten, harass, directly or 
indirectly, or in any other manner 
discriminate against, a whistleblower in the 
terms and conditions of employment because 
of any lawful act done by the 
whistleblower— 
 
(i) in providing information to the 
Commission in accordance with this section; 
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in 
any investigation or judicial or administrative 
action of the Commission based upon or 
related to such information; or 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or 
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this chapter, 
including section 78j-1(m) of this title, 
section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any other 
law, rule, or regulation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). The issue in this 
case concerns subdivision (iii), which gives 
whistleblower protection to all those who 
make any required or protected disclosure 
under Sarbanes-Oxley and all other relevant 
laws. 
Subdivision (iii) was added after the bill went 
through Committee. There is no legislative 
history explaining its purpose, but its 
language illuminates congressional intent. By 
broadly incorporating, through subdivision 
(iii), Sarbanes-Oxley's disclosure 
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requirements and protections, DFA 
necessarily bars retaliation against an 
employee of a public company who reports 
violations to the boss, i.e., one who 
“provide[s] information” regarding a 
securities law violation to “a person with 
supervisory authority over the employee.” 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(a). Provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley and the Exchange Act mandate 
internal reporting before external reporting. 
Auditors, for example, must “as soon as 
practicable, inform the appropriate level of 
management” of illegal acts, and only after 
such internal reporting may auditors bring 
their concerns to the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(b). Leaving employees without protection 
for that required preliminary step would 
result in early retaliation before the 
information could reach the regulators. As 
the Second Circuit noted, “[I]f subdivision 
(iii) requires reporting to the [SEC], its 
express cross-reference to the provisions of 
Sarbanes-Oxley would afford an auditor 
almost no Dodd-Frank protection for 
retaliation because the auditor must await a 
company response to internal reporting 
before reporting to the Commission, and any 
retaliation would almost always precede 
Commission reporting.” Berman, 801 F.3d at 
151. Sarbanes-Oxley likewise requires 
lawyers to report internally, 15 U.S.C. § 
7245, and the SEC's Standards of 
Professional Conduct set forth only limited 
instances in which an attorney may reveal 
client confidences to the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 
205.3(d)(2). The attorney would be left with 
little DFA protection. 
 
That DFA's definitional provision describes 
“whistleblowers” as employees who report 
“to the Commission” thus should not be 
dispositive of the scope of DFA's later anti-
retaliation provision. Terms can have 
different operative consequences in different 
contexts. See King v. Burwell, –––U.S. ––––
, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2489, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 
(2015). The use of a term in one part of a 
statute “may mean [a] different thing[ ]” in a 
different part, depending on context. See id. 
at 2493 n.3. This is true even where, as here, 
the statute includes a definitional provision: 
“[Statutory d]efinitions are, after all, just one 
indication of meaning—a very strong 
indication, to be sure, but nonetheless one 
that can be contradicted by other 
indications.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 228 (2012). DFA's anti-
retaliation provision unambiguously and 
expressly protects from retaliation all those 
who report to the SEC and who report 
internally. See King, 135 S.Ct. at 2493 n.3. 
Its terms should be enforced. 
 
Reading the use of the word “whistleblower” 
in the anti-retaliation provision to incorporate 
the earlier, narrow definition would make 
little practical sense and undercut 
congressional intent. As the Second Circuit 
pointed out, subdivision (iii) would be 
narrowed to the point of absurdity; the only 
class of employees protected would be those 
who had reported possible securities 
violations both internally and to the SEC, 
when the employer—unaware of the report to 
the SEC—fires the employee solely on the 
basis of the employee's internal report. See 
Berman, 801 F.3d at 151–52. This reading is 
illogical. Employees are not likely to report 
in both ways, but are far more likely to 
choose reporting either to the SEC or 
reporting internally. See id. Reporting to the 
SEC brings a higher likelihood of a problem 
being addressed, along *1050 with an 
increased risk of employer retaliation, 
whereas internal reporting may be less 
efficient but safer. Id. As we have seen, 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Exchange Act 
prohibit potential whistleblowers—auditors 
and lawyers—from reporting to the SEC until 
after they have reported internally. Id. at 152–
53. The anti-retaliation provision would do 
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nothing to protect these employees from 
immediate retaliation in response to their 
initial internal report. A strict application of 
DFA's definition of whistleblower would, in 
effect, all but read subdivision (iii) out of the 
statute. We should try to give effect to all 
statutory language. See Duncan v. Walker, 
533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 
L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (rejecting a statutory 
construction that would render a term 
“insignificant, if not wholly superfluous”); 
see also Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. 
Pritzker, 828 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
 
We recognize there is intercircuit 
disagreement. The Second Circuit in Berman 
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit, which had 
earlier applied the formal definition of 
whistleblower to limit the scope of the anti-
retaliation provision. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630. 
The Asadi decision reasoned that if DFA 
protected the same conduct that Sarbanes-
Oxley did, then the Sarbanes-Oxley 
enforcement scheme would be rendered moot 
or superfluous, on the theory that no one 
would use it. See id. at 628–29. The Fifth 
Circuit pointed out that Sarbanes-Oxley lacks 
DFA's double damage provision, has a 
shorter statute of limitations, and has more 
extensive administrative requirements. Id. 
But as the SEC has pointed out in its amicus 
brief in this case, DFA's enforcement scheme 
is not more protective in all situations and 
would not swallow Sarbanes-Oxley because 
Sarbanes-Oxley offers a different process 
from DFA. Sarbanes-Oxley may be more 
attractive to the whistleblowing employee in 
at least two important ways. First, Sarbanes-
Oxley provides for adjudication through 
administrative review, with the Department 
of Labor taking responsibility for asserting 
the claim on the whistleblower's behalf. 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2). This procedure would 
likely be significantly less costly and 
stressful for whistleblowers than having to 
file an action in federal court, pursuant to 
DFA's enforcement scheme. See 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-6(h)(1)(B). Second, while DFA provides 
for awards of double back pay, 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-6(h)(1)(C), Sarbanes-Oxley allows 
employees to recover “all relief necessary to 
make the employee whole,” including 
compensation for special damages, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(c). An employee who has suffered 
more substantial emotional injury than 
financial harm would likely be better off with 
Sarbanes-Oxley's allowance for special 
damages. See Jones v. SouthPeak Interactive 
Corp., 777 F.3d 658, 672 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(joining the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in 
concluding that emotional distress damages 
are available under Sarbanes-Oxley as 
“special damages”). DFA's protection for 
internal reporting therefore does not render 
Sarbanes-Oxley's enforcement scheme 
superfluous. The statutes provide alternative 
enforcement mechanisms. 
 
For all these reasons, we conclude that 
subdivision (iii) of section 21F should be read 
to provide protections to those who report 
internally as well as to those who report to the 
SEC. We also agree with the Second Circuit 
that, even if the use of the word 
“whistleblower” in the anti-retaliation 
provision creates uncertainty because of the 
earlier narrow definition of the term, the 
agency responsible for enforcing the 
securities laws has resolved any ambiguity 
and its regulation is entitled to deference. In 
2011, the SEC issued Exchange Act Rule 
21F-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2, pursuant to its 
rule-making authority under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(j). The SEC's rule *1051 in our view 
accurately reflects Congress's intent to 
provide broad whistleblower protections 
under DFA. The Rule says that anyone who 
does any of the things described in 
subdivisions (i), (ii), and (iii) of the anti-
retaliation provision is entitled to protection, 
including those who make internal 
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disclosures under Sarbanes-Oxley. They are 
all whistleblowers. The Rule is quite direct: 
“For purposes of the anti-retaliation 
protections afforded by Section 21F(h)(1) of 
the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)), 
you are a whistleblower if: ... [y]ou provide 
that information in a manner described in [the 
anti-retaliation provision] of the Exchange 
Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)).” 17 C.F.R. § 
240.21F-2. 
 
The regulation accurately reflects 
congressional intent that DFA protect 
employees whether they blow the whistle 
internally, as in many instances, or they 
report directly to the SEC. The district court 
correctly so recognized. 
 
The judgment of the district court is 
AFFIRMED. 
 
* * * 
 
OWENS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
I agree with the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. 
Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 
(5th Cir. 2013), and Judge Jacobs' dissent in 
Berman v. Neo @Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 
155–60 (2d Cir. 2015), and therefore 
respectfully dissent. Both the majority here 
and the Second Circuit in Berman rely in part 
on King v. Burwell, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 
2480, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015), to read the 
relevant statutes in favor of the government's 
position. In my view, we should quarantine 
King and its potentially dangerous 
shapeshifting nature to the specific facts of 
that case to avoid jurisprudential disruption 
on a cellular level. Cf. John Carpenter's The 
Thing (Universal Pictures 1982). 
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“U.S. high court to review scope of Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
protections” 
 
Reuters 
Sarah N. Lynch 
June 26, 2017 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday 
to consider whether corporate insiders who 
blow the whistle on their employers are 
shielded from retaliation if they only report 
alleged misconduct internally rather than to 
the government's Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
The justices will hear Digital Realty Trust 
Inc's appeal of a lower court ruling in favor 
of Paul Somers, an executive fired by the San 
Francisco-based company after he 
complained internally about alleged 
misconduct by his supervisor but never 
reported the matter to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
The case hinges on the SEC's whistleblower 
protection rules required by the 2010 Dodd-
Frank Wall Street reform law. 
The court agreed to take up the case on the 
last day of a nine-month session. The court 
will hear the case during the next term that 
starts in October. 
The SEC rules, adopted in 2011, prohibit 
corporate employers from retaliating in any 
way against whistleblowers who try to report 
allegations of securities law violations. 
They also give the SEC the power to offer 
monetary awards to whistleblowers whose 
tips lead to successful enforcement actions. 
Digital Realty Trust argues the anti-
retaliation protections do not apply to people 
who fail to report their allegations to the SEC 
because the law defines a whistleblower as a 
person who reports possible securities 
violations to the SEC. 
If the Supreme Court ultimately sides with 
the company, then it would force corporate 
whistleblowers to report wrongdoing to the 
SEC in order to be protected from retaliation. 
Such a result could deter people from 
reporting misconduct internally first, said 
Jordan Thomas, a partner at Labaton 
Sucharow who represents SEC 
whistleblowers. 
"I think both corporate whistleblowers and 
corporations should hope that the Supreme 
Court finds that internal reporting is 
sufficient to have the anti-retaliation 
protections because if not, sophisticated 
corporate whistleblowers will bypass internal 
reporting systems and report directly to the 
SEC," he said. 
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Digital Realty Trust, a real estate investment 
trust company, became entangled in the 
dispute over whistleblower protection after it 
fired Somers, its former vice president of 
portfolio management. 
Somers had complained internally that his 
supervisor had eliminated some internal 
controls and hid major cost overruns on a 
project in Hong Kong. 
After he was fired, he sued the company in 
November 2014, saying he was protected 
from retaliation as a whistleblower under the 
Dodd-Frank law. 
The company tried unsuccessfully to quash 
his claim in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California. 
While the case was on appeal before the 9th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, a divided 2nd 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals panel ruled in 
a similar case that people who only report 
misconduct internally are whistleblowers 
who merit protection from retaliation. 
The 9th Circuit later affirmed the California 
finding, with the SEC also filing a friend of 
the court brief in the case and participating in 
oral arguments in support of Somers. 
Both the 2nd and 9th Circuit opinions are at 
odds with the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which previously held that 
whistleblowers must report to the SEC in 
order to receive protective status. 
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“The Bumpy Road To Protection For Internal Whistleblowers” 
 
Law360 
Ryan S. Hedges, Brooke E. Conner 
March 27, 2017 
 
Two recent court decisions are just the latest 
developments in the bumpy road to 
protection for internal corporate 
whistleblowers, a prominent issue that has 
sparked outspoken advocacy from the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
may be increasingly likely to draw the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s attention. On March 8, 
2017, a split Ninth Circuit panel ruled in 
favor of extending Dodd-Frank’s anti-
retaliation protections to whistleblowers who 
choose to report suspected securities law 
violations internally to their employers, but 
who do not report directly to the SEC. On 
March 20, 2017, the Supreme Court declined 
to review a case out of the Sixth Circuit in 
which the district court had dismissed the 
case and ruled that Dodd-Frank’s 
whistleblower protections applied only to 
those who report to the SEC. In that case, the 
Sixth Circuit had affirmed on other grounds, 
so the Dodd-Frank issue was not squarely in 
play on certiorari. But, in light of the 
widening circuit split on the issue, it seems 
likely that the Supreme Court’s recent denial 
of certiorari will not be its final say on the 
topic. 
The crux of the legal debate centers on 
whether the whistleblower protection 
provision in Section 922 of Dodd-Frank 
protects whistleblower reports that are made 
internally within a company but not to the 
SEC. Section 21F(a)(6) of Dodd-Frank 
defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual 
who provides ... information relating to a 
violation of the securities laws to the 
Commission.” However, Dodd-Frank’s anti-
retaliation provisions, specifically Section 
21F(h)(1)(A)(iii), prohibit retaliation against 
“whistleblowers” who make disclosures that 
are required or protected under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the Securities Exchange Act and 
“any other law, rule or regulation subject to 
the jurisdiction of the [SEC],” which, under 
certain circumstances, would include only 
internal reports. It is no surprise that the 
arguably confusing statutory provisions have 
caused the SEC to adopt rules clarifying its 
position and have resulted in opposing 
judicial opinions in multiple circuit courts. 
The SEC’s Strong Record in Favor of 
Broad Whistleblower Protection 
The SEC’s position on the issue has been 
well-documented through agency rule-
making, as well as in numerous amicus briefs 
filed in federal cases across the country since 
the implementation of Dodd-Frank. From a 
policy perspective, the SEC believes that 
internal company reporting by employees is 
essential in order to deter, detect and halt 
unlawful conduct that may harm investors. 
To that end, the SEC views the Dodd-Frank 
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anti-retaliation provisions as a welcome 
supplement to the existing securities-law 
enforcement regime because the provisions 
encourage robust compliance programs and 
internal investigations of whistleblower 
reports. 
Thus, the SEC has supported broad 
whistleblower protection in the face of legal 
challenges and has taken all steps available to 
encourage reporting and prohibit 
retaliation.[1] In May 2011, the SEC issued 
regulations providing that internal 
whistleblowers are protected from retaliation 
under Dodd-Frank, even if they report only to 
their employers and not to the SEC.[2] The 
SEC accomplished this by promulgating two 
separate definitions of the word 
“whistleblower” — one that applies to 
whistleblower awards and confidentiality 
provisions and one that applies for purposes 
of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation protections. 
Just over four years later, in August 2015, the 
SEC issued an “interpretive rule” reaffirming 
its view that individuals who have not 
reported to the SEC are protected from 
retaliation by an employer.[3] 
The SEC has been very active in litigation 
pertaining to this issue in federal district and 
appellate courts across the country.[4] The 
SEC’s amicus briefs filed in these cases have 
asked courts to rely on the agency’s adopted 
regulations prohibiting employers from 
retaliating against “individuals who report to 
persons or governmental authorities other 
than the Commission,” including employees 
who make “the disclosures that are required 
or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act” 
or other securities laws.[5] In October 2016, 
Jane Norberg, chief of the SEC’s Office of 
the Whistleblower, reiterated the SEC’s 
position that it is “committed to protecting 
whistleblowers from retaliation and will 
continue to file briefs as appropriate in 
support of whistleblower protection.” 
Moreover, in 2016 the SEC initiated its own 
litigation to enforce whistleblower 
protection, bringing its first stand-alone 
enforcement action against a company for 
unlawful retaliation without an underlying 
securities violation,[6] as well as 
enforcement actions based solely on 
restrictive language contained in companies’ 
standard separation agreements, and not 
relating to the underlying allegations reported 
by a whistleblower.[7] 
Under the SEC’s formal whistleblower 
program, created as part of Dodd-Frank, an 
individual who provides the SEC with 
original information leading to an 
enforcement action that results in over $1 
million in monetary sanctions is eligible to 
receive an award of 10 percent to 30 percent 
of the amount collected. The whistleblower 
program encourages internal reporting of 
possible violations by offering additional 
economic incentives to do so in the first 
instance.[8] Based on the success of the 
whistleblower program, the SEC has a vested 
interest in expanding protections for those 
individuals who choose to report possible 
misconduct, whether they choose to do so 
internally or directly to the SEC.[9] 
On the other hand, many companies facing 
legal action for alleged retaliation have 
vehemently opposed the SEC’s position and 
argued against extending whistleblower 
protections to non-SEC reports, hoping to 
eliminate a potential cause of action that 
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could be asserted by terminated employees. 
In response to the SEC’s concerns, 
companies have argued that Congress has 
taken clear and effective action to address 
potential abuse of whistleblowers through the 
plain language of Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-
Oxley. Thus, companies insist that 
whistleblower qualification under Dodd-
Frank requires more than merely performing 
existing job duties, which for many 
employees includes assessing compliance 
with the law and reporting issues internally. 
Companies may also have a valid interest in 
protecting their right to make reasonable 
employment decisions based on false reports 
made in bad faith, or for legitimate alternative 
business reasons, without fear of a retaliation 
lawsuit. 
Federal Circuit Split — Conflicting 
Interpretations of Whistleblower 
Protection 
The recent Ninth Circuit ruling (discussed 
above and below) followed two prominent 
conflicting decisions in other federal circuit 
courts. In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) LLC, 
the Fifth Circuit was the first to consider the 
issue and held that whistleblowers who did 
not report to the SEC had no claim for 
retaliation against their employers under 
Dodd-Frank.[10] The court chose to “start 
and end [its] analysis with the text of the 
relevant statute,” holding that the definition 
of “whistleblower” must be applied 
consistently throughout the statute, thereby 
requiring whistleblowers to report to the SEC 
in order to become eligible for anti-retaliation 
protection.[11] The Fifth Circuit found that 
the relevant statutory provisions were not 
inconsistent when applied to an employee 
who complained to both the SEC and his or 
her employer, as such employee would 
qualify as a “whistleblower” under the 
statutory definition and therefore would be 
entitled to protection from retaliation. The 
Fifth Circuit pointed out that if a 
whistleblower qualified for retaliation 
protection under Dodd-Frank based on the 
individual’s qualification as a whistleblower 
under Sarbanes-Oxley, such a result would 
effectively moot Sarbanes-Oxley’s distinct 
protections.[12] 
The Second Circuit rejected this analysis in 
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC and found that 
non-SEC reporting whistleblowers are 
entitled to protection from employer 
retaliation.[13] The court found Dodd-
Frank’s definition of whistleblower 
inconsistent with its anti-retaliation 
provisions, and it therefore applied Chevron 
deference to the SEC’s regulations 
interpreting the statute.[14] The Second 
Circuit noted that the Dodd-Frank anti-
retaliation provisions would be narrowed to 
the point of absurdity if SEC reporting were 
a requirement for protection. In such a 
scenario, the only protected individuals 
would be those who reported possible 
securities violations both internally and to the 
SEC and were then fired solely on the basis 
of the internal report.[15] Despite the circuit 
split caused by the Second Circuit’s opinion, 
the defendants in Berman did not seek 
Supreme Court review of the decision. 
Ninth Circuit’s Recent Ruling Widens the 
Circuit Split 
More recently, in Somers v. Digital Realty 
Trust Inc., the Ninth Circuit affirmed a 
district court ruling that a former employee 
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was entitled to sue his former employer over 
his termination after he reported suspected 
securities law violations to his employer but 
not to the SEC.[16] The Ninth Circuit panel 
majority found that Dodd-Frank 
“unambiguously and expressly protects from 
retaliation all those who report to the SEC 
and who report internally,” and it reasoned 
that requiring a whistleblower to have 
reported to the SEC in order to benefit from 
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions 
would unjustly limit the intended protections 
for whistleblowers and would “make little 
practical sense.”[17] The court expressed 
concern that such a requirement may provide 
an incentive for companies to immediately 
terminate complaining employees in the 
hopes that they have not yet shared their 
concerns with the agency, thereby avoiding a 
potential retaliation claim. The court 
recognized that since certain of Sarbanes-
Oxley’s provisions require internal reporting 
before external reporting for certain 
individuals, failing to protect internal 
reporters “would result in early retaliation 
before the information could reach the 
regulators.”[18] The court expressly agreed 
with the Second Circuit’s reasoning in 
Berman, including that the SEC’s regulations 
are entitled to deference and that the SEC’s 
position “correctly reflects congressional 
intent to provide protection for those who 
make internal disclosures as well as to those 
who make disclosures to the SEC.”[19] 
The dissent simply stated that the statute’s 
definition of whistleblower should be applied 
consistently throughout the statute, in 
accordance with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in 
Asadi. The dissent also took issue with the 
majority’s reliance on a 2015 Supreme Court 
decision in King v. Burwell,[20] which found 
that a defined statutory term could be 
interpreted differently depending on the 
context of different statutory sections. 
The scope of Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
protection has been presented in at least two 
other courts of appeals. As discussed above, 
the Supreme Court recently declined to 
review the Verble case out of the Sixth 
Circuit, which had sidestepped the issue by 
finding that a potential whistleblower’s 
claims were too vague.[21] The issue is also 
presented for decision in a case currently 
pending in the Third Circuit.[22] 
Expanded Whistleblower Protection — 
Ripe for Repeal or Reversal? 
Given the present uncertainty in the law, it is 
not readily apparent how the change in 
administration may affect the SEC’s well-
defined position on whistleblower protection, 
if at all. The SEC may prefer the status quo, 
since encouraging and protecting internal 
reporters from retaliation may allow 
companies to investigate issues internally and 
potentially minimize SEC inquiries resulting 
from whistleblower reports. On the other 
hand, the anti-retaliation provisions may be 
subject to scrutiny given that President 
Donald J. Trump and congressional 
Republicans have pledged to roll back many 
Dodd-Frank regulations, although President 
Trump’s nominee for SEC chair, Walter 
“Jay” Clayton, revealed at his confirmation 
hearing that he would have no immediate 
plans to broadly attack Dodd-Frank’s 
mandates if he is confirmed. In addition, the 
new administration may prefer that anti-
retaliation provisions not be extended to 
employees who do not report to the SEC if 
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that is viewed as imposing a greater burden 
on employers. 
On the enforcement front, many 
commentators have noted that SEC chair 
nominee Clayton, a partner at a New York 
law firm who has not held any government 
position, may not be as aggressive as recent 
former federal prosecutors who served as 
chair, which could result in fewer 
enforcement actions to protect 
whistleblowers. Others have been outspoken 
in their criticism of the SEC’s current stance 
— and of Dodd-Frank itself — including 
Paul Atkins, a former SEC commissioner and 
adviser to President Trump, who has argued 
in favor of requiring whistleblowers to report 
internally before going to the SEC. Exactly 
how the new administration and SEC 
leadership will view Dodd-Frank’s 
whistleblower protections and the SEC’s 
well-documented position on the issue 
remains to be seen. 
Irrespective of the possible legislative and 
executive developments, it is likely that anti-
retaliation provisions will continue to face 
significant scrutiny in the courts. If the issue 
is squarely presented and the Supreme Court 
weighs in on the circuit split, President 
Trump’s selected Supreme Court nominee, 
Judge Neil Gorsuch, could take part in 
deciding the issue if he is confirmed. Given 
his well-documented history as an originalist 
and textualist, and as a skeptic of deference 
to agencies, Judge Gorsuch, if confirmed, 
may be inclined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach in Asadi, strictly applying Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblower definition rather than 
looking to the SEC’s interpretation of the 
provisions and its asserted entitlement to 
deference to its own rule-making. Thus, 
should the SEC choose to maintain the status 
quo on the regulatory front, the Supreme 
Court’s resolution of the circuit split may 
result in a rollback of protections for non-
SEC reporting whistleblowers nonetheless. 
Even if the Supreme Court chooses to limit 
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions to 
SEC reports, it is unclear how much 
employers stand to gain. If an employee is 
required to report to the SEC prior to 
termination in order to later bring a retaliation 
claim against an employer, companies may 
face increased regulatory scrutiny as a result. 
Additional SEC investigations of 
whistleblower reports may occur before 
companies are able to fully investigate the 
reported misconduct themselves. Moreover, 
even if the whistleblowers do not report to the 
SEC, employees who report internally could 
continue to seek recourse from retaliation 
under Sarbanes-Oxley. Employers will 
continue to be obligated to investigate 
whistleblower allegations and to provide an 
independent basis for terminating any 
whistleblowers, lest it appear to regulators 
that steps were taken to conceal misconduct. 
Under the circumstances, a potential lawsuit 
by a former employee may not be the most 
distressing of the risks facing companies that 
receive a whistleblower complaint. 
No matter what happens, whistleblower 
protection is not an issue employers can 
afford to take lightly. Companies should not 
discount the importance of effective 
whistleblower reporting infrastructure and 
anti-retaliation training. This is particularly 
important in the Second Circuit and Ninth 
Circuit, where employers are more likely to 
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be sued by terminated employees who report 
internally without going to the SEC. 
Companies should continue to retain 
experienced outside counsel to investigate 
whistleblower claims as soon as a report is 
received. Companies contemplating the 
termination of an employee who may be 
considered a whistleblower should involve 
outside counsel in that process and should 
work to ensure that any termination is well-
documented. If a company discovers that a 
whistleblower claim has merit, it should 
consult with outside counsel regarding how 
best to remediate the misconduct and to 
consider whether a self-report to the SEC is 
warranted. In any event, however a 
whistleblower chooses to report potential 
misconduct, a company’s response may be 
subject to scrutiny by the government or the 
courts. 
The opinions expressed are those of the 
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the firm, its clients, or Portfolio 
Media Inc., or any of its or their respective 
affiliates. This article is for general 
information purposes and is not intended to 
be and should not be taken as legal advice. 
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“Supreme Court To Consider The Scope Of Dodd-Frank Whistleblower 
Provisions” 
 
Lexology 
July 6, 2017 
 
On June 26, 2017, the United States Supreme 
Court granted the petition for certiorari of 
Digital Realty Trust Inc. (“Digital Realty”) to 
consider whether the anti-retaliation 
provision for whistleblowers in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) 
extends to individuals who have not reported 
alleged misconduct to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and thus 
arguably fall outside Dodd-Frank’s definition 
of a “whistleblower.” In March, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
ruled, in a 2-1 decision, that the term 
“whistleblower” extends protection to 
employees making internal disclosures of 
alleged unlawful activity, and does not limit 
protection under Dodd-Frank to employees 
reporting potential violations to the SEC. The 
Ninth Circuit’s decision widened an existing 
split between the Second and Fifth Circuits, 
making the issue ripe for review. 
I. Background 
Respondent, Paul Somers, was employed by 
Petitioner, Digital Realty, from 2010 to 2014. 
During that time, Somers made reports to 
senior management alleging federal 
securities laws violations by Digital Realty. 
Shortly after he raised these concerns 
internally, and before he made any report to 
the SEC, Digital Realty terminated Somers’ 
employment. Following his firing, Somers 
sued Digital Realty, alleging violations of 
various state and federal laws, including 
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), which contains 
anti-retaliation provisions added by Dodd-
Frank. 
At the district court level, Digital Realty 
moved to dismiss the retaliation claim on the 
ground that Somers was not a 
“whistleblower” entitled to Dodd-Frank’s 
protections because he merely reported 
possible violations internally and not to the 
SEC. The district court denied Digital 
Realty’s motion to dismiss holding that 
individuals who report internally are 
protected from retaliation under Dodd-Frank. 
Digital Realty appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
II. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision 
The Ninth Circuit panel began its discussion 
by acknowledging the split between the 
Second and Fifth Circuits. The Fifth Circuit 
held in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C. 
that Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision 
requires a whistleblower to make a report to 
the SEC in order to be covered, rejecting the 
SEC’s regulation adopting a contrary 
interpretation. The Second Circuit held in 
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC that the 
provision extends protections to all those 
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who make disclosures of suspected 
violations, whether the disclosures are made 
internally or to the SEC. 
Next, the court chronicled the contours of a 
robust twenty-first century financial 
regulatory framework it described as created 
specifically to curb securities abuses. To 
frame the case against this regulatory 
backdrop, the court focused on provisions of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) including 
internal reporting requirements for lawyers, 
requirements for anonymous reporting 
avenues within corporate compliance 
regimes, and most importantly, 
whistleblower protections for employees. 
The court acknowledged SOX’s express 
protections of those who lawfully provide 
information to federal agencies, Congress, or 
“a person with supervisory authority over the 
employee.” With respect to Dodd-Frank, the 
court reasoned that, like SOX, the legislation 
was passed in the wake of a financial scandal 
with the primary aims of improving 
accountability and transparency in the 
financial system, and protecting consumers 
from abusive financial practices. 
As the court observed, Dodd-Frank created 
incentives and protections for whistleblowers 
by adding Section 21F to the Exchange Act. 
Unlike SOX, however, Section 21F defines a 
whistleblower as “any individual who 
provides . . . information relating to a 
violation of the securities laws to the [SEC], 
in a manner established, by rule or regulation, 
by the [SEC].” On its face, this definition 
describes a whistleblower as a person who 
reports information directly to the SEC. The 
issue in Somers arises out of a later 
subsection of Section 21F – specifically 
subdivision (iii) – wherein whistleblower 
protection extends to individuals who make 
any “required or protected” disclosure under 
SOX and all other relevant laws. Subdivision 
(iii) was added after the bill went through 
Committee, so there is no meaningful 
legislative history on it. 
Although legislative history is not helpful, 
the Ninth Circuit found that the language of 
subdivision (iii) “illuminates congressional 
intent.” The Ninth Circuit found that, by 
incorporating SOX’s disclosure requirements 
and protections through subdivision (iii), 
Congress meant for Dodd-Frank to bar 
retaliation against an employee of a public 
company who “provide[s] information . . . to 
a person with supervisory authority over the 
employee.” Citing a similar analysis from the 
Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit drew 
attention to the “absurdities” potentially 
created by a different interpretation, 
explaining that, “if subdivision (iii) requires 
reporting to the [SEC], its express cross-
reference to the provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley would afford an auditor almost no 
Dodd-Frank protection for retaliation 
because the auditor must await a company 
response to internal reporting before 
reporting to the [SEC], and any retaliation 
would almost always precede [SEC] 
reporting.” Even though Dodd-Frank’s 
definition of “whistleblowers” is limited to 
those persons who report to the SEC, the 
Ninth Circuit posited that terms can have 
different operative consequences in different 
contexts, and therefore was comfortable 
accepting that the term “may mean a different 
thing in a different part, depending on 
context.” The court stated that interpreting 
the word “whistleblower” to incorporate the 
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earlier, narrower definition of the Exchange 
Act would “make little practical sense” and 
“undercut congressional intent.” Citing again 
to the Second Circuit’s similar reasoning in 
Berman, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a 
strict application of Dodd-Frank’s definition 
“would, in effect, all but read subdivision (iii) 
out of the statute.” 
Furthermore, unlike the Fifth Circuit in 
Asadi, the court accorded deference to the 
SEC rules adopted in 2011 that contain the 
more expansive definition of 
“whistleblower” and found that those rules 
reflected Congressional intent to provide 
broad whistleblower protection. With those 
bases, the court held that any employee who 
takes any action described in subdivisions (i), 
(ii), or (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision – 
including, by reference to SOX, reporting “to 
a person with supervisory authority over the 
employee” – is entitled to protection as a 
whistleblower. The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the interpretation accurately reflects 
Congressional intent that Dodd-Frank 
protects employees “whether they blow the 
whistle internally” or report directly to the 
SEC. 
III. Digital Realty’s Petition to the 
Supreme Court 
On April 25, 2017, Digital Realty filed a 
petition of certiorari for review of the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision. Digital Realty argued that 
the Supreme Court should grant the petition 
because the “case presents a straightforward 
conflict among the courts of appeals on an 
important and recurring question involving 
the interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act” 
that “cries out for the Court’s review.” In his 
response, Somers argued that the case does 
not warrant further review because “the 
circuit conflict is shallow and may ultimately 
resolve itself.” Somers stated that “the SEC 
did not participate in the Fifth Circuit (but did 
in the [Second and Ninth Circuits]), so there 
is no split at all in cases directly involving the 
agency tasked with enforcing the statute.” 
Additionally, he stated that there “is good 
reason to believe the Fifth Circuit will 
reconsider its position, especially if 
additional circuits continue lining up against 
it.” The Supreme Court granted Digital 
Realty’s petition on June 26, 2017, and will 
hear the case during the October term. A date 
for oral argument  has not been set.
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“9th Circ. Says Dodd-Frank Protects Non-SEC Whistleblowers” 
 
Law360 
Carmen Germaine 
March 8, 2017 
 
A divided Ninth Circuit panel ruled 
Wednesday that the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-
retaliation protections extend to 
whistleblowers who haven’t reported to the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
widening a circuit split and affirming that a 
former Digital Realty Trust Inc. employee 
can sue over his termination. 
The Ninth Circuit opinion widens a circuit 
split between the Fifth Circuit and the 
Second Circuit over how the Dodd-Frank 
Act defines a "whistleblower." (AP) 
A split three-judge panel affirmed U.S. 
District Judge Edward M. Chen’s decision 
denying Digital Realty’s bid to dismiss 
former Vice President of Portfolio 
Management Paul Somers’ claims that the 
technology-related real estate investment 
trust discriminated against him for being 
openly gay and then fired him in retaliation 
for his complaints about a supervisor’s 
actions. 
While the panel noted that an earlier section 
of the Dodd-Frank Act defines a 
“whistleblower” as someone who reports to 
the SEC, the judges said using that 
definition in the act’s later anti-retaliation 
provisions and effectively limiting 
protections to employees who have already 
reported to the government would “make 
little practical sense and undercut 
congressional intent.” 
“DFA’s anti-retaliation provision 
unambiguously and expressly protects from 
retaliation all those who report to the SEC 
and who report internally,” Judge Mary M. 
Schroeder wrote for the panel. “Its terms 
should be enforced.” 
Judge John B. Owens wrote a brief dissent 
saying he would agree with the Fifth Circuit 
that the anti-retaliation subdivision should 
be read using the same definition of 
whistleblower outlined earlier in the statute. 
The opinion widens a circuit split between 
the Fifth Circuit, which held in 2013 in its 
Asadi case that only those who report to the 
SEC are whistleblowers, and the Second 
Circuit, which ruled in 2015 that the 
retaliation provision was ambiguous and that 
courts must defer to the SEC’s guidance. 
The Sixth Circuit considered similar issues 
in an appeal brought by a former Morgan 
Stanley employee but dodged the question 
after ruling that his claims were too vague to 
afford him whistleblower protections; the 
employee has since filed a petition for U.S. 
Supreme Court review. Meanwhile, the 
Third Circuit is also weighing the issue in an 
appeal brought by a former in-house tax 
attorney for Vanguard Group Inc. 
103 
  
Somers brought his case in November 2014, 
alleging that he was discriminated against as 
an openly gay man while employed at 
Digital Realty from July 2010 to April 2014, 
despite successful performance, and 
ultimately terminated based on “vague, 
trivial and false allegations of misconduct” 
after he complained to senior management 
that a senior vice president had eliminated 
some internal corporate controls in 
violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Judge 
Chen denied Digital Realty’s motion to 
dismiss the suit in May 2015. 
The anti-retaliation provision in question, 
subdivision (iii) of Section 21F of Dodd-
Frank, prohibits employers from discharging 
or discriminating against a whistleblower 
who makes disclosures that are required or 
protected by Sarbanes-Oxley. 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the provision 
was added after Dodd-Frank had gone 
through committee and has no legislative 
history explaining its purpose. But the panel 
said the incorporation of Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
disclosure requirements made it clear that 
the provision was intended to bar retaliation 
against employees of public companies who 
report violations “to the boss.” 
Using the narrower definition of 
whistleblower outlined earlier in Dodd-
Frank would effectively narrow subdivision 
(iii) “to the point of absurdity,” the panel 
wrote, because under that reading the 
provision would only protect employees 
who have reported both internally and to the 
SEC but are fired solely because of the 
internal report. 
“This reading is illogical,” Judge Schroeder 
wrote. “Employees are not likely to report in 
both ways, but are far more likely to choose 
reporting either to the SEC or reporting 
internally.” 
In so holding, the panel relied on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in King v. 
Burwell, which upheld the Affordable Care 
Act’s grant of tax credits to individuals in all 
states after finding language defined one 
way in another section of the statute could 
be read to have a different meaning in the 
challenged clause, depending on the context. 
Judge Owens wrote a paragraph dissent 
disagreeing with the majority’s reliance on 
King v. Burwell. 
“In my view, we should quarantine King and 
its potentially dangerous shapeshifting 
nature to the specific facts of that case to 
avoid jurisprudential disruption on a cellular 
level,” Judge Owens wrote, citing John 
Carpenter’s 1982 film “The Thing.” 
Circuit Judges Mary M. Schroeder, John B. 
Owens and Kim McLane Wardlaw sat on 
the panel for the Ninth Circuit. 
Representatives for Somers and Digital 
Realty Trust did not immediately respond to 
requests for comment. 
Somers is represented by Stephen F. Henry. 
Digital Realty Trust is represented by Brian 
T. Ashe, Tamara H. Fisher, Kiran A. Seldon 
and Kyle A. Petersen of Seyfarth Shaw LLP. 
The SEC is represented by Stephen G. 
Yoder, Anne K. Small, Sanket J. Bulsara, 
Michael A. Conley and Thomas J. Karr. 
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The case is Paul Somers v. Digital Realty 
Trust Inc. et al., case number 15-17352, in 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. 
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Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association 
16-476 
Ruling Below: National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 
389, 391 (C.A.3 (N.J.), 2016) 
Professional and amateur sports leagues brought action to enjoin New Jersey from giving effect 
to law partially repealing state's prohibitions against sports wagering. The United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, Michael A. Shipp, J., finding that state's law violated 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), entered summary judgment in 
leagues' favor and issued permanent injunction. State appealed. The Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, Rendell, Circuit Judge, affirmed. 
Question Presented: Whether a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law 
prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeers the regulatory power of states in 
contravention of New York v. United States. 
 
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated assoc 
iation; National Basketball Association, a joint venture; National Football League, an 
unincorporated association; National Hockey League, an unincorporated association; 
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, an unincorporated association doing business as 
Major League Baseball 
v. 
GOVERNOR OF the State of NEW JERSEY; David L. Rebuck, Director of the New 
Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement and Assistant Attorney General of the State of 
New Jersey; Frank Zanzuccki, Executive Director of the New Jersey Racing Commission; 
New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's Association, Inc; New Jersey Sports & Exposition 
Authority 
Stephen M. Sweeney, President of the New Jersey Senate; Vincent Prieto, Speaker of the 
New Jersey General Assembly (Intervenors in District Court), Appellants in 14-4568 
Governor of New Jersey; David L. Rebuck; Frank Zanzuccki, Appellants in 14-4546 
New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's Association, Inc., Appellant in 14-4569 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit 
Decided on August 9, 2016 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
The issue presented before the en banc court 
is whether SB 2460, which the New Jersey 
Legislature enacted in 2014 to partially 
repeal certain prohibitions on sports 
gambling (the “2014 Law”), violates federal 
law. The District Court held that the 2014 
Law violates the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”). A panel of 
this Court affirmed this ruling in a divided 
opinion which was subsequently vacated 
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upon the grant of the Petition for Rehearing 
en banc. We now hold that the District Court 
correctly ruled that because PASPA, by its 
terms, prohibits states from authorizing by 
law sports gambling, and because the 2014 
Law does exactly that, the 2014 Law violates 
federal law. We also hold that we correctly 
ruled in Christie I that PASPA does not 
commandeer the states in a way that runs 
afoul of the Constitution. 
 
I. Background 
 
Congress passed PASPA in 1992 to prohibit 
state-sanctioned sports gambling. PASPA 
provides: 
 
It shall be unlawful for— 
 
(1) a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, 
advertise, promote, license, or authorize by 
law or compact, or 
 
(2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or 
promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a 
governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, 
or other betting, gambling, or wagering 
scheme based ... on one or more competitive 
games in which amateur or professional 
athletes participate, or are intended to 
participate, or on one or more performances 
of such athletes in such games. 
 
PASPA defines “governmental entity” to 
include states and their political subdivisions. 
It includes a remedial provision that permits 
any sports league whose games are or will be 
the subject of sports gambling to bring an 
action to enjoin the gambling.  
 
Congress included in PASPA exceptions for 
state-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada 
and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware, 
and also an exception for New Jersey but only 
if New Jersey were to enact a sports gambling 
scheme within one year of PASPA's 
enactment. New Jersey did not do so, and 
thus the PASPA exception expired. Notably, 
sports gambling was prohibited in New 
Jersey for many years by statute and by the 
New Jersey Constitution. In 2010, however, 
the New Jersey Legislature held public 
hearings on the advisability of allowing 
sports gambling. These hearings included 
testimony that sports gambling would 
generate revenues for New Jersey's 
struggling casinos and racetracks. In 2011, 
the Legislature held a referendum asking 
New Jersey voters whether sports gambling 
should be permitted, and sixty-four percent 
voted in favor of amending the New Jersey 
Constitution to permit sports gambling. The 
constitutional amendment provided: 
 
    It shall also be lawful for the Legislature to 
authorize by law wagering at casinos or 
gambling houses in Atlantic City on the 
results of any professional, college, or 
amateur sport or athletic event, except that 
wagering shall not be permitted on a college 
sport or athletic event that takes place in New 
Jersey or on a sport or athletic event in which 
any New Jersey college team participates 
regardless of where the event takes place.... 
 
The amendment thus permitted the New 
Jersey Legislature to “authorize by law” 
sports “wagering at casinos or gambling 
houses in Atlantic City,” except that 
wagering was not permitted on New Jersey 
college teams or on any collegiate event 
occurring in New Jersey. An additional 
section of the amendment permitted the 
Legislature to “authorize by law” sports 
“wagering at current or former running and 
harness horse racetracks,” subject to the same 
restrictions regarding New Jersey college 
teams and collegiate events occurring in New 
Jersey.  
 
After voters approved the sports-wagering 
constitutional amendment, the New Jersey 
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Legislature enacted the Sports Wagering Act 
in 2012 (“2012 Law”), which provided for 
regulated sports wagering at New Jersey's 
casinos and racetracks. The 2012 Law 
established a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme, requiring licenses for operators and 
individual employees, extensive 
documentation, minimum cash reserves, and 
Division of Gaming Enforcement access to 
security and surveillance systems. 
 
Five sports leagues1 sued to enjoin the 2012 
Law as violative of PASPA. The New Jersey 
Parties did not dispute that the 2012 Law 
violated PASPA, but urged instead that 
PASPA was unconstitutional under the anti-
commandeering doctrine. The District Court 
held that PASPA was constitutional and 
enjoined implementation of the 2012 Law. 
The New Jersey Parties appealed, and we 
affirmed in National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n v. Governor of New Jersey (Christie I). 
 
In Christie I, we rejected the New Jersey 
Parties' argument that PASPA was 
unconstitutional by commandeering New 
Jersey's legislative process. In doing so, we 
stated that “[n]othing in [PASPA's] words 
requires that the states keep any law in place. 
All that is prohibited is the issuance of 
gambling ‘license [s]’ or the affirmative 
‘authoriz[ation] by law’ of gambling 
schemes.” The New Jersey Parties had urged 
that PASPA commandeered the state because 
it prohibited the repeal of New Jersey's 
prohibitions on sports gambling; they 
reasoned that repealing a statute barring an 
activity would be equivalent to authorizing 
the activity, and “authorizing” was not 
allowed by PASPA. We rejected that 
argument, observing that “PASPA speaks 
only of ‘authorizing by law’ a sports 
gambling scheme,” and “[w]e [did] not see 
how having no law in place governing sports 
wagering is the same as authorizing it by 
law.” We further emphasized that “the lack of 
an affirmative prohibition of an activity does 
not mean it is affirmatively authorized by 
law. The right to do that which is not 
prohibited derives not from the authority of 
the state but from the inherent rights of the 
people.” In short, we concluded that the New 
Jersey Parties' argument rested on a “false 
equivalence between repeal and 
authorization.” The New Jersey Parties 
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, which denied certiorari. 
 
Undeterred, in 2014, the Legislature passed 
the 2014 Law, SB 2460, which provided in 
part: 
 
    [A]ny rules and regulations that may 
require or authorize any State agency to 
license, authorize, permit or otherwise take 
action to allow any person to engage in the 
placement or acceptance of any wager on any 
professional, collegiate, or amateur sport 
contest or athletic event, or that prohibit 
participation in or operation of a pool that 
accepts such wagers, are repealed to the 
extent they apply or may be construed to 
apply at a casino or gambling house operating 
in this State in Atlantic City or a running or 
harness horse racetrack in this State, to the 
placement and acceptance of wagers on 
professional, collegiate, or amateur sport 
contests or athletic events.... 
 
The 2014 Law specifically prohibited 
wagering on New Jersey college teams' 
competitions and on any collegiate 
competition occurring in New Jersey, and it 
limited sports wagering to “persons 21 years 
of age or older situated at such location[s],” 
namely casinos and racetracks. 
 
II. Procedural History and Parties' 
Arguments 
 
The Leagues filed suit to enjoin the New 
Jersey Parties from giving effect to the 2014 
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Law. The District Court held that the 2014 
Law violates PASPA, granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Leagues, and issued 
a permanent injunction against the Governor 
of New Jersey, the Director of the New Jersey 
Division of Gaming Enforcement, and the 
Executive Director of the New Jersey Racing 
Commission (collectively, the “New Jersey 
Enjoined Parties”). The District Court 
interpreted Christie I as holding that PASPA 
offers two choices to states: maintaining 
prohibitions on sports gambling or 
completely repealing them. It reasoned that 
the 2014 Law runs afoul of PASPA because 
the 2014 Law is a partial repeal that 
necessarily results in sports wagering with 
the State's imprimatur. The New Jersey 
Parties appealed. 
 
On appeal, the New Jersey Parties argue that 
the 2014 Law does not constitute an 
authorization in violation of PASPA and it is 
consistent with Christie I because the New 
Jersey Legislature effected a repealer as 
Christie I specifically permitted. 
 
The Leagues urge that the 2014 Law violates 
PASPA because it “authorizes by law” sports 
wagering and also impermissibly “licenses” 
the activity by confining the repeal of 
gambling prohibitions to licensed gambling 
facilities and thus, in effect, enlarging the 
terms of existing gaming licenses. The 
United States submitted an amicus brief in 
support of the Leagues. 
 
A panel of this Court affirmed in a divided 
opinion, which was subsequently vacated. 
Because we, sitting en banc, essentially agree 
with the reasoning of the panel majority's 
opinion, we incorporate much of it verbatim 
in this opinion. 
 
III. Analysis 
 
A. The 2014 Law Violates PASPA 
 
As a preliminary matter, we acknowledge the 
2014 Law's salutary purpose in attempting to 
legalize sports gambling to revive its troubled 
casino and racetrack industries. The New 
Jersey Assembly Gaming and Tourism 
Committee chairman stated, in regard to the 
2014 Law, that “[w]e want to give the 
racetracks a shot in the arm. We want to help 
Atlantic City. We want to do something for 
the gaming business in the state of New 
Jersey, which has been under tremendous 
duress....” New Jersey State Senator Ray 
Lesniak, a sponsor of the law, has likewise 
stated that “[s]ports betting will be a lifeline 
to the casinos, putting people to work and 
generating economic activity in a growth 
industry.” And New Jersey State Senator 
Joseph Kyrillos stated that “New Jersey's 
continued prohibition on sports betting at our 
casinos and racetracks is contrary to our 
interest of supporting employers that provide 
tens of thousands of jobs and add billions to 
our state's economy” and that “[s]ports 
betting will help set New Jersey's wagering 
facilities apart from the competition and 
strengthen Monmouth Park and our 
struggling casino industry.” PASPA has 
clearly stymied New Jersey's attempts to 
revive its casinos and racetracks and provide 
jobs for its workforce. 
 
Moreover, PASPA is not without its critics, 
even aside from its economic impact. It has 
been criticized for prohibiting an activity, 
i.e., sports gambling, that its critics view as 
neither immoral nor dangerous. It has also 
been criticized for encouraging the spread of 
illegal sports gambling and for making it 
easier to fix games, since it precludes the 
transparency that accompanies legal 
activities. Simply put, “[w]e are cognizant 
that certain questions related to this case—
whether gambling on sporting events is 
harmful to the games' integrity and whether 
states should be permitted to license and 
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profit from the activity—engender strong 
views.” While PASPA's provisions and its 
reach are controversial (and, some might say, 
unwise), “we are not asked to judge the 
wisdom of PASPA” and “[i]t is not our place 
to usurp Congress' role simply because 
PASPA may have become an unpopular 
law.” We echo Christie I in noting that “New 
Jersey and any other state that may wish to 
legalize gambling on sports ... are not left 
without redress. Just as PASPA once gave 
New Jersey preferential treatment in the 
context of gambling on sports, Congress may 
again choose to do so or ... may choose to 
undo PASPA altogether.” Unless that 
happens, however, we are duty-bound to 
interpret the text of the law as Congress wrote 
it. 
 
We now turn to the primary question before 
us: whether the 2014 Law violates PASPA. 
We hold that it does. Under PASPA, it shall 
be unlawful for “a governmental entity to 
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, 
or authorize by law or compact” sports 
gambling. We conclude that the 2014 Law 
violates PASPA because it authorizes by law 
sports gambling. 
 
First, the 2014 Law authorizes casinos and 
racetracks to operate sports gambling while 
other laws prohibit sports gambling by all 
other entities. Without the 2014 Law, the 
sports gambling prohibitions would apply to 
casinos and racetracks. Appellants urge that 
the 2014 Law does not provide authority for 
sports gambling because we previously held 
that “[t]he right to do that which is not 
prohibited derives not from the authority of 
the state but from the inherent rights of the 
people” and that “[w]e do not see how having 
no law in place governing sports wagering is 
the same as authorizing it by law.” But this is 
not a situation where there are no laws 
governing sports gambling in New Jersey. 
Absent the 2014 Law, New Jersey's myriad 
laws prohibiting sports gambling would 
apply to the casinos and racetracks. Thus, the 
2014 Law provides the authorization for 
conduct that is otherwise clearly and 
completely legally prohibited. 
 
Second, the 2014 Law authorizes sports 
gambling by selectively dictating where 
sports gambling may occur, who may place 
bets in such gambling, and which athletic 
contests are permissible subjects for such 
gambling. Under the 2014 Law, New Jersey's 
sports gambling prohibitions are specifically 
removed from casinos, gambling houses, and 
horse racetracks as long as the bettors are 
people age 21 or over, and as long as there are 
no bets on either New Jersey college teams or 
collegiate competitions occurring in New 
Jersey. The word “authorize” means, inter 
alia, “[t]o empower; to give a right or 
authority to act,” or “[t]o permit a thing to be 
done in the future.” The 2014 Law allows 
casinos and racetracks and their patrons to 
engage, under enumerated circumstances, in 
conduct that other businesses and their 
patrons cannot do. That selectiveness 
constitutes specific permission and 
empowerment. 
 
Appellants urge that because the 2014 Law is 
only a “repeal” removing prohibitions against 
sports gambling, it is not an “affirmative 
authorization” under Christie I. To the extent 
that in Christie I we took the position that a 
repeal cannot constitute an authorization, we 
now reject that reasoning. Moreover, we do 
not adopt the District Court's view that the 
options available to a state are limited to two. 
Neither of these propositions were necessary 
to their respective rulings and were, in 
essence, dicta. Furthermore, our discussion 
of partial versus total repeals is similarly 
unnecessary to determining the 2014 Law's 
legality because the question presented here 
is straightforward—i.e., what does the law 
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do—and does not turn on the way in which 
the state has enacted its directive. 
 
The presence of the word “repeal” does not 
prevent us from examining what the 
provision actually does, and the Legislature's 
use of the term does not change that the 2014 
Law selectively grants permission to certain 
entities to engage in sports gambling. New 
Jersey's sports gambling prohibitions remain, 
and no one may engage in such conduct 
except those singled out in the 2014 Law. 
While artfully couched in terms of a repealer, 
the 2014 Law essentially provides that, 
notwithstanding any other prohibition by 
law, casinos and racetracks shall hereafter be 
permitted to have sports gambling. This is an 
authorization. 
 
Third, the exception in PASPA for New 
Jersey, which the State did not take 
advantage of before the one-year time limit 
expired, is remarkably similar to the 2014 
Law. The exception states that PASPA does 
not apply to “a betting, gambling, or 
wagering scheme ... conducted exclusively in 
casinos ..., but only to the extent that ... any 
commercial casino gaming scheme was in 
operation ... throughout the 10-year period” 
before PASPA was enacted. The exception 
would have permitted sports gambling at 
New Jersey's casinos, which is just what the 
2014 Law does. We can easily infer that, by 
explicitly excepting a scheme of sports 
gambling in New Jersey's casinos from 
PASPA's prohibitions, Congress intended 
that such a scheme would violate PASPA. If 
Congress had not perceived that sports 
gambling in New Jersey's casinos would 
violate PASPA, then it would not have 
needed to insert the New Jersey exception. In 
other words, if sports gambling in New 
Jersey's casinos does not violate PASPA, 
then PASPA's one-year exception for New 
Jersey would have been superfluous. We will 
not read statutory provisions to be 
surplusage. In order to avoid rendering the 
New Jersey exception surplusage, we must 
read the 2014 Law as authorizing a scheme 
that clearly violates PASPA. 
 
As support for their argument that the 2014 
Law does not violate PASPA, Appellants cite 
the 2014 Law's construction provision, which 
provides that “[t]he provisions of this act ... 
are not intended and shall not be construed as 
causing the State to sponsor, operate, 
advertise, promote, license, or authorize by 
law or compact” sports wagering. This 
conveniently mirrors PASPA's language 
providing that states may not “sponsor, 
operate, advertise, promote, license, or 
authorize by law or compact” sports 
wagering.  
 
The construction provision does not save the 
2014 Law. States may not use clever drafting 
or mandatory construction provisions to 
escape the supremacy of federal law. In the 
same vein, the New Jersey Legislature cannot 
use a targeted construction provision to limit 
the reach of PASPA or to dictate to a court a 
construction that would limit that reach. The 
2014 Law violates PASPA, and the 
construction provision cannot alter that fact. 
Appellants also draw a comparison between 
the 2014 Law and the 2012 Law, which 
involved a broad regulatory scheme, as 
evidence that the 2014 Law does not violate 
PASPA. It is true that the 2014 Law does not 
set forth a comprehensive scheme or provide 
for a state regulatory role, as the 2012 Law 
did. However, PASPA does not limit its reach 
to active state involvement or extensive 
regulation of sports gambling. It prohibits a 
range of state activity, the least intrusive of 
which is “authorization” by law of sports 
gambling. 
 
We conclude that the 2014 Law violates 
PASPA because it authorizes by law sports 
gambling. 
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B. PASPA Does Not Impermissibly 
Commandeer the States 
Appellants expend significant effort in this 
appeal revisiting our conclusion in Christie I 
that PASPA does not unconstitutionally 
commandeer the states. They root this effort 
in the District Court's erroneous conclusion 
that PASPA presents states with a binary 
choice—either maintain a complete 
prohibition on sports wagering or wholly 
repeal state prohibitions. In Christie I, we 
engaged in a lengthy discussion to rebut 
Appellants' assertion that if we conclude that 
New Jersey's repeal of its prohibition is not 
permitted by PASPA, then it has 
unconstitutionally commandeered New 
Jersey. In so doing, we discussed the 
Supreme Court's clear case law on 
commandeering. Our prior conclusion that 
PASPA does not run afoul of anti-
commandeering principles remains sound 
despite Appellants' attempt to call it into 
question using the 2014 Law as an exemplar. 
 
1. Anti–Commandeering Jurisprudence 
 
As we noted in Christie I, the Supreme 
Court's anti-commandeering principle rests 
on the conclusion that “Congress ‘lacks the 
power directly to compel the States to require 
or prohibit’ acts which Congress itself may 
require or prohibit.” In our prior survey of the 
anti-commandeering case law in Christie I, 
we grouped four commandeering cases 
upholding the federal laws at issue into two 
categories: (1) permissible regulation in a 
pre-emptible field; and (2) prohibitions on 
state action. The Supreme Court has struck 
down federal laws on anti-commandeering 
grounds in only two cases, New York v. 
United States and Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 
(1997). We summarize our prior review 
below. 
 
First, congressional action in passing laws in 
otherwise pre-emptible fields has withstood 
attack in cases where the states were not 
compelled to enact laws or implement federal 
statutes or regulatory programs themselves. 
In Hodel, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a law that imposed 
federal standards for coal mining. The law 
left states a choice. A state could “assume 
permanent regulatory authority over ... 
surface coal mining operations” and “submit 
a proposed permanent program” that 
“demonstrate[s] that the state legislature has 
enacted laws implementing the 
environmental protection standards ... and 
that the State has the administrative and 
technical ability to enforce the[ ] standards.” 
However, if a state chose not to assume 
regulatory authority, the federal government 
would “administer[ ] the Act within that State 
and continue[ ] as such unless and until a 
‘state program’ [wa]s approved.” As we 
described in Christie I: 
 
The Supreme Court upheld the provisions, 
noting that they neither compelled the states 
to adopt the federal standards, nor required 
them “to expend any state funds,” nor 
coerced them into “participat[ing] in the 
federal regulatory program in any manner 
whatsoever.” The Court further concluded 
that Congress could have chosen to 
completely preempt the field by simply 
assuming oversight of the regulations itself. 
Id. It thus held that the Tenth Amendment 
posed no obstacle to a system by which 
Congress “chose to allow the States a 
regulatory role.” As the Court later 
characterized Hodel, the scheme there did not 
violate the anti-commandeering principle 
because it “merely made compliance with 
federal standards a precondition to continued 
state regulation in an otherwise preempted 
field.”  
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The Supreme Court's opinion in F.E.R.C. v. 
Mississippi the following year confirmed its 
view that a law does not unconstitutionally 
commandeer the states when the law does not 
impose federal requirements on the states, but 
leaves states the choice to decline to 
implement federal standards.  
 
Second, the Supreme Court has found 
Congress's prohibition of certain state actions 
to not constitute unconstitutional 
commandeering. In South Carolina v. Baker, 
the Court upheld federal laws that prohibited 
the issuance of bearer bonds, which required 
states to amend legislation to be in 
compliance. As we characterized this case in 
Christie I: 
 
    The Court concluded this result did not run 
afoul [of] the Tenth Amendment because it 
did not seek to control or influence the 
manner in which States regulate private 
parties but was simply an inevitable 
consequence of regulating a state activity. In 
subsequent cases, the Court explained that 
the regulation in Baker was permissible 
because it simply subjected a State to the 
same legislation applicable to private parties. 
 
Later, in Reno v. Condon, the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of a law that prohibited 
states from releasing information gathered by 
state departments of motor vehicles. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the law at 
issue “d[id] not require the States in their 
sovereign capacity to regulate their own 
citizens[,] ... d[id] not require the [State] 
Legislature[s] to enact any laws or 
regulations, and it d[id] not require state 
officials to assist in the enforcement of 
federal statutes regulating private 
individuals.”  
 
As noted above, the Supreme Court has 
invalidated laws on anti-commandeering 
grounds on only two occasions. In New York, 
the Supreme Court struck down a “take-title” 
provision whereby states were required to 
take title to radioactive waste by a specific 
date, at the waste generator's request, if they 
did not adopt a federal program. As we stated 
in Christie I, the provision “compel[led] the 
states to either enact a regulatory program, or 
expend resources in taking title to the waste.” 
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded in 
New York that the take-title provision 
“crossed the line distinguishing 
encouragement from coercion.” Similarly in 
Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court 
concluded that Congress “may neither issue 
directives requiring the States to address 
particular problems, nor command the States' 
officers ... to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program.”  
 
2. PASPA Does Not Violate Anti-
Commandeering Principles 
 
We continue to view PASPA's prohibition as 
more akin to those laws upheld in Hodel, 
F.E.R.C., Baker, and Reno, and 
distinguishable from those struck down by 
the Supreme Court in New York and Printz. 
Our articulation of the way in which PASPA 
does not violate anti-commandeering 
principles warrants refinement, however, 
given the way in which the 2014 Law 
attempted to skirt PASPA and the thrust of 
Appellants' arguments in this appeal. 
 
In an attempt to reopen the anti-
commandeering question we previously 
decided, Appellants creatively rely on certain 
language that was used in Christie I. In 
pressing for a declaration that PASPA 
unconstitutionally commandeered the states 
in Christie I, Appellants characterized 
PASPA as requiring the states to 
affirmatively keep a prohibition against 
sports wagering on their books, lest they be 
found to have authorized sports gambling by 
law by repealing the prohibition. In response, 
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we opined that Appellants' position “rest[ed] 
on a false equivalence between repeal and 
authorization,” implying that a repeal is not 
an authorization. Before us now Appellants 
urge that “[t]his Court held [in Christie I] that 
PASPA is constitutional precisely because it 
permits States to elect not to prohibit sports 
wagering, even if affirmatively authorizing it 
would be unlawful.” Appellants are saying, 
in effect, “We told you so”—if the legislature 
cannot repeal New Jersey's prohibition as it 
attempted to do in the 2014 Law, then it is 
required to affirmatively keep the prohibition 
on the books, and PASPA unconstitutionally 
commandeers the states. We reject this 
argument. 
 
That said, we view our discussion in Christie 
I regarding the relationship between a 
“repeal” and an “authorization” to have been 
too facile. While we considered whether 
repeal and authorization are interchangeable, 
our decision did not rest on that discussion. 
Today, we choose to excise that discussion 
from our prior opinion as unnecessary dicta. 
To be clear, a state's decision to selectively 
remove a prohibition on sports wagering in a 
manner that permissively channels wagering 
activity to particular locations or operators is, 
in essence, “authorization” under PASPA. 
However, our determination that such a 
selective repeal of certain prohibitions 
amounts to authorization under PASPA does 
not mean that states are not afforded 
sufficient room under PASPA to craft their 
own policies. 
 
Appellants urge that our conclusion in 
Christie I that PASPA does not 
unconstitutionally commandeer the states 
rested on our view that PASPA allows states 
to “choos[e] among many different potential 
policies on sports wagering that do not 
include licensing or affirmative authorization 
by the State.” This is correct. PASPA does 
not command states to take affirmative 
actions, and it does not present a coercive 
binary choice. Our reasoning in Christie I that 
PASPA does not commandeer the states 
remains unshaken. 
 
Appellants characterize the 2014 Law as a 
lawful exercise in the space PASPA affords 
states to create their own policy. They argue 
that without options beyond a complete 
repeal or a complete ban on sports wagering, 
such as the partial repeal New Jersey pursued, 
PASPA runs afoul of anti-commandeering 
principles. This argument sweeps too 
broadly. That a specific partial repeal which 
New Jersey chose to pursue in its 2014 Law 
is not valid under PASPA does not preclude 
the possibility that other options may pass 
muster. The issue of the extent to which a 
given repeal would constitute an 
authorization, in a vacuum, is not before us, 
as it was not specifically before us in Christie 
I. However, as the Leagues noted at oral 
argument before the en banc court, not all 
partial repeals are created equal. For instance, 
a state's partial repeal of a sports wagering 
ban to allow de minimis wagers between 
friends and family would not have nearly the 
type of authorizing effect that we find in the 
2014 Law. We need not, however, articulate 
a line whereby a partial repeal of a sports 
wagering ban amounts to an authorization 
under PASPA, if indeed such a line could be 
drawn. It is sufficient to conclude that the 
2014 Law overstepped it. 
 
Appellants seize on the District Court's 
erroneous interpretation of Christie I's anti-
commandeering analysis—namely, that 
PASPA presents states with a strict binary 
choice between total repeal and keeping a 
complete ban on their books—to once again 
urge that if PASPA commands such a choice, 
then it is comparable to the challenged law in 
New York. First, unlike the take-title 
provision included in the statute at issue in 
New York, PASPA's text does not present 
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states with a coercive choice to adopt a 
federal program. To interpret PASPA to 
require such a coercive choice is to read 
something into the statute that simply is not 
there. 
 
Second, PASPA is further distinguishable 
from the law at issue in New York because it 
does not require states to take any action. In 
New York, the Supreme Court held that a 
federal law that required states to enact a 
federal regulatory program or take title to 
radioactive waste at the behest of generators 
“crossed the line distinguishing 
encouragement from coercion.” Unlike the 
law at issue in New York, PASPA includes 
no coercive direction by the federal 
government. As we previously concluded in 
Christie I, PASPA does not command states 
to take any affirmative steps: 
 
    PASPA does not require or coerce the 
states to lift a finger—they are not required to 
pass laws, to take title to anything, to conduct 
background checks, to expend any funds, or 
to in any way enforce federal law. They are 
not even required, like the states were in 
F.E.R.C., to expend resources considering 
federal regulatory regimes, let alone to adopt 
them. Simply put, we discern in PASPA no 
directives requiring the States to address 
particular problems and no commands to the 
States' officers to administer or enforce a 
federal regulatory program. 
 
Put simply, PASPA does not impose a 
coercive either-or requirement or affirmative 
command. 
 
We will not allow Appellants to bootstrap 
already decided questions of PASPA's 
constitutionality onto our determination that 
the 2014 Law violates PASPA. We reject the 
notion that PASPA presents states with a 
coercive binary choice or affirmative 
command and conclude, as we did in Christie 
I, that it does not unconstitutionally 
commandeer the states. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The 2014 Law violates PASPA because it 
authorizes by law sports gambling. We 
continue to find PASPA constitutional. We 
will affirm. 
 
FUENTES, joined by RESTREPO, Circuit 
Judges, dissenting: 
 
In November 2011, the question of whether 
to allow sports betting in New Jersey went 
before the electorate. By a 2-1 margin, New 
Jersey voters passed a referendum to amend 
the New Jersey Constitution to allow the New 
Jersey Legislature to “authorize by law” 
sports betting.1 Accordingly, the Legislature 
enacted the 2012 Sports Wagering Act 
(“2012 Law”). The Sports Leagues 
challenged this Law, claiming that it violated 
the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act's (“PASPA”) prohibition on 
states “authoriz[ing] by law” sports betting.2 
In Christie I, we agreed with the Sports 
Leagues and held that the 2012 Law violated 
and thus was preempted by PASPA. We 
explained, however, that New Jersey was free 
to repeal the sports betting prohibitions it 
already had in place. We rejected the 
argument that a repeal of prohibitions on 
sports betting was equivalent to authorizing 
by law sports betting. When the matter was 
brought to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor 
General echoed that same sentiment, stating 
that, “PASPA does not even obligate New 
Jersey to leave in place the state-law 
prohibitions against sports gambling that it 
had chosen to adopt prior to PASPA's 
enactment. To the contrary, New Jersey is 
free to repeal those prohibitions in whole or 
in part.” 
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So New Jersey did just that. In 2014, the New 
Jersey Legislature repealed certain sports 
betting prohibitions at casinos and gambling 
houses in Atlantic City and at horse 
racetracks in the State (“2014 Repeal”). In 
addition to repealing the 2012 Law in full, the 
2014 Repeal stripped New Jersey of any 
involvement in sports betting, regulatory or 
otherwise. In essence, the 2014 Repeal 
rendered previous prohibitions on sports 
betting non-existent. 
 
But the majority today concludes that the 
New Jersey Legislature's efforts to satisfy its 
constituents while adhering to our decision in 
Christie I are still in violation of PASPA. 
According to the majority, the “selective” 
nature of the 2014 Repeal amounts to 
“authorizing by law” a sports wagering 
scheme. That is, because the State retained 
certain restrictions on sports betting, the 
majority infers the authorization by law. I 
cannot agree with this interpretation of 
PASPA. 
 
PASPA restricts the states in six ways—a 
state cannot “sponsor, operate, advertise, 
promote, license, or authorize by law or 
compact” sports betting.4 The only one of 
these six restrictions that includes “by law” is 
“authorize.” None of the other restrictions 
say anything about how the states are 
restricted. Thus, I believe that Congress gave 
this restriction a special meaning—that a 
state's “authoriz[ation] by law” of sports 
betting cannot merely be inferred, but rather 
requires a specific legislative enactment that 
affirmatively allows the people of the state to 
bet on sports. Any other interpretation would 
be reading the phrase “by law” out of the 
statute. 
Indeed, we stated exactly this in Christie I—
that all PASPA prohibits is “the affirmative 
‘authoriz[ation] by law’ of gambling 
schemes.” Thus, we explained, nothing 
prevented New Jersey from repealing its 
sports betting prohibitions, since, “in reality, 
the lack of an affirmative prohibition of an 
activity does not mean it is affirmatively 
authorized by law.” As we noted, “that the 
Legislature needed to enact the [2012 Law] 
itself belies any contention that the mere 
repeal of New Jersey's ban on sports 
gambling was sufficient to ‘authorize [it] by 
law.’ ” The Legislature itself “saw a 
meaningful distinction between repealing the 
ban on sports wagering and authorizing it by 
law, undermining any contention that the 
amendment alone was sufficient to 
affirmatively authorize sports wagering—the 
[2012 Law] was required.” In short, we 
explained that there was a false equivalence 
between repeal and authorization. 
 
With the 2014 Repeal, the New Jersey 
Legislature did what it thought it was 
permitted to do under our reading of PASPA 
in Christie I. The majority, however, 
maintains that the 2014 Repeal “authorizes” 
sports wagering at casinos, gambling houses, 
and horse racetracks simply because other 
sports betting prohibitions remain in place. 
According to the majority, “[a]bsent the 2014 
Law, New Jersey's myriad laws prohibiting 
sports gambling would apply to the casinos 
and racetracks,” and thus “the 2014 Law 
provides the authorization for conduct that is 
otherwise clearly and completely legally 
prohibited.” But I believe the majority is 
mistaken as to the impact of a partial repeal. 
A repeal is defined as an “abrogation of an 
existing law by legislative act.” When a 
statute is repealed, “the repealed statute, in 
regard to its operative effect, is considered as 
if it had never existed.” If a repealed statute 
is treated as if it never existed, a partially 
repealed statute is treated as if the repealed 
sections never existed. The 2014 Repeal, 
then, simply returns New Jersey to the state it 
was in before it first enacted those 
prohibitions on sports gambling. In other 
words, after the repeal, it is as if New Jersey 
116 
  
never prohibited sports wagering at casinos, 
gambling houses, and horse racetracks. 
Therefore, with respect to those locations, 
there are no laws governing sports wagering. 
Contrary to the majority's position, the 
permission to engage in such an activity is not 
affirmatively granted by virtue of it being 
prohibited elsewhere. 
 
To bolster its position, the majority rejects 
our reasoning in Christie I, stating that “[t]o 
the extent that in Christie I we took the 
position that a repeal cannot constitute an 
authorization, we now reject that reasoning.” 
I continue to maintain, however, that the 
2014 Repeal is not an affirmative 
authorization by law. It is merely a repeal—
it does not, and cannot, authorize by law 
anything. 
 
In my view, the majority's position that the 
2014 Repeal “selectively grants permission 
to certain entities to engage in sports 
gambling” is simply incorrect. There is no 
explicit grant of permission in the 2014 
Repeal for any person or entity to engage in 
sports gambling. Rather, the 2014 Repeal is a 
self-executing deregulatory measure that 
repeals existing prohibitions and regulations 
for sports betting and requires the State to 
abdicate any control or involvement in sports 
betting. The majority fails to explain why a 
partial repeal is equivalent to a grant of 
permission (by law) to engage in sports 
betting. 
 
Suppose the State did exactly what the 
majority suggests it could have done: repeal 
completely its sports betting prohibitions. In 
that circumstance, sports betting could occur 
anywhere in the State and there would be no 
restrictions as to age, location, or whether a 
bettor could wager on games involving local 
teams. Would the State violate PASPA if it 
later enacted limited restrictions regarding 
age requirements and places where wagering 
could occur? Surely no conceivable reading 
of PASPA would preclude a state from 
restricting sports wagering in this scenario. 
Yet the 2014 Repeal comes to the same 
result. 
 
The majority also fails to illustrate how the 
2014 Repeal results in sports wagering 
pursuant to state law when there is effectively 
no law in place as to several locations, no 
scheme created, and no state involvement. A 
careful comparison with the 2012 Law is 
instructive. The 2012 Law lifted New Jersey's 
ban on sports wagering and created a 
licensing scheme for sports wagering pools at 
casinos and racetracks in the State. This 
comprehensive regime required close State 
supervision and regulation of those sports 
wagering pools. For instance, the 2012 Law 
required any entity that wished to operate a 
“sports pool lounge” to acquire a “sports pool 
license.” To do so, a prospective operator was 
required to pay a $50,000 application fee, 
secure Division of Gaming Enforcement 
(“DGE”) approval of all internal controls, 
and ensure that any of its employees who 
were to be directly involved in sports 
wagering obtained individual licenses from 
the DGE and the Casino Control Commission 
(“CCC”). In addition, the betting regime 
required entities to, among other things, 
submit extensive documentation to the DGE, 
adopt new “house” rules subject to DGE 
approval, and conform to DGE standards. 
This, of course, violated PASPA in the most 
basic way: New Jersey developed an intricate 
scheme that both “authorize[d] by law” and 
“license[d]” sports gambling. The 2014 
Repeal eliminated this entire scheme. 
Moreover, all state agencies with jurisdiction 
over state casinos and racetracks, such as the 
DGE and the CCC, were stripped of any 
sports betting oversight. 
 
The majority likewise falters when it 
analogizes the 2014 Repeal to the exception 
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Congress originally offered to New Jersey in 
1992. The exception stated that PASPA did 
not apply to “a betting, gambling, or 
wagering scheme ... conducted exclusively in 
casinos[,] ... but only to the extent that ... any 
commercial casino gaming scheme was in 
operation ... throughout the 10-year period” 
before PASPA was enacted. Setting aside the 
most obvious distinction between the 2014 
Repeal and the 1992 exception—that it 
contemplated a scheme that the 2014 Repeal 
does not authorize—the majority misses the 
mark when it states: “If Congress had not 
perceived that sports gambling in New 
Jersey's casinos would violate PASPA, then 
it would not have needed to insert the New 
Jersey exception.” Congress did not, 
however, perceive, or intend for, private 
sports wagering in casinos to violate PASPA. 
Instead, Congress prohibited sports wagering 
undertaken pursuant to state law. That the 
2014 Repeal might bring about an increase in 
the amount of private, legal sports wagering 
in New Jersey is of no moment, and the 
majority's reliance on such a possibility is 
misplaced. The majority is also wrong in a 
more fundamental way. The exception 
Congress offered to New Jersey was exactly 
that: an exception to the ordinary prohibitions 
of PASPA. That is to say, with this exception, 
New Jersey could have “sponsor[ed], 
operate[d], advertise[d], promote[d], 
license[d], or authorize[d] by law or 
compact” sports wagering. Under the 2014 
Repeal, of course, New Jersey cannot and 
does not aim to do any of these things. 
 
Because I do not see how a partial repeal of 
prohibitions is tantamount to authorizing by 
law a sports wagering scheme in violation of 
PASPA, I respectfully dissent. 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
While Congress “has the authority under the 
Constitution to pass laws requiring or 
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power 
directly to compel the States to require or 
prohibit those acts.” Concluding that the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection 
Act (“PASPA”), was a congressional 
command that States must prohibit wagering 
on sporting events because it forbids the 
States from “authoriz[ing] by law” such 
activity, I dissented from the holding in 
Christie I that PASPA was a valid exercise of 
congressional authority. My colleagues in the 
majority in Christie I disagreed with my 
conclusion because they believed that States 
had the option of repealing existing bans on 
sports betting. In upholding PASPA, Christie 
I rejected New Jersey's argument that a repeal 
of its ban on sports betting would be viewed 
as effectively “authoriz[ing] by law” this 
activity. Christie I declared that New Jersey's 
“attempt to read into PASPA a requirement 
that the states must affirmatively keep a ban 
on sports gambling in their books rests on a 
false equivalence between repeal and 
authorization.” I viewed that “false 
equivalence” assertion with considerable 
skepticism. My skepticism is validated by 
today's majority opinion. The majority 
dodges the inevitable conclusion that PASPA 
conscripts the States to prohibit wagering on 
sports by suggesting that some partial repeal 
of the ban on sports gambling would not be 
tantamount to authorization of gambling. 
 
Implicit in today's majority opinion and 
Christie I is the premise that Congress lacks 
the authority to decree that States must 
prohibit sports wagering, and so both 
majorities find some undefined room for 
States to enact partial repeals of existing bans 
on sports gambling. While the author of 
Christie I finds that New Jersey's partial 
repeal at issue here is not the equivalent of 
authorizing by law wagering on sporting 
events, today's majority concludes otherwise. 
This shifting line approach to a State's 
exercise of its sovereign authority is 
118 
  
untenable. The bedrock principle of 
federalism that Congress may not compel the 
States to require or prohibit certain activities 
cannot be evaded by the false assertion that 
PASPA affords the States some undefined 
options when it comes to sports wagering. 
Because I believe that PASPA was intended 
to compel the States to prohibit wagering on 
sporting events, it cannot survive 
constitutional scrutiny. Accordingly, as I did 
in Christie I, I dissent. 
 
I. 
 
According to the majority, “a state's decision 
to selectively remove a prohibition on sports 
wagering in a manner that permissively 
channels wagering activity to particular 
locations or operators is, in essence, 
‘authorization’ under PASPA.” The majority 
also claims “a state's partial repeal of a sports 
wagering ban to allow de minimis wagers 
between friends and family would not have 
nearly the type of authorizing effect that we 
find in the 2014 Law.” Thus, according to the 
majority, the 2014 Law is a partial repeal that 
is foreclosed by PASPA, but “other options 
may pass muster” because “not all partial 
repeals are created equal.” 
 
Noticeably, the majority does not explain 
why all partial repeals are not created equal 
or explain what distinguishes the 2014 Law 
from those partial repeals that pass muster. 
To further complicate matters, the majority 
continues to rely on Christie I, which did “not 
read PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from 
repealing its ban on sports wagering” and 
informed New Jersey that “[n]othing in 
[PASPA's] words requires that the states keep 
any law in place.”  
 
A. 
 
Christie I “[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of 
the affirmative/negative command 
distinction,” and “agree[d] with [New Jersey] 
that the affirmative act requirement, if not 
properly applied, may permit Congress to 
‘accomplish exactly what the 
commandeering doctrine prohibits' by 
stopping the states from ‘repealing an 
existing law.’ ” Christie I, however, 
discounted concerns regarding PASPA's 
affirmative act requirement because Christie 
I “d[id] not read PASPA to prohibit New 
Jersey from repealing its ban on sports 
wagering.” According to Christie I, PASPA 
is constitutional because “[n]othing in 
[PASPA's] words requires that the states keep 
any law in place.” This conclusion formed 
the premise for the conclusion in Christie I 
that PASPA passed constitutional muster. 
 
Remarkably, the majority chooses to “excise 
that discussion from our prior opinion as 
unnecessary dicta.” Maj. Op., at 401. This 
cannot be the case, however, because that 
discussion was the cornerstone of the holding 
in Christie I.  
 
Indeed, to rationalize its conclusion in 
Christie I, the Christie I majority had to 
expressly reject the notion that when a state 
“choose [s] to repeal an affirmative 
prohibition of sports gambling, that is the 
same as ‘authorizing’ that activity, and 
therefore PASPA precludes repealing 
prohibitions on gambling just as it bars 
affirmatively licensing it.” This aspect of 
Christie I was not peripheral to the ultimate 
holding because Christie I specifically 
“agree[d] with [New Jersey] that the 
affirmative act requirement, if not properly 
applied, may permit Congress to ‘accomplish 
exactly what the commandeering doctrine 
prohibits' by stopping the states from 
‘repealing an existing law.’ ” Thus, to resolve 
the issue before it, Christie I necessarily had 
to give this issue the “full and careful 
consideration of the court.”  
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In giving the issue its full and careful 
consideration, Christie I explained that the 
notion that a “repeal” could be the same as an 
“authorization” was “problematic in 
numerous respects.” Christie I did “not see 
how having no law in place governing sports 
wagering is the same as authorizing it by 
law.” Christie I recognized a distinction 
between affirmative commands for actions 
and prohibitions, and explained that there 
was “a false equivalence between repeal and 
authorization.” Thus, as a matter of statutory 
construction, and to avoid “a series of 
constitutional problems,” Christie I 
specifically held that if the Court did not 
distinguish between “repeals” (affirmative 
commands) and “authorizations” (affirmative 
prohibitions), the Court would “read[ ] the 
term ‘by law’ out of [PASPA].”  
 
I dissented from that opinion because “any 
distinction between a federal directive that 
commands states to take affirmative action 
and one that prohibits states from exercising 
their sovereignty is illusory.” The decision to 
base Christie I on a distinction between 
affirmative commands for action and 
affirmative prohibitions was “untenable,” 
because “affirmative commands to engage in 
certain conduct can be rephrased as a 
prohibition against not engaging in that 
conduct.” As I explained, basing Christie I on 
such an illusory distinction raises 
constitutional concerns because “[a]n 
interpretation of federalism principles that 
permits congressional negative commands to 
state governments will eviscerate the 
constitutional lines drawn” by the Supreme 
Court. 
B. 
After Christie I, a state like New Jersey at 
least had the choice to either “repeal its sports 
wagering ban,” or, “[o]n the other hand ... 
keep a complete ban on sports gambling.” 
The Christie I majority found that this choice 
was not too coercive because it left “much 
room for the states to make their own policy” 
and left it to a State “to decide how much of 
a law enforcement priority it wants to make 
of sports gambling, or what the exact 
contours of the prohibition will be.” 
 
Today's majority makes it clear that PASPA 
does not leave a State “much room” at all. 
Indeed, it is evident that States must leave 
gambling prohibitions on the books to 
regulate their citizens. A review of the four 
Supreme Court anti-commandeering cases 
referenced by the majority is illuminating. 
 
1. 
 
The first two anti-commandeering cases that 
the majority reviews are Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 
and F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi. As the majority 
points out, these cases address “permissible 
regulation in a pre-emptible field.” In 
analyzing these cases, however, the majority 
overlooks the main rule announced by the 
Supreme Court in situations where there is an 
exercise of legislative authority under the 
Commerce Clause or where Congress 
preempts an area with federal legislation 
within its legislative power. In such 
situations, States have a choice: they may 
either comply with the federal legislation or 
the Federal Government will carry the 
legislation into effect. 
 
This rule was announced in Hodel, where the 
Supreme Court explained that “[i]f a State 
does not wish to ... compl[y] with the Act and 
implementing regulations, the full regulatory 
burden will be borne by the Federal 
Government.” The same theme repeated 
itself in F.E.R.C., as the Supreme Court 
focused on “the choice put to the States—that 
of either abandoning regulation of the field 
altogether or considering the federal 
standards.” In both cases, the Supreme Court 
was clear that there must be some choice for 
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the states to make because without it “the 
accountability of both state and federal 
officials is diminished.”  
 
Indeed, in New York v. United States, the 
Court explained that a State's view on 
legislation “can always be pre-empted under 
the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the 
national view, but in such a case ... it will be 
federal officials that suffer the consequences 
if the decision turns out to be detrimental or 
unpopular.” The Supreme Court reiterated 
this point Printz v. United States, explaining 
that, “[b]y forcing state governments to 
absorb the financial burden of implementing 
a federal regulatory program, Members of 
Congress can take credit for ‘solving’ 
problems without having to ask their 
constituents to pay for the solutions with 
higher federal taxes.” Thus, States must be 
given a choice because the Supreme Court is 
concerned that “it may be state officials who 
will bear the brunt of public disapproval, 
while the federal officials who devised the 
regulatory program may remain insulated 
from the electoral ramifications of their 
decision.” 
 
As the majority explains, while “PASPA's 
provisions and its reach are controversial 
(and, some might say, unwise).... we are 
duty-bound to interpret the text of the law as 
Congress wrote it.” Because the majority has 
excised the distinction between a repeal and 
an authorization, the majority makes it clear 
that under PASPA as written, no repeal of 
any kind will evade the command that no 
State “shall ... authorize by law” sports 
gambling. In the face of such a congressional 
directive, “no case-by-case weighing of the 
burdens or benefits is necessary; such 
commands are fundamentally incompatible 
with our constitutional system of dual 
sovereignty.” 
 
2. 
 
This leads to the other two anti-
commandeering cases reviewed by the 
majority: South Carolina v. Baker, and Reno 
v. Condon. The majority explains that these 
cases address permissible “prohibitions on 
state action.” Again, however, the majority 
seems to overlook the animating factor for 
each of these opinions. In both Baker and 
Reno the Supreme Court explained that 
permissible prohibitions regulated State 
activities. The Supreme Court has never 
sanctioned statutes or regulations that sought 
to control or influence the manner in which 
States regulate private parties. 
 
For example, in Baker, the Supreme Court 
reviewed a challenge to the Internal Revenue 
Code's enactment of § 310(b)(1) of the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 
which prohibited States from issuing 
unregistered bearer bonds. Notably, when 
reviewing the case, the Court specifically 
found that it did not need to address “the 
possibility that the Tenth Amendment might 
set some limits on Congress' power to compel 
States to regulate on behalf of federal 
interests” because the Court found that the 
commandeering concerns “in FERC [were] 
inapplicable to § 310.” Importantly, the Court 
distinguished § 310 from the statute in 
F.E.R.C. because the Court found that 
“Section 310 regulates state activities; it does 
not, as did the statute in FERC, seek to 
control or influence the manner in which 
States regulate private parties.” Similarly, in 
Reno, the Court addressed a statute that did 
not require (1) “the States in their sovereign 
capacity to regulate their own citizens,” (2) 
“the ... Legislature to enact any laws or 
regulations,” or (3) “state officials to assist in 
the enforcement of federal statutes regulating 
private individuals.” It was only on these 
bases that the Supreme Court found the 
statute at issue in Reno was “consistent with 
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the constitutional principles enunciated in 
New York and Printz.” 
 
Unlike the statutes at issue in Baker and 
Reno, however, PASPA seeks to control and 
influence the manner in which States regulate 
private parties. Through PASPA, Congress 
unambiguously commands that “[i]t shall be 
unlawful for ... a governmental entity to ... 
authorize by law” sports gambling. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 3702. By issuing this command, Congress 
has set an impermissible “mandatory agenda 
to be considered in all events by state 
legislative or administrative 
decisionmakers.” 
 
3. 
 
The logical extension of the majority is that 
PASPA prevents States from passing any 
laws to repeal existing gambling laws. As the 
majority correctly notes, “[t]he word 
‘authorize’ means, inter alia, ‘[t]o empower; 
to give a right or authority to act,’ or ‘[t]o 
permit a thing to be done in the future.’ ” 
Because authorization includes permitting a 
thing to be done, it follows that PASPA also 
prevents state officials from stopping 
enforcement of existing gambling laws. 
States must regulate conduct prioritized by 
Congress.  
 
It is true that civil actions to enjoin a violation 
of PASPA “may be commenced in an 
appropriate district court of the United States 
by the Attorney General of the United 
States.” But it can hardly be said that the 
United States Attorney General bears the full 
regulatory burden because, through PASPA, 
Congress effectively commands the States to 
maintain and enforce existing gambling 
prohibitions.1 
PASPA is a statute that directs States to 
maintain gambling laws by dictating the 
manner in which States must enforce a 
federal law. The Supreme Court has never 
considered Congress' legislative power to be 
so expansive. 
 
II. 
 
It is now apparent that Christie I was 
incorrect in finding that “nothing in 
[PASPA's] words requires that the states keep 
any law in place.” With respect to the 
doctrinal anchors of Christie I, the 
cornerstone of its holding has been eroded by 
the majority, which has excised Christie I's 
discussion regarding “a false equivalence 
between repeal and an authorization.” 
Notably, that discussion was included in 
Christie I to avoid “a series of constitutional 
problems.” Today's majority makes it clear 
that passing a law so that there is no law in 
place governing sports wagering is the same 
as authorizing it by law.  
 
I dissented in Christie I because the 
distinction between repeal and authorization 
is unworkable. Today's majority opinion 
validates my position: PASPA leaves the 
States with no choice. While Christie I at 
least gave the States the option of repealing, 
in whole or in part, existing bans on gambling 
on sporting events, today's decision tells the 
States that they must maintain an anti-sports 
wagering scheme. The anti-commandeering 
doctrine, essential to protect State 
sovereignty, prohibits Congress from 
compelling States to prohibit such private 
activity. Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
122 
  
“New Jersey’s Appeal of Sports Betting Ban Heads to Supreme Court” 
 
The New York Times 
Nick Corasanti, Joe Drape 
June 27, 2017 
 
The Supreme Court agreed on Tuesday to 
hear an appeal from Gov. Chris Christie and 
the state of New Jersey to allow betting on 
professional and collegiate sports at the 
state’s casinos and racetracks. 
The case, which the court will hear in the fall, 
will be a major test for the federal ban on 
sports betting as established by the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection 
Act, known as Paspa, which Congress passed 
in 1992 outlawing betting on amateur or 
professional athletes except in four states that 
already had operations. 
New Jersey has been fighting either to 
overturn the federal ban or to find a way to 
work around it since 2011, when voters in the 
state approved a nonbinding resolution to 
allow sports betting. The effort has since 
been supported by Democratic and 
Republican legislators as a way to help shore 
up the sagging Atlantic City casinos and state 
racetracks. 
But the effort was met with lawsuits from the 
N.C.A.A. and the four major sports leagues 
after Mr. Christie signed a law in 2014 to 
allow sports betting. The challenges wound 
their way through numerous lower courts, 
finally reaching the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Philadelphia, 
which issued a ruling last year upholding the 
federal ban. 
In a news conference in Trenton on Tuesday, 
Mr. Christie said he was “thrilled” by the 
decision of the court. 
 “The fact that the Supreme Court granted 
cert. in this case is a very good sign for sports 
betting having a future in New Jersey,” he 
said. “I’m encouraged by it. We’re not 
declaring victory, but at least we’re in the 
game, and that’s what we want to be.” 
The decision by the Supreme Court to hear 
the case comes as a bit of a surprise after 
Jeffrey B. Wall, the acting solicitor general of 
the United States, asked the court in May not 
to hear the case. 
Numerous states, including Pennsylvania, 
New York and California, have recently 
pushed bills to legalize sports betting. Sports 
betting podcasts like “Against All Odds” 
regularly crack the top sports charts on 
iTunes. Daily fantasy sports sites like 
DraftKings and FanDuel, which offer a very 
specific type of sports wagering, remain quite 
popular. 
At stake is a significant amount of money. In 
Nevada, where sports betting is legal, it is 
now an industry of nearly $5 billion a year. 
Industry and law enforcement officials 
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estimate that more than $150 billion is placed 
annually with illegal bookmakers and with 
offshore accounts. 
With that much at stake, the American 
Gaming Association announced the creation 
of a coalition this month encompassing 
attorneys general, the police, policy makers 
and others to advocate a repeal of the federal 
ban. 
“We are pleased the Supreme Court appears 
to have responded favorably to our 
arguments as to why they should hear this 
important case,” said Geoff Freeman, the 
president and chief executive of the gaming 
association. “And we are hopeful their 
engagement will provide further 
encouragement for Congress to take the steps 
necessary to create a regulated sports betting 
marketplace in the United States.” 
 
In a recent meeting with reporters for The 
New York Times, Mr. Freeman said his 
organization had detected a new willingness 
among the sports leagues to make sports 
betting legal. Adam Silver, the commissioner 
of the N.B.A., has been forthright in calling 
for legal betting and the openness that 
accompanies it. Rob Manfred, the 
commissioner of Major League Baseball, has 
acknowledged that a sports betting market 
would continue to fuel fan interest in 
baseball. 
The N.F.L., long an opponent of the bill, has 
signaled a softening of that stance in recent 
months with the commissioner, Roger 
Goodell, saying the league’s thinking on 
sports gambling was “evolving,” a shift 
underscored in March when team owners 
approved the move of the Oakland Raiders to 
Las Vegas. 
Mr. Freeman, however, acknowledged that 
the N.C.A.A. remained the most concerted 
opponent to legalized sports gambling, 
noting that collegiate athletes are unpaid 
amateurs. He said one possible solution 
would be to prohibit betting on college 
football and basketball. 
The N.C.A.A. did not immediately comment 
on the decision by the Supreme Court to hear 
the case. 
While the court has offered no indication of 
how it might rule or why it was moving 
forward with the case, some industry 
advocates viewed the decision as a sign that 
the federal ban might be nearing its end. 
“Paspa’s days may be numbered,” said 
Daniel Wallach, a sports and gambling 
lawyer from Florida, who has tracked the 
case closely. "The court can overturn federal 
statute and provide a free and clear pathway 
for Congress to take this up. It’s the perfect 
time for the leagues, casino industry and 
Congress to come together, and I think it 
potentially opens sports betting up nationally 
by the 2018 N.F.L. season.” 
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“Supreme Court Still Mulling Over Hearing New Jersey Sports Betting 
Case” 
 
Forbes 
Darren Heitner 
January 17, 2017 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court previously set 
today, January 17, as the date that it would 
likely decide whether to hear an appeal 
brought by the State of New Jersey in its 
attempt to legalize sports betting within its 
borders. While the odds of the U.S. Supreme 
Court accepting certiorari and hearing New 
Jersey's case remain slim (approximately 1% 
of petitioned cases are heard by the Court), 
proponents of the legalization of sports 
betting in New Jersey may have earned a 
small win based on the Court's delay. 
New Jersey remains hopeful that it will be 
able to provide sports betting similar to Las 
Vegas. (Photo by Ethan Miller/Getty Images) 
Instead of deciding whether it would hear the 
case, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that 
it would wait on the U.S. Solicitor General to 
weigh in on the issue. It is a better outcome 
for the pending appeal than the more than 130 
cases that had their petitions to be heard 
denied earlier today. 
"The Acting Solicitor General is invited to 
file a brief in these cases expressing the views 
of the United States," states the U.S. Supreme 
Court's order. 
As noted by John Brennan of The Record, 
history would not necessarily bode well for 
New Jersey, despite the U.S. Supreme Court 
determining that it needs a bit more time to 
ruminate on the case. The federal government 
has previously taken the position that 
coincides with the big four U.S. professional 
sports leagues (NFL , MLB , NBA , NHL) as 
well as the NCAA, which have opposed the 
legalization of full-fledged sports betting 
beyond Nevada's borders. The prohibition 
dates back to 1992, when Congress passed a 
law, the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act (PASPA), which makes it 
unlawful for any governmental entity to 
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license 
or authorize any betting, gambling or 
wagering scheme based on games played by 
amateur or professional athletes. 
However, a new U.S. Solicitor General will 
soon be in place under President-Elect 
Donald Trump, whom may not follow the 
course set by prior administrations. 
The U.S. Solicitor General will consider the 
claims raised by New Jersey, which include 
the state's position that PASPA is 
unconstitutional. New Jersey has stated that it 
is against the U.S. Constitution for the federal 
government to usurp state rights and provide 
Nevada with the ability to control a robust 
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sports betting scheme while denying New 
Jersey and other states the same opportunity. 
There is no clear timetable as to when a brief 
will be filed by the U.S. Solicitor General. In 
the meantime, the State of New Jersey and 
those hoping to overturn PASPA will be 
paying close attention to President-Elect 
Trump's choice for the position. Above The 
Law has delivered an educated guess as to the 
list of names that Trump may be currently 
considering. 
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“New Jersey’s attempt at legalized sports betting suffers another big 
setback in court” 
 
The Washington Post 
Matt Bonesteel 
August 9, 2016 
 
The U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals on 
Tuesday upheld the prohibition of sports 
gambling in New Jersey, ruling that the 
state’s 2014 attempt at legalizing the practice 
violated the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act (PASPA), the 1992 federal 
law that prohibits sports gambling in all but 
four states: Nevada, Oregon, Montana and 
Delaware. 
New Jersey has made two attempts at 
legalizing sports gambling in an attempt to 
shore up the lagging fortunes of the state’s 
Atlantic City casinos, which have been 
decimated by the spread of legalized casino 
gambling in neighboring states. The state has 
been opposed by the NCAA, MLB, NBA, 
NFL and NHL, who have long argued that the 
expansion of legalized gambling violates 
federal law. 
The leagues won their first victory in U.S. 
District Court, and last August a three-judge 
panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled that New Jersey’s most recent attempt 
to legalize sports gambling, in 2014, 
amounted to a de facto authorization, in 
violation of PASPA, even though the state 
only wanted to repeal its laws prohibiting 
sports betting and would not actually be 
involved in the regulation of sports gambling, 
leaving that to the casinos and racetracks. 
In turn, New Jersey asked that the entire 
Third Circuit panel hear its argument, a so-
called en banc hearing that is granted only 
under exceptional circumstances. In 
February, state attorneys presented their case 
before all 12 active judges of the Third 
Circuit. 
In a 10-to-2 vote, the Third Circuit sided 
Tuesday with the NCAA and the sports 
leagues, though two of the judges wrote 
dissenting opinions. 
“We now hold that the District Court 
correctly ruled that because PASPA, by its 
terms, prohibits states from authorizing by 
law sports gambling, and because the 2014 
Law does exactly that, the 2014 Law violates 
federal law,” Judge Marjorie Rendell wrote 
in the majority opinion, adding that PASPA 
is indeed constitutional because it does not 
commandeer the states to enforce a federal 
law not expressly written into the 
Constitution. 
In his dissent, Judge Julio M. Fuentes writes 
that New Jersey’s attempted repeal of its 
sports gambling prohibitions did not amount 
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to an authorization of sports betting in the 
state because New Jersey would not be 
officially regulating sports gambling, instead 
merely allowing it. A literal reading of 
PASPA would allow such a move, Fuentes 
writes. Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie, in a 
separate dissent, repeated his earlier assertion 
that PASPA as a whole is unconstitutional. 
Bot Fuentes and Vanaskie had sided with 
New Jersey in previous court decisions. 
According to sports-law expert Daniel 
Wallach, New Jersey has until Nov. 7 to 
petition the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the 
case, and State Sen. Raymond Lesniak, a 
longtime supporter of legalized gambling, 
told ESPN’s David Purdum that the state will 
do exactly that. Both Wallach and Lesniak 
both have their doubts about whether the 
Supreme Court will hear the case, with 
Lesniak on Tuesday calling it “a long shot.” 
Wallach does note, however, that the rise of 
daily fantasy sports and the specific 
legalization of DFS in certain states may pave 
the way for legalized sports gambling overall 
in the United States, especially in light of the 
fact that the professional leagues have 
financial agreements with DFS companies in 
place. States that have legalized DFS could 
argue that the Department of Justice is 
selectively enforcing PASPA by prohibiting 
sports gambling but allowing legalized DFS. 
“They can’t have it both ways. Either PASPA 
applies to both or to neither,” Wallach says. 
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Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC 
16-499 
Ruling Below: In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 808 F.3d 144 (C.A.2 
(N.Y.),2015) 
United States and foreign nationals, who were injured or captured by terrorists overseas, or 
family members and estate representative of those who were injured, captured, or killed, brought 
actions against bank which allegedly financed and facilitated activities of organizations that 
committed attacks that took place in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, alleging violations 
of Anti–Terrorism Act (ATA), the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), and federal common law. Actions 
were consolidated. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Brian 
M. Cogan, J., dismissed claims. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed. 
Question Presented: Whether the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, categorically forecloses 
corporate liability. 
 
In re ARAB BANK, PLC ALIEN TORT STATUTE LITIGATION. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 
Decided on December 8, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
SACK, Circuit Judge: 
The plaintiffs in this case filed five separate 
lawsuits between 2004 and 2010 in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York against the defendant. 
The plaintiffs are aliens who were injured or 
captured by terrorists overseas, or family 
members and estate representatives of those 
who were injured, captured, or killed. The 
plaintiffs seek judgments against Arab Bank, 
PLC—a bank headquartered in Jordan with 
branches in various places around the 
world—for allegedly financing and 
facilitating the activities of organizations that 
committed the attacks that caused the 
plaintiffs' injuries. It is undisputed that, as a 
PLC,4 Arab Bank is a corporation for 
purposes of this appeal. 
 
The plaintiffs allege violations by Arab Bank 
of the Anti–Terrorism Act (the “ATA”), the 
Alien Tort Statute, and federal common law. 
The ATS differs from the ATA in that, 
among other things, it provides jurisdiction 
only with respect to suits by “aliens,” while 
the ATA provides jurisdiction only for suits 
by “national[s] of the United States.” 
 
Between 2007 and 2010, the plaintiffs' 
federal common-law claims were dismissed 
as redundant and lacking what the district 
court called a “sound basis.” On May 24, 
2013, the defendant also moved to dismiss 
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the plaintiffs' ATS claims, arguing that the 
law of this Circuit prohibits ATS suits against 
corporate entities. In their briefing in the 
district court, the plaintiffs responded to the 
defendant's arguments on their merits but 
also argued, in the alternative, that if the 
district court granted the defendant's motion, 
it should also reinstate the plaintiffs' federal 
common-law claims or permit the plaintiffs 
to plead related non-federal common-law 
claims. 
 
On August 23,2013, the district court issued 
the following order: 
 
The law of this Circuit is that plaintiffs cannot 
bring claims against corporations under the 
ATS. A decision by a panel of the Second 
Circuit “is binding unless and until it is 
overruled by the Court en banc or by the 
Supreme Court.” Because the Supreme Court 
affirmed [this Circuit's Kiobel decision] on 
other grounds, the Second Circuit's holding 
on corporate liability under the ATS remains 
intact. Nothing in the Supreme Court's 
affirmance undercuts the authority of the 
Second Circuit's decision. Plaintiffs' request 
to reinstate their federal common law claims 
or, in the alternative, assert non-federal 
common law claims is denied. The federal 
common law claims were dismissed not only 
as redundant, but also because Plaintiffs 
offered “no sound basis” for them. Plaintiffs 
also offer no sound basis for repackaging 
these claims under unidentified “non-federal 
common law” theories. 
 
Soon thereafter, judgments on the pleadings 
were entered in each of the individual cases 
as to the ATS claims. The plaintiffs filed 
timely appeals as to these claims. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue principally 
that this Circuit's opinion in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., aff'd on other grounds, 
when analyzed in light of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Kiobel II, is no longer 
“good law,” or at least, does not control this 
case. The plaintiffs also contend that the facts 
alleged sufficiently touch and concern the 
territory of the United States as required 
under Kiobel II to support jurisdiction, 
although they request that we remand to the 
district court for an initial decision on this 
issue. Finally, and in the alternative, the 
plaintiffs request the opportunity either to 
reinstate their federal common-law claims or 
to amend their pleadings in order to plead 
non-federal common-law claims. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
I. The Plaintiffs' Claims 
 
The plaintiffs in the underlying cases are U.S. 
and foreign nationals who have brought suit 
against Arab Bank for its alleged role in 
facilitating terrorist operations that harmed 
the plaintiffs. While the underlying cases 
contain differing factual allegations, they are, 
as the plaintiffs assert, “based on the same 
nucleus of [purported] material facts.” In 
recounting those facts to this Court, the 
plaintiffs' briefing relies heavily on the 
operative, amended complaint in Zur v. Arab 
Bank, PLC. In providing a summary of the 
facts of this case, we therefore draw, at times 
verbatim, from the district court's thorough 
opinion addressing a previous motion to 
dismiss by Arab Bank in Zur. 
 
According to the plaintiffs, over the past two 
decades, four prominent Palestinian terrorist 
organizations—the Islamic Resistance 
Movement (“HAMAS”), the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”), the Al Aqsa Martyrs' 
Brigade (“AAMB”), and the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (“PFLP”) 
(collectively “the terrorist organizations”)—
have conducted widespread murderous 
attacks, including suicide bombings, against 
citizens of Israel—mostly Jews. The terrorist 
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organizations allegedly arranged those 
attacks in part by promising, and later 
delivering, financial payments to the relatives 
of “martyrs” who were killed—along with 
those who were injured or captured—while 
perpetrating the attacks.  
 
The plaintiffs assert that the terrorist 
organizations funded these attacks in two 
ways. The organizations solicited public and 
private donations directly and deposited them 
in bank accounts throughout the Middle East. 
The organizations also raised funds through 
affiliated, purportedly charitable proxy 
organizations, including two entities created 
in Saudi Arabia: the Popular Committee for 
Assisting the Palestinian Mujahideen and the 
Saudi Committee for Aid to the Al–Quds 
Intifada (the “Saudi Committee”). These two 
organizations allegedly set up their own bank 
accounts, under the shared label “Account 
98,” at various banks in Saudi Arabia in order 
to hold funds collected for the families of 
“martyrs.” 
 
According to the amended complaint, Arab 
Bank—one of the largest financial 
institutions in the Middle East, with branches 
and subsidiaries in more than twenty-five 
countries, including a New York branch that 
provides clearing and correspondent banking 
services to foreign financial institutions—
deliberately helped the terrorist organizations 
and their proxies to raise funds for attacks and 
make payments to the families of “martyrs.” 
The plaintiffs further allege that Arab Bank 
used some of those facilities—the New York 
branch among them—to support the terrorist 
organizations in three ways. 
 
First, Arab Bank allegedly maintained 
accounts that the terrorist organizations used 
to solicit funds directly. The plaintiffs allege, 
with respect to HAMAS specifically, that 
Arab Bank “collected” funds into HAMAS 
accounts in its Beirut, Lebanon, and Gaza 
Strip branches. Supporters knew to donate to 
HAMAS directly through Arab Bank because 
the HAMAS website directed supporters to 
make contributions to Arab Bank's Gaza 
Strip branch, and because there were various 
advertisements publicized throughout the 
Middle East calling for donations to Arab 
Bank accounts. According to the plaintiffs, 
Arab Bank knew that the donations were 
being collected for terrorist attacks.  
 
Second, Arab Bank allegedly maintained 
accounts that proxy organizations and 
individuals used to raise funds for the 
terrorist organizations. For example, 
according to the amended complaint, Arab 
Bank maintained accounts, solicited and 
collected donations, and laundered funds for 
some of the purported charitable 
organizations that acted as fronts for the 
terrorist organizations. Arab Bank also 
maintained accounts for individual 
supporters of terrorist organizations such as 
HAMAS and al Qaeda. Again, responsible 
officials at Arab Bank purportedly knew that 
the accounts of these various organizations 
and individuals were being used to fund the 
suicide bombings and other attacks 
sponsored by the terrorist organizations. 
 
Third, Arab Bank allegedly played an active 
role in identifying the families of “martyrs” 
and facilitating payments to them from the 
Saudi Committee's “Account 98” funds, on 
behalf of the terrorist organizations. 
According to the plaintiffs, Arab Bank first 
worked with the Saudi Committee and 
HAMAS to finalize lists of eligible 
beneficiaries. Arab Bank then created 
individual bank accounts for the beneficiaries 
and facilitated transfers of “Account 98” 
funds into those accounts, often routing the 
transfers through its New York branch in 
order to convert Saudi currency into Israeli 
currency. Once the accounts were filled, 
Arab Bank provided instructions to the public 
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on how to qualify for and collect the money, 
and made payments to beneficiaries with 
appropriate documentation. 
 
The plaintiffs allege that Arab Bank's 
involvement with the terrorist 
organizations—particularly its facilitation of 
payments to the families of “martyrs”—
incentivized and encouraged suicide 
bombings and other murderous acts that 
harmed the plaintiffs. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
The plaintiffs in the consolidated cases filed 
five separate lawsuits between 2004 and 
2010 in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York against 
Arab Bank alleging variations on the theme 
of the foregoing facts. All five lawsuits 
included tort claims under the ATS. At the 
district court level, these cases were 
consolidated, along with six others, for 
discovery and pre-trial proceedings. 
 
On August 23, 2013, the district court 
dismissed the plaintiffs' ATS claims on the 
basis of Kiobel I. At the time, ATS claims 
were the only ones remaining in three of the 
five cases before the district court: Jesner, 
Lev, and Agurenko. Final judgments were 
therefore filed in each of those cases on 
August 28, 2013. The two remaining actions, 
Almog and Afriat–Kurtzer, involved both 
ATS claims and ATA claims, the latter of 
which remained intact after the district court's 
August 23, 2013 order. As a result, partial 
final judgments as to the ATS claims were 
issued in those cases on October 16, 2013. 
The plaintiffs in all five cases appealed to this 
Court from the judgments on the pleadings 
regarding their ATS claims. On December 
10, 2013, the plaintiffs collectively moved to 
consolidate the appeals. We granted that 
motion on January 6, 2014. 
For the following reasons, we affirm the 
judgments of the district court. 
DISCUSSION 
 
I. Standard of Review 
 
“We review de novo a district court's decision 
to grant a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(c).” In doing so, we “employ[ ] 
the same ... standard applicable to dismissals 
pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 
12(b)(6).” Thus, we “accept[ ] as true factual 
allegations made in the complaint, and draw[ 
] all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiffs.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, 
a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”  
 
II. Corporate Liability Under the Alien 
Tort Statute 
 
We conclude that Kiobel I is and remains the 
law of this Circuit, notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel II 
affirming this Court's judgment on other 
grounds. We affirm the decision of the 
district court on that basis. We do so despite 
our view that Kiobel II suggests that the ATS 
may allow for corporate liability and our 
observation that there is a growing consensus 
among our sister circuits to that effect. 
Indeed, on the issue of corporate liability 
under the ATS, Kiobel I now appears to swim 
alone against the tide. 
 
A. The Decisions in Kiobel I and Kiobel II 
 
To repeat: The ATS provides, in full, that 
“[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for 
a tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States.” In 
Kiobel I, the panel divided over the breadth 
of liability recognized by the “law of 
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nations”—and, consequently, on whether 
corporations may be held liable under the 
ATS. 
 
The majority opinion, written by Judge 
Cabranes and joined by then-Chief Judge 
Jacobs, concluded that the ATS does not 
permit claims against corporations because 
“[n]o corporation has ever been subject to 
any form of liability (whether civil, criminal, 
or otherwise) under the customary 
international law of human rights.” This 
conclusion was based on the majority's view 
that the law of nations must affirmatively 
extend liability to “a particular class of 
defendant, such as corporations,” before that 
class of defendant may be held liable for 
conduct that violates a substantive norm of 
customary international law. As precedential 
support for that view, the majority cited 
footnote 20 in Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain. In 
Sosa, commenting on the portion of the 
opinion that instructed “federal courts ... not 
[to] recognize private claims under federal 
common law for violations of any 
international law norm with less definite 
content and acceptance among civilized 
nations than the historical paradigms familiar 
when § 1350 was enacted,” the Supreme 
Court stated that “[a] related consideration is 
whether international law extends the scope 
of liability for a violation of a given norm to 
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is 
a private actor such as a corporation or 
individual.” 
 
Judge Leval, Kiobel I's third panel member, 
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment 
for the defendant, but sharply contesting the 
majority's conception of liability under the 
law of nations. He described “[i]nternational 
law, at least as it pertains to human rights,” as 
“a sparse body of norms ... prohibiting 
conduct,” which lacks comprehensive rules 
regarding liability and so “leaves the manner 
of enforcement ... almost entirely to 
individual nations.” Judge Leval argued that 
Sosa's footnote 20 is consistent with that view 
inasmuch as it does no more than caution 
courts to defer to the law of nations on the 
scope of liability in those exceptional cases 
where customary international law 
affirmatively bars recovery against private 
actors: 
 
    If the violated norm is one that 
international law applies only against States, 
then a private actor, such as a corporation or 
an individual, who acts independently of a 
State, can have no liability for violation of the 
law of nations because there has been no 
violation of the law of nations. On the other 
hand, if the conduct is of the type classified 
as a violation of the norms of international 
law regardless of whether done by a State or 
a private actor, then a private actor, such as a 
corporation or an individual, has violated the 
law of nations and is subject to liability in a 
suit under the ATS. The majority's partial 
quotation out of context, interpreting the 
Supreme Court as distinguishing between 
individuals and corporations, misunderstands 
the meaning of the passage. 
 
Under that view, the ATS does not prohibit 
corporate liability per se. Instead, if 
unspecified by the international law in 
question, the scope of liability under the ATS 
is appropriately classified as a question of 
remedy to be settled under domestic law. 
The plaintiffs in Kiobel I obtained a writ of 
certiorari from the United States Supreme 
Court. In its eventual opinion on the merits, 
the Supreme Court described the case's rather 
arduous path to and before it: 
 
The [United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York] dismissed 
[several ATS] claims, reasoning that the facts 
alleged to support those claims did not give 
rise to a violation of the law of nations. The 
court denied respondents' motion to dismiss 
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with respect to the remaining claims, but 
certified its order for interlocutory appeal [to 
the Second Circuit] pursuant to § 1292(b). 
The Second Circuit dismissed the entire 
complaint, reasoning that the law of nations 
does not recognize corporate liability. We 
granted certiorari to consider that question. 
After oral argument, we directed the parties 
to file supplemental briefs addressing an 
additional question: “Whether and under 
what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts 
to recognize a cause of action for violations 
of the law of nations occurring within the 
territory of a sovereign other than the United 
States.” We heard oral argument again and 
now affirm the judgment below, based on our 
answer to the second question. 
 
Thus, the Supreme Court first agreed to 
review the judgment of this Court. After 
being supplied with briefing and conducting 
oral argument directed to the analysis we had 
employed in Kiobel I, the Court decided to 
address a different issue. The Court 
concluded not that Kiobel I was right on the 
law, but that it was right in its conclusion 
because of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. The Court observed that 
“all the relevant conduct took place outside 
the United States,” which justified dismissal 
of the plaintiffs' ATS claims.  
 
B. The Impact of Kiobel II on Kiobel I 
 
Although the route the Supreme Court took 
to its decision in Kiobel II seems to suggest 
that the Court was less than satisfied with our 
approach to jurisdiction over the cases on 
appeal under the ATS, it neither said as much 
nor purported to overrule Kiobel I. The two 
decisions adopted different bases for 
dismissal for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Whatever the tension between 
them, the decisions are not logically 
inconsistent. 
The Supreme Court chose to affirm Kiobel I 
on extraterritoriality grounds without 
reaching the corporate liability question. But 
because both of these questions concern the 
proper interpretation of the ATS itself, and 
because the ATS is strictly jurisdictional, it 
follows that both of these questions are 
jurisdictional. Regarding corporate liability, 
Kiobel I held that federal courts lack 
jurisdiction over ATS suits against 
corporations; as to extraterritoriality, Kiobel 
II held that federal courts lack jurisdiction 
over ATS suits based solely on 
extraterritorial conduct unless that conduct 
sufficiently touches and concerns the 
territory of the United States. Taken together, 
they require that if either the defendant in an 
ATS suit is a corporation, or the ATS suit is 
premised on conduct outside the United 
States that does not sufficiently touch and 
concern the territory of the United States, or 
both, the federal court in which the suit was 
brought lacks jurisdiction. 
 
Generally speaking, “this panel is bound by 
prior decisions of this court unless and until 
the precedents established therein are 
reversed en banc or by the Supreme Court.” 
We have recognized, though, that there is an 
exception to this general rule when an 
“intervening Supreme Court decision ... casts 
doubt on our controlling precedent.” “[F]or 
this exception to apply, the intervening 
decision need not address the precise issue 
already decided by our Court.” Instead, there 
must be a conflict, incompatibility, or 
“inconsisten[cy]” between this Circuit's 
precedent and the intervening Supreme Court 
decision. The effect of intervening precedent 
may be “subtle,” but if the impact is 
nonetheless “fundamental,” it requires this 
Court to conclude that a decision of a panel 
of this Court is “no longer good law.” 
 
Kiobel II does cast a shadow on Kiobel I in 
several ways. 
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First, in Kiobel II, the Supreme Court stated 
that “[c]orporations are often present in many 
countries, and it would reach too far to say 
that mere corporate presence suffices” to 
displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application. The implication 
of a statement that mere corporate presence is 
insufficient would seem to be that corporate 
presence may, in combination with some 
other factual allegations, be sufficient—so 
jurisdiction over ATS suits against 
corporations is sometimes proper. Indeed, if 
corporate liability under the ATS were not 
possible as a general matter, the Supreme 
Court's statement about “mere corporate 
presence” would seem meaningless. 
Accordingly, Kiobel II appears to suggest 
that the ATS allows for some degree of 
corporate liability. 
 
Second, Kiobel II embraced an interpretation 
of Sosa that seems to us to be more consistent 
with Judge Leval's Kiobel I concurrence than 
the majority opinion. According to the 
Supreme Court, “[t]he question under Sosa ” 
is “whether [a federal] court has authority to 
recognize a cause of action under U.S. law to 
enforce a norm of international law.” The 
Supreme Court further stated that the ATS 
empowers federal courts to recognize such a 
cause of action “under federal common law” 
to enable litigants to bring “private claims” 
based on “international law violations.” 
Kiobel II thus appears to reinforce Judge 
Leval's reading of Sosa, which derives from 
international law only the conduct 
proscribed, leaving domestic law to govern 
the available remedy and, presumably, the 
nature of the party against whom it may be 
obtained. If that is so, Kiobel II suggests that 
Kiobel I relies in part on a misreading of 
Sosa. 
 
Third, Kiobel I and Kiobel II may work in 
tandem to narrow federal courts' jurisdiction 
under the ATS more than what we understand 
Congress may have intended in passing the 
statute. As Justice Breyer noted in his Kiobel 
II concurrence, the basic purpose of the ATS 
is to provide compensation to foreign 
plaintiffs injured by “pirates,” “torturers,” 
“perpetrators of genocide,” and similar 
actors. Together, Kiobel I and Kiobel II put 
such aggrieved potential plaintiffs in a very 
small box: The two decisions read 
cumulatively provide that plaintiffs can bring 
ATS suits against only natural persons, and 
perhaps non-corporate entities, based on 
conduct that occurs at least in part within (or 
otherwise sufficiently touches and concerns) 
the territory of the United States. At a time 
when large corporations are often among the 
more important actors on the world stage, and 
where actions and their effects frequently 
cross international frontiers, Kiobel I and 
Kiobel II may work together to prevent 
foreign plaintiffs from having their day in 
court in a far greater proportion of tort cases 
than Congress envisioned when, centuries 
ago, it passed the ATS. 
 
Our reading of Kiobel II is bolstered by what 
appears to be a growing consensus among our 
sister circuits that the ATS allows for 
corporate liability. To date, the other circuits 
to have considered the issue have all 
determined that corporate liability is possible 
under the ATS.  
 
For those reasons, Kiobel II may be viewed 
as an “intervening Supreme Court decision 
that casts doubt on [Kiobel I ],” even though 
it does not “address the precise issue” of 
corporate liability. Kiobel II suggests a 
reading of the ATS that is at best 
“inconsistent” with Kiobel I 's core holding, 
which along with the views of our sister 
circuits indicates that something may be 
wrong with Kiobel I. 
 
We nonetheless decline to conclude that 
Kiobel II overruled Kiobel I. We think that 
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one panel's overruling of the holding of a case 
decided by a previous panel is perilous. It 
tends, in our view, to degrade the expectation 
of litigants, who routinely rely on the 
authoritative stature of the Court's panel 
opinions. It also diminishes respect for the 
authority of three-judge panel decisions and 
opinions by which the overwhelming 
majority of our work, and that of other 
circuits, is accomplished. We will leave it to 
either an en banc sitting of this Court or an 
eventual Supreme Court review to overrule 
Kiobel I if, indeed, it is no longer viable.  
If this Court declines to overrule Kiobel I 
(either on the merits or by refusing to proceed 
en banc), the Supreme Court would, of 
course, be able to do so should it choose to 
hear the case. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on this issue in 2011 when it first 
decided to hear an appeal from Kiobel I. 
Having nonetheless avoided addressing the 
issue directly in Kiobel II, perhaps it would 
decide to grant certiorari on this issue 
again—especially in light of the divergence 
of federal case law since. 
 
Finally, the district court dismissed the 
plaintiffs' ATS claims solely on corporate 
liability grounds under Kiobel I. It is well 
settled that “we may affirm on any grounds 
for which there is a record sufficient to permit 
conclusions of law, including grounds not 
relied upon by the district court.” However, 
we have discretion to choose not to do so 
based on prudential factors and concerns. 
It is tempting to seek to avoid grappling with 
issues requiring an analysis of the 
relationship between Kiobel I and Kiobel II 
and the continuing viability of Kiobel I 
simply by affirming the district court's 
judgments on the basis of Kiobel II alone. We 
nevertheless decline to do so for several 
reasons. First, inasmuch as the district court 
did decide the case based solely on a 
mechanical application of Kiobel I, if it is 
“good law,” an affirmance on the basis of 
Kiobel I is the simplest, most direct route to 
that result. By contrast, in order to affirm on 
the grounds that law established by Kiobel II 
prohibits the assumption of jurisdiction in 
this case, we would have to decide in the first 
instance that the alleged activities underlying 
the plaintiffs' claims do not touch and 
concern the United States sufficiently to 
justify a conclusion that the district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction under Kiobel II 's 
extraterritoriality test. It seems to us to be 
unwise to decide the difficult and sensitive 
issue of whether the clearing of foreign 
dollar-denominated payments through a 
branch in New York could, under these 
circumstances, displace the presumption 
against the extraterritorial application of the 
ATS, when it was not the focus of either the 
district court's decision or the briefing on 
appeal. 
 
Moreover, deciding this appeal solely on the 
basis of Kiobel I may well further the 
development of the law of this Circuit in this 
regard. If Kiobel I remains authoritative, 
litigants would benefit from the settling of 
expectations that clarification would bring. 
And if the rule of Kiobel I does not prevail, 
then leaving it unnecessarily “on the books” 
is worrisome—it may result in the dismissal 
of cases that are meritorious, including 
possibly multidistrict litigations that are 
randomly assigned to the district courts in 
this Circuit. Perhaps more insidiously, 
plaintiffs with ATS claims against 
corporations that turn out to be permissible 
might well be dissuaded from asserting them 
in this Circuit despite their ultimate merit. 
We therefore affirm on the basis of the 
holding of Kiobel I. 
 
III. Common Law Claims 
 
The plaintiffs request that if we affirm the 
dismissal of their ATS claims—as indeed we 
do—we reinstate the “general federal 
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common law” claims asserted in their 
complaints (to which they refer on appeal as 
their “general common-law tort” claims), 
which the district court dismissed as 
redundant and lacking a “sound basis.” 
Alternatively, the plaintiffs request leave to 
amend their complaints in order to re-plead 
under state or foreign law the claims that they 
originally pleaded under federal common 
law. We decline both requests. 
 
First, we will not reinstate the plaintiffs' 
federal common-law causes of action 
because we discern no basis for such 
nebulous, non-statutory claims under federal 
law. 
 
As for leave to amend the complaints, “we 
review [the district court's refusal to allow 
such amendment] only for abuse of discretion 
which ordinarily we will not identify absent 
an error of law, a clearly erroneous 
assessment of the facts, or a decision outside 
the available range of permitted choices.” 
While “[l]eave to amend should be freely 
granted, ... the district court has the discretion 
to deny leave if there [was] a good reason for 
it, such as futility, bad faith, undue delay, or 
undue prejudice to the opposing party 
 
The plaintiffs have spent more than ten years 
litigating the matters before us but have not 
specified any particular state or foreign 
common-law theory on which they seek to 
recover. To be sure, they have in their 
complaints and in their briefing on appeal 
asserted that they may recover under general 
principles of joint-venture liability, agency, 
reckless disregard, intentional injury of 
others by a third party, reckless disregard, 
wrongful death, survival, and negligent or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
But their short and conclusory statements to 
this effect, untethered to the law of any 
particular jurisdiction or any serious attempt 
at explanation, did not put the defendant on 
notice of specific state or foreign common-
law claims that it might be called upon to 
defend against in this litigation. The plaintiffs 
have had ample time to develop and assert 
such theories. The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying leave to amend 
because permitting the plaintiffs to repackage 
their federal common-law claims as state or 
foreign common-law claims at such a late 
stage would, we think, do a disservice both to 
the courts in which they chose to litigate their 
claims, and to the defendant, which must 
prepare itself to defend against them. 
 
Permitting the plaintiffs in Jesner, Lev, and 
Agurenko to amend their complaints would, 
moreover, have been futile. Following the 
dismissal of the plaintiffs' ATS claims, the 
only basis on which the district court might 
exercise jurisdiction over these actions would 
be diversity of citizenship. But “diversity is 
lacking ... where the only parties are foreign 
entities, or where on one side there are 
citizens and aliens and on the opposite side 
there are only aliens.” Here, there are aliens 
on both sides of the litigation—plaintiffs are 
aliens (only aliens can bring ATS claims), 
and so is the defendant, a citizen of Jordan—
and the Jesner, Lev, and Agurenko plaintiffs 
do not seek to assert any other federal claims 
that might provide a basis for federal-
question jurisdiction. For these reasons, 
permitting the Jesner, Lev, and Agurenko 
plaintiffs to amend their complaints to assert 
non-federal common-law claims would be 
fruitless. 
 
The district court therefore acted within its 
discretion in declining to permit the plaintiffs 
to amend their complaints. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the 
judgments of the district court. 
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“Supreme Court to Weigh if Firms Can Be Sued in Human Rights 
Cases” 
 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
April 3, 2017 
 
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to 
decide whether corporations may be sued in 
American courts for complicity in human 
rights abuses abroad. 
The case concerns Arab Bank, which is based 
in Jordan and has been accused of processing 
financial transactions through a branch in 
New York for groups linked to terrorism. The 
plaintiffs in the case seek to hold the bank 
liable for attacks in Israel and in the 
Palestinian territories by Hamas and other 
groups. 
The case turns on the meaning of the Alien 
Tort Statute, a cryptic 1789 law that allows 
federal district courts to hear “any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.” 
The law was largely ignored until the 1980s, 
when federal courts started to apply it in 
international human rights cases. A 2004 
Supreme Court decision, Sosa v. Álvarez-
Machain, left the door open to some claims 
under the law, as long as they involved 
violations of international norms with 
“definite content and acceptance among 
civilized nations.” 
The federal appeals courts are divided over 
whether corporations may be sued under the 
law. 
The Supreme Court had agreed to decide the 
question once before, in 2011, in Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum. The Obama 
administration urged the court to rule that 
corporations could be subject to the law. 
After hearing arguments on the question in 
2012, the Supreme Court asked the parties to 
brief and argue a broader issue: whether 
American courts may ever hear disputes 
under the law for human rights abuses 
abroad, whether the defendant was a 
corporation or not. 
In 2013, the court said that there was a 
general presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of American law, 
ruling against Nigerian plaintiffs who said 
foreign oil companies had aided in atrocities 
by Nigerian military and police forces against 
Ogoni villagers. 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., writing for 
the majority, wrote that even minimal contact 
with the United States would not be sufficient 
to overcome the presumption. “Even where 
the claims touch and concern the territory of 
the United States, they must do so with 
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sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritorial application,” he wrote. 
But the Supreme Court did not answer the 
question it had initially agreed to consider, 
whether corporations are categorically 
excluded from the law. 
The new case, Jesner v. Arab Bank, No. 16-
499, is likely to produce an answer. It is an 
appeal from a decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in 
New York, which ruled in favor of Arab 
Bank, saying that corporations may not be 
sued under the 1789 law. 
The plaintiffs in the case said the bank had 
“served as the ‘paymaster’ for Hamas and 
other terrorist organizations, helping them 
identify and pay the families of suicide 
bombers and other terrorists.” 
The bank responded that it had helped the 
United States in “the fight against terrorism 
financing and money laundering” and was 
not accused by the plaintiffs of being 
“involved in the planning, financing or 
commission of the attacks that caused their 
injuries.” 
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“DOJ’s curious Supreme Court brief in Arab Bank Alien Tort case” 
 
Reuters 
Alison Frankel 
June 29, 2017 
 
It’s always fascinating to see how the U.S. 
solicitor general’s office attempts to 
reconcile competing executive-branch 
interests when it files briefs in U.S. Supreme 
Court litigation affecting the government’s 
relationships with foreign sovereigns. 
The latest example is the Justice 
Department’s brief in a dispute over whether 
about 6,000 non-U.S. citizens can use a 1798 
law to sue Jordan’s biggest financial 
institution, Arab Bank, for allegedly 
facilitating terrorism. The brief preserves the 
integrity of the solicitor general’s office by 
repeating arguments the Justice Department 
made in a 2012 Supreme Court case that 
raised the exact same question as the Arab 
Bank case. But the filing also reflects the U.S. 
State Department’s concerns about alienating 
an important ally. 
That awkward balance could be an 
opportunity for Arab Bank to get the 
Supreme Court to look at a second issue in a 
case the bank is otherwise almost certain to 
lose. 
The Supreme Court granted review of the 
case, Jesner v. Arab Bank, to decide whether 
the Alien Tort Statute can be asserted against 
corporations. If that question sounds familiar, 
it’s because the justices agreed to hear the 
same issue back in 2011, in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum. The Justice Department, 
siding with the Nigerian plaintiffs in the 
Royal Dutch case, submitted a brief arguing 
that the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
was wrong to hold that corporations cannot 
be sued under the ATS. It urged the Supreme 
Court to reverse the 2nd Circuit and rule that 
corporations can be liable. 
Instead, the Supreme Court changed its mind 
about what the real issue in the case was. The 
justices called for additional briefing about 
whether the ATS extends to conduct outside 
of U.S. borders. The court’s 2013 Kiobel 
decision held that the ATS presumptively 
does not apply to overseas conduct but 
plaintiffs can rebut the presumption by 
showing “with sufficient force” that their 
claims “touch and concern the territory of the 
United States.” 
The Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision did not 
directly address whether corporations can be 
sued so the 2nd Circuit’s Kiobel ruling 
remained intact, as the non-U.S. plaintiffs 
trying to sue Arab Bank discovered to their 
detriment in 2015. The plaintiffs, all of whom 
blame the Jordanian bank for allowing 
Hamas to finance international terror attacks, 
moved to revive dismissed ATS claims after 
the Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision. A 
three-judge 2nd Circuit panel said they still 
couldn’t sue the bank because Kiobel was 
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still binding 2nd Circuit precedent, and under 
that precedent, plaintiffs can’t assert the ATS 
against corporations. In 2016, a splintered en 
banc 2nd Circuit declined to hear the Arab 
Bank ATS case. 
In the plaintiffs’ June 20 merits brief, their 
Supreme Court counsel, Jeffrey Fisher of 
Stanford’s Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, 
argued that the 2nd Circuit’s prohibition on 
ATS suits against corporations is the result of 
a misread footnote in a Supreme Court case 
that only discussed actionable conduct under 
the ATS, not liability. There’s nothing in the 
text of the ancient statute, which was 
supposed to address piracy on the high seas, 
or in its long history to indicate corporations 
are exempt when they violate international 
norms, the brief said. 
“A business should not be allowed to reap the 
benefits of incorporation while claiming 
immunity from liability for noxious acts such 
as terrorism, slavery, or genocide,” Fisher 
wrote. 
The Justice Department’s brief, posted 
Wednesday on the SG’s website, completely 
backed the plaintiffs’ interpretation – and 
Justice’s own previous analysis from Kiobel 
– of corporate liability under the ATS. 
(DOJ’s brief was signed by Deputy Solicitor 
General Edwin Kneedler because Acting SG 
Jeffrey Wall is recused.) No other federal 
circuit has adopted the 2nd Circuit’s bar on 
suing corporations under the ATS, the Justice 
Department pointed out, and “nothing in 
international law discountenances civil 
claims against corporations.” 
By my read, the 2nd Circuit’s Kiobel 
prohibition on ATS suits against corporations 
is doomed. Even Arab Bank, represented at 
the Supreme Court by Paul Clement of 
Kirkland & Ellis, didn’t try very hard in its 
brief opposing Supreme Court review to 
justify the legal reasoning of the 2nd Circuit’s 
Kiobel precedent, though the brief half-
heartedly mentioned the U.N. Council on 
Human Rights “has recognized that 
international law does not currently impose 
any direct legal responsibilities on 
corporations.” 
But the second half of the Justice Department 
brief may keep the Arab Bank case from 
being completely lopsided – if Arab Bank can 
leverage it to persuade the justices to look 
beyond the narrow question of corporate 
liability under the Alien Tort Statute. 
The Justice Department’s brief didn’t stop at 
that question. It went on to address whether 
the non-U.S. plaintiffs suing Arab Bank can 
rebut the presumption against overseas 
application of the ATS, as the Supreme Court 
said they must in that 2013 Kiobel ruling. 
According to the Justice Department, non-
U.S. plaintiffs can’t overcome the 
presumption just by arguing that foreign 
banks used automated systems to clear U.S. 
dollar transactions through banks in the U.S. 
“Automated clearance activities alone would 
not support claims under the ATS,” the 
Justice brief said. “A foreign actor’s 
preference for dollar-denominated 
transactions, and the consequent likelihood 
that a transaction will be automatically routed 
through a bank’s U.S. branch or affiliate, are 
not generally circumstances for which the 
international community might validly deem 
the United States to be responsible. Congress 
did not intend the ATS to ‘make the United 
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States a uniquely hospitable forum for the 
enforcement of international norms.’ That 
limitation is difficult to reconcile with an 
approach under which a claim under the ATS 
may be premised on the popularity of the 
dollar as a currency for remunerating foreign 
illegal activity.” 
The Justice Department conceded that our 
own government has been known to base 
criminal and forfeiture actions on “foreign 
misuse of domestic (banking) 
instrumentalities,” but said the rules are 
different for private plaintiffs asserting the 
ATS. That’s especially true, the brief said, 
when foreign policy is implicated, as it is in 
the Arab Bank case, which has already frayed 
the government’s relationship with a crucial 
friend in military operations against the 
Islamic State. 
The Justice Department did not call on the 
Supreme Court to expand the Arab Bank case 
to include whether dollar-clearing is 
sufficient to provide the requisite “touch and 
concern” with U.S. territory. It also noted that 
plaintiffs have alleged more than dollar-
clearing against Arab Bank, and that those 
additional assertions could justify reviving 
the ATS suit. 
The brief asked the Supreme Court to instruct 
the 2nd Circuit to decide whether the Arab 
Bank plaintiffs meet the territorial test for an 
ATS suit – an issue the 2nd Circuit pointedly 
avoided when it said the case couldn’t be 
brought because Arab Bank is a corporation. 
The big question now is whether Arab Bank, 
in its response brief, will push for the 
Supreme Court to go even farther and decide 
whether what the bank has always described 
as mere banking services can give rise to ATS 
liability. That’s a potentially more difficult 
question than the 2nd Circuit’s bar on ATS 
suits against corporations. Global banks have 
already been spooked by a Brooklyn federal 
jury verdict holding Arab Bank liable to U.S. 
citizens in a terror financing suit that parallels 
the case at the Supreme Court. If the justices 
decide they’re interested in dollar-clearing 
transactions and territoriality, international 
banks will be watching intently. 
That’s unlikely to happen, of course. The 
plaintiffs suing Arab Bank described in detail 
their evidence that the bank wasn’t just 
processing transactions by rote but was 
facilitating money transfers for known 
Hamas leaders. There’s every reason for the 
justices to wait for a different case to test the 
jurisdictional power of dollar-clearing 
transactions in suits by private citizens. 
But Kiobel’s history at the Supreme Court 
shows that anything can happen. The justices 
already changed their focus in one ATS case. 
Who says they won’t do it again? 
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“Plaintiffs Petition U.S. Supreme Court in High-Profile Alien Tort 
Statute Case” 
 
Lexology 
Emily Holland 
November 2, 2016 
 
Plaintiffs in Jesner v. Arab Bank have sought 
certiorari from the United States Supreme 
Court requesting that the Court take up, and 
answer, the unresolved question of whether 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) permits 
corporate liability for violations of the law of 
nations. Seeking certiorari does not ensure 
that the Supreme Court will agree to hear the 
case—the Court agrees to hear only a small 
fraction of the cases submitted to it for 
review. In this case, however, the chances of 
review are somewhat increased because: (i) 
there is currently a split between the various 
Courts of Appeal on the question of whether 
corporate liability is possible in a claim 
brought under the ATS, and (ii) because the 
Second Circuit, which decided Jesner, 
specifically noted that the issue could benefit 
from the Supreme Court’s review.  
Briefly, plaintiffs sued Arab Bank, which is 
one of the largest financial institutions in 
Jordan, several years ago alleging a variety of 
claims, including some under the ATS. The 
plaintiffs, U.S. and foreign nationals who 
were injured, or whose family members were 
killed or injured in certain terrorist attacks 
carried out in Israel, seek to hold the bank 
responsible for allegedly financing and 
facilitating the activities of Hamas, which the 
United States has labelled a terrorist 
organization. (Arab Bank previously settled 
claims brought on the basis of the same 
conduct by plaintiffs under the U.S. Anti-
Terrorism Act, which allows U.S. citizens to 
pursue claims arising from international 
terrorism, having lost its bid to avoid liability 
in court.)  
With respect to the ATS claims, the Second 
Circuit ruled for Arab Bank. The Second 
Circuit applied an earlier Second Circuit 
decision and held that ATS does not permit 
claims against corporations. That case, 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, went to the 
Supreme Court, which ultimately decided the 
case on different grounds, finding that the 
presumption against extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law bars ATS claims that 
lack a sufficient connection to the United 
States. In rejecting the possibility that the 
claims presented in Kiobel had sufficient 
connections to the United States to permit 
them to go forward, the Court ruled that “it 
would reach too far to say” that [a 
defendant’s] mere corporate presence [in the 
United States] suffices.”  
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The question the Jesner plaintiffs, 
represented by Stanford Law School and two 
law firms, now ask the Court to address is the 
question left unanswered in Kiobel: whether 
a corporation, as opposed to a natural person, 
can be found liable under the ATS. The 
certiorari petition notes that several Courts of 
Appeal—by a margin of, according to the 
petition, “four to one”—have decided that the 
ATS permits corporate liability. Plaintiffs 
also argue that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Kiobelsuggests (or appears to suggest) that 
the ATS contemplates corporate liability. 
The petition disputes what it describes as the 
Second Circuit’s outlier position that, 
following Kiobel’sintroduction of the “touch 
and concern” test, the issue of whether the 
ATS allows corporate liability will “rarely” 
matter. In support, and among other 
arguments, the petition points to another case 
currently making its way through the Second 
Circuit, involving terror financing allegations 
against another financial institution.  
In that case, Licci v. Lebanese Canadian 
Bank, the Second Circuit concluded that 
plaintiffs’ ATS claims had “surpassed 
[Kiobel’s] jurisdictional hurdle,” since the 
conduct alleged touched and concerned the 
United States with the requisite “sufficient 
force” necessary to survive dismissal, and 
had stated a claim for a violation of the law 
of nations. Specifically, the court pointed to 
the bank’s use of a correspondent banking 
account in New York to facilitate wire 
transfers to a terrorist organization that 
enabled and facilitated terrorist rocket attacks 
harming or killing plaintiffs and their 
decedents. Ultimately, however, the court 
determined that the circuit’s bar on corporate 
liability under the ATS foreclosed the claims.  
Back to Jesner, Arab Bank’s opposition is 
due on November 12. The petitioners have 
consented to any and all amicus briefs, and 
we expect at least one from Arab Bank.
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“Corporate Liability and the ATS: Arab Bank Appeal Continues to 
Define Kiobel Legacy” 
 
Lawfare Blog 
Sarah Freuden, Alex Zerden 
December 16, 2015 
 
At a time of heightened concern over a new 
wave of terrorism financing threats, the 
decade-long Arab Bank terrorism financing 
litigation took another turn last week when 
the Second Circuit denied several thousand 
terrorism victims the right to pursue claims 
against the Jordan-based Arab Bank PLC in 
U.S. federal court. The plaintiffs are non-U.S. 
victims of Palestinian terrorism from the 
Second Intifada from 2000-2004 who sued 
Arab Bank under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) for alleged financing and facilitation 
of terrorist organization activities. The 
Second Circuit’s decision comes at a time 
when courts across the country are grappling 
with broader issues of how to handle complex 
substantive and jurisdictional questions 
involving foreign companies and 
extraterritorial conduct. 
Last Tuesday, a three-judge panel of the 
Second Circuit issued a ruling that addressed 
the narrow but critical issue whether the ATS 
applies to corporations. Citing the Court’s 
2010 decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(Kiobel I), affʹd on other grounds, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013) (Kiobel II), the panel held that it does 
not, and therefore affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of these claims against the Arab 
Bank. However, all is not lost for the 
plaintiffs; the panel also recognized that 
Kiobel I “appears to swim alone against the 
tide” of sister circuits, which allow for 
corporate liability under the ATS, and 
welcomed en banc or Supreme Court review. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel is also contemplating an 
appeal. 
The ATS is an eighteenth century law that 
permits foreign plaintiffs to bring suit in 
federal court for torts “committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.” After laying dormant for much of its 
existence, the ATS has been used in recent 
decades to pursue claims against individuals 
and corporations around the world for human 
rights violations. The Supreme Court, 
however, has approached the ATS with some 
skepticism, and has reined in the use of the 
statute considerably in recent years. In the 
seminal ATS case Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 
542 U.S. 692 (2004), the Supreme Court held 
that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute, which 
grants jurisdiction over violations of only 
those international norms that are binding, 
specific, and universally accepted, such as 
piracy and torture. 
Kiobel I, the Second Circuit decision on 
which Tuesday’s Arab Bank ruling is based, 
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purported to apply Sosa. The majority 
opinion, authored by Judge Cabranes, held 
that corporations are not subject to liability 
under the ATS, because the concept of 
corporate liability has not attained “universal 
acceptance” in international law. Yet all other 
Circuits that have addressed the issue have 
disagreed, assuming or deciding that the ATS 
permits corporate liability under certain 
circumstances. This includes the Ninth, D.C., 
Seventh, Eleventh, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits. 
Judge Leval likewise came to that conclusion 
in Kiobel I, reasoning in his concurring 
opinion that “international law takes no 
position” on whether civil liability should be 
imposed on particular actors, such as 
corporations, but “leaves that question to 
each nation to resolve.” 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Kiobel on the issue of corporate liability, but 
instead applied the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and ruled that the case was 
not actionable, because the alleged violations 
did not sufficiently “touch and concern” the 
United States. The ATS is a statute 
specifically designed to address wrongs 
committed against non-U.S. nationals, so 
application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality significantly narrows that 
the scope of actionable claims. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality in 
Kiobel II and Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010), has had, and will 
continue to have, a resounding impact not 
only on the viability of ATS cases, but on the 
viability of all cases involving non-U.S. 
actors and conduct. The Supreme Court 
recently granted certiorari in another Second 
Circuit case, European Community v. RJR 
Nabisco, concerning the proper application 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
under RICO. It will be important to watch 
how the Supreme Court rules in that case, and 
whether its decision applies beyond the 
context of RICO. 
As for corporate liability under the ATS, the 
issue remains unresolved. The lack of an 
outright rejection by the Supreme Court may 
indicate that such liability is theoretically 
possible, and some language in Kiobel II 
appears to specifically contemplate corporate 
liability. The Second Circuit acknowledged 
as much in the Arab Bank decision, noting 
that “Kiobel II suggests a reading of the ATS 
that is at best ‘inconsistent’ with Kiobel I’s 
core holding.” That, combined with the 
opposite conclusions of several Circuit 
Courts indicates that there may be 
“something wrong” with Kiobel I. Yet the 
Second Circuit “declined to conclude” that 
Kiobel II overruled Kiobel I, reasoning it 
would be preferable to have the issue 
resolved en banc and/or through further 
review by the Supreme Court. Therefore, for 
the moment at least, corporations may be not 
sued under the ATS in the Second Circuit. 
More broadly, beyond the ATS, the Arab 
Bank case exists in a complex legal, policy, 
and diplomatic space. Along with the non-
U.S. ATS victims, nearly 500 American 
plaintiffs sued under a separate statute, the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, and are engaged in 
ongoing settlement negotiations with the 
Arab Bank after achieving a federal jury 
verdict against the bank in September 2014 
and the announcement of a settlement 
framework on the heels of the damages trial 
in August 2015. The case has also provoked 
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a spirited interagency debate pitting the State 
Department against the Treasury and Justice 
Departments that implicates diplomatic 
relations with Jordan and the Palestinian 
Authority. 
Ultimately, another court will have to decide 
if corporations can be sued under the ATS. 
However, this Arab Bank decision nudges the 
issue forward for future resolution and serves 
as another example to consider when 
weighing how to address foreign companies 
and extraterritorial conduct under U.S. law. 
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National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. 
16-307 
Ruling Below: Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013 (C.A.5, 2015) 
Employer filed petition for review of order of the National Labor Relations Board, 361 NLRB 
No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454, finding that it had unlawfully required employees to sign arbitration 
agreement waiving their right to pursue class and collective actions. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge, granted in part and denied in part. 
Question Presented: Whether arbitration agreements with individual employees that bar them 
from pursuing work-related claims on a collective or class basis in any forum are prohibited as 
an unfair labor practice under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), because they limit the employees' right 
under the National Labor Relations Act to engage in “concerted activities” in pursuit of their 
“mutual aid or protection,” 29 U.S.C. § 157, and are therefore unenforceable under the savings 
clause of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 
MURPHY OIL USA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner/Cross–Respondent 
v. 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent/Cross–Petitioner. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 
Decided on October 26, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge: 
 
The National Labor Relations Board 
concluded that Murphy Oil USA, Inc., had 
unlawfully required employees at its 
Alabama facility to sign an arbitration 
agreement waiving their right to pursue class 
and collective actions. Murphy Oil, aware 
that this circuit had already held to the 
contrary, used the broad venue rights 
governing the review of Board orders to file 
its petition with this circuit. The Board, also 
aware, moved for en banc review in order to 
allow arguments that the prior decision 
should be overturned. Having failed in that 
motion and having the case instead heard by 
a three-judge panel, the Board will not be 
surprised that we adhere, as we must, to our 
prior ruling. We GRANT Murphy Oil's 
petition, and hold that the corporation did not 
commit unfair labor practices by requiring 
employees to sign its arbitration agreement or 
seeking to enforce that agreement in federal 
district court. 
 
We DENY Murphy Oil's petition insofar as 
the Board's order directed the corporation to 
clarify language in its arbitration agreement 
applicable to employees hired prior to March 
2012 to ensure they understand they are not 
barred from filing charges with the Board. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
 
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., operates retail gas 
stations in several states. Sheila Hobson, the 
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charging party, began working for Murphy 
Oil at its Calera, Alabama facility in 
November 2008. She signed a “Binding 
Arbitration Agreement and Waiver of Jury 
Trial” (the “Arbitration Agreement”). The 
Arbitration Agreement provides that, 
“[e]xcluding claims which must, by ... law, 
be resolved in other forums, [Murphy Oil] 
and Individual agree to resolve any and all 
disputes or claims ... which relate ... to 
Individual's employment ... by binding 
arbitration.” The Arbitration Agreement 
further requires employees to waive the right 
to pursue class or collective claims in an 
arbitral or judicial forum. 
 
In June 2010, Hobson and three other 
employees filed a collective action against 
Murphy Oil in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Alabama 
alleging violations of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”). Murphy Oil moved 
to dismiss the collective action and compel 
individual arbitration pursuant to the 
Arbitration Agreement. The employees 
opposed the motion, contending that the 
FLSA prevented enforcement of the 
Arbitration Agreement because that statute 
grants a substantive right to collective action 
that cannot be waived. The employees also 
argued that the Arbitration Agreement 
interfered with their right under the National 
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) to engage in 
Section 7 protected concerted activity. 
While Murphy Oil's motion to dismiss was 
pending, Hobson filed an unfair labor charge 
with the Board in January 2011 based on the 
claim that the Arbitration Agreement 
interfered with her Section 7 rights under the 
NLRA. The General Counsel for the Board 
issued a complaint and notice of hearing to 
Murphy Oil in March 2011. 
 
In a separate case of first impression, the 
Board held in January 2012 that an employer 
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by 
requiring employees to sign an arbitration 
agreement waiving their right to pursue class 
and collective claims in all forums. D.R. 
Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012). The 
Board concluded that such agreements 
restrict employees' Section 7 right to engage 
in protected concerted activity in violation of 
Section 8(a)(1). Id. The Board also held that 
employees could reasonably construe the 
language in the D.R. Horton arbitration 
agreement to preclude employees from filing 
an unfair labor practice charge, which also 
violates Section 8(a)(1). 
 
Following the Board's decision in D.R. 
Horton, Murphy Oil implemented a “Revised 
Arbitration Agreement” for all employees 
hired after March 2012. The revision 
provided that employees were not barred 
from “participating in proceedings to 
adjudicate unfair labor practice[ ] charges 
before the” Board. Because Hobson and the 
other employees involved in the Alabama 
lawsuit were hired before March 2012, the 
revision did not apply to them. 
 
In September 2012, the Alabama district 
court stayed the FLSA collective action and 
compelled the employees to submit their 
claims to arbitration pursuant to the 
Arbitration Agreement. One month later, the 
General Counsel amended the complaint 
before the Board stemming from Hobson's 
charge to allege that Murphy Oil's motion to 
dismiss and compel arbitration in the 
Alabama lawsuit violated Section 8(a)(1) of 
the NLRA. 
 
Meanwhile, the petition for review of the 
Board's decision in D.R. Horton was making 
its way to this court. In December 2013, we 
rejected the Board's analysis of arbitration 
agreements. We held: (1) the NLRA does not 
contain a “congressional command 
overriding” the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”); and (2) “use of class action 
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procedures ... is not a substantive right” under 
Section 7 of the NLRA. This holding means 
an employer does not engage in unfair labor 
practices by maintaining and enforcing an 
arbitration agreement prohibiting employee 
class or collective actions and requiring 
employment-related claims to be resolved 
through individual arbitration. 
 
In analyzing the specific arbitration 
agreement at issue in D.R. Horton, however, 
we held that its language could be 
“misconstrued” as prohibiting employees 
from filing an unfair labor practice charge, 
which would violate Section 8(a)(1). We 
enforced the Board's order requiring the 
employer to clarify the agreement. The Board 
petitioned for rehearing en banc, which was 
denied without a poll in April 2014. 
 
The Board's decision as to Murphy Oil was 
issued in October 2014, ten months after our 
initial D.R. Horton decision and six months 
after rehearing was denied. The Board, 
unpersuaded by our analysis, reaffirmed its 
D.R. Horton decision. It held that Murphy Oil 
violated Section 8(a)(1) by “requiring its 
employees to agree to resolve all 
employment-related claims through 
individual arbitration, and by taking steps to 
enforce the unlawful agreements in [f]ederal 
district court.” The Board also held that both 
the Arbitration Agreement and Revised 
Arbitration Agreement were unlawful 
because employees would reasonably 
construe them to prohibit filing Board 
charges. 
 
The Board ordered numerous remedies. 
Murphy Oil was required to rescind or revise 
the Arbitration and Revised Arbitration 
agreements, send notification of the 
rescission or revision to signatories and to the 
Alabama district court, post a notice 
regarding the violation at its facilities, 
reimburse the employees' attorneys' fees 
incurred in opposing the company's motion to 
dismiss and compel arbitration in the 
Alabama litigation, and file a sworn 
declaration outlining the steps it had taken to 
comply with the Board order. 
 
Murphy Oil timely petitioned this court for 
review of the Board decision. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Board decisions that are “reasonable and 
supported by substantial evidence on the 
record considered as a whole” are upheld. 
“Substantial evidence is such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind would accept 
to support a conclusion.” This court reviews 
the Board's legal conclusions de novo, but 
“[w]e will enforce the Board's order if its 
construction of the statute is reasonably 
defensible.”  
 
I. Statute of Limitations and Collateral 
Estoppel 
 
Murphy Oil asserts that Hobson filed her 
charge too late after the execution of the 
Arbitration Agreement and the submission of 
Murphy Oil's motion to compel in the 
Alabama litigation. By statute, “no complaint 
shall issue based upon any unfair labor 
practice occurring more than six months prior 
to the filing of the charge with the Board.” 
Murphy Oil also contends that the Board is 
collaterally estopped from considering 
whether it was lawful to enforce the 
Arbitration Agreement because the district 
court had already decided that issue in the 
Alabama litigation. 
 
Both of these arguments were raised in 
Murphy Oil's answer to the Board's 
complaint. They were not, though, discussed 
in its brief before the Board. “No objection 
that has not been urged before the Board ... 
shall be considered by the court....” Similarly, 
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we have held that “[a]ppellate preservation 
principles apply equally to petitions for 
enforcement or review of NLRB decisions.” 
While Murphy Oil may have properly pled its 
statute of limitations and collateral estoppel 
defenses, it did not sufficiently press those 
arguments before the Board. Thus, they are 
waived.  
 
II. D.R. Horton and Board Nonacquiescence 
 
The Board, reaffirming its D.R. Horton 
analysis, held that Murphy Oil violated 
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by enforcing 
agreements that “requir [ed] ... employees to 
agree to resolve all employment-related 
claims through individual arbitration.” In 
doing so, of course, the Board disregarded 
this court's contrary D.R. Horton ruling that 
such arbitration agreements are enforceable 
and not unlawful. Our decision was issued 
not quite two years ago; we will not repeat its 
analysis here. Murphy Oil committed no 
unfair labor practice by requiring employees 
to relinquish their right to pursue class or 
collective claims in all forums by signing the 
arbitration agreements at issue here.  
 
Murphy Oil argues that the Board's explicit 
“defiance” of D.R. Horton warrants issuing a 
writ or holding the Board in contempt so as 
to “restrain [it] from continuing its 
nonacquiescence practice with respect to this 
[c]ourt's directive.” The Board, as far as we 
know, has not failed to apply our ruling in 
D.R. Horton to the parties in that case. The 
concern here is the application of D.R. 
Horton to new parties and agreements. 
 
An administrative agency's need to acquiesce 
to an earlier circuit court decision when 
deciding similar issues in later cases will be 
affected by whether the new decision will be 
reviewed in that same circuit. Murphy Oil 
could have sought review in (1) the circuit 
where the unfair labor practice allegedly took 
place, (2) any circuit in which Murphy Oil 
transacts business, or (3) the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia. The Board may well not know 
which circuit's law will be applied on a 
petition for review. We do not celebrate the 
Board's failure to follow our D.R. Horton 
reasoning, but neither do we condemn its 
nonacquiescence. 
 
III. The Agreements and NLRA Section 
8(a)(1) 
 
The Board also held that Murphy Oil's 
enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement 
and Revised Arbitration Agreement violated 
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because 
employees could reasonably believe the 
contracts precluded the filing of Board 
charges. Hobson and the other employees 
involved in the Alabama litigation were 
subject to the Arbitration Agreement 
applicable to employees hired before March 
2012. The Revised Arbitration Agreement 
contains language that sought to correct the 
possible ambiguity. 
 
A. The Arbitration Agreement in Effect 
Before March 2012 
 
Section 8(a) of the NLRA makes it unlawful 
for an employer to commit unfair labor 
practices. For example, an employer is 
prohibited from interfering with employees' 
exercise of their Section 7 rights. Under 
Section 7, employees have the right to self-
organize and “engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”  
The Board is empowered to prevent unfair 
labor practices. This power cannot be limited 
by an agreement between employees and the 
employer. “Wherever private contracts 
conflict with [the Board's] functions, they ... 
must yield or the [NLRA] would be reduced 
to a futility.” Accordingly, as we held in D.R. 
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Horton, an arbitration agreement violates the 
NLRA if employees would reasonably 
construe it as prohibiting filing unfair labor 
practice charges with the Board.  
 
Murphy Oil argues that Hobson's choice to 
file a charge with the Board proves that the 
pre-March 2012 Arbitration Agreement did 
not state or suggest such charges could not be 
filed. The argument misconstrues the 
question. “[T]he actual practice of employees 
is not determinative” of whether an employer 
has committed an unfair labor practice. The 
Board has said that the test is whether the 
employer action is “likely to have a chilling 
effect” on employees' exercise of their rights. 
The possibility that employees will 
misunderstand their rights was a reason we 
upheld the Board's rejection of a similar 
provision of the arbitration agreement in D.R. 
Horton. We explained that the FAA and 
NLRA have “equal importance in our 
review” of employment arbitration contracts. 
We held that even though requiring 
arbitration of class or collective claims in all 
forums does not “deny a party any statutory 
right,” an agreement reasonably interpreted 
as prohibiting the filing of unfair labor 
charges would unlawfully deny employees 
their rights under the NLRA. 
 
Murphy Oil's Arbitration Agreement 
provided that “any and all disputes or claims 
[employees] may have ... which relate in any 
manner ... to ... employment” must be 
resolved by individual arbitration. 
Signatories further “waive their right to ... be 
a party to any group, class or collective action 
claim in ... any other forum.” The problem is 
that broad “any claims” language can create 
“[t]he reasonable impression ... that an 
employee is waiving not just [her] trial rights, 
but [her] administrative rights as well.” 
We do not hold that an express statement 
must be made that an employee's right to file 
Board charges remains intact before an 
employment arbitration agreement is lawful. 
Such a provision would assist, though, if 
incompatible or confusing language appears 
in the contract.  
 
We conclude that the Arbitration Agreement 
in effect for employees hired before March 
2012, including Hobson and the others 
involved in the Alabama case, violates the 
NLRA. The Board's order that Murphy Oil 
take corrective action as to any employees 
that remain subject to that version of the 
contract is valid. 
 
B. The Revised Arbitration Agreement in 
Effect After March 2012 
 
In March 2012, following the Board's 
decision in D.R. Horton, Murphy Oil added 
the following clause in the Revised 
Arbitration Agreement: “[N]othing in this 
Agreement precludes [employees] ... from 
participating in proceedings to adjudicate 
unfair labor practice[ ] charges before the 
[Board].” The Board contends that Murphy 
Oil's modification is also unlawful because it 
“leaves intact the entirety of the original 
Agreement” including employees' waiver of 
their right “to commence or be a party to any 
group, class or collective action claim in ... 
any other forum.” This provision, the Board 
said, could be reasonably interpreted as 
prohibiting employees from pursuing an 
administrative remedy “since such a claim 
could be construed as having ‘commence[d]’ 
a class action in the event that the [Board] 
decides to seek classwide relief.” 
 
We disagree with the Board. Reading the 
Murphy Oil contract as a whole, it would be 
unreasonable for an employee to construe the 
Revised Arbitration Agreement as 
prohibiting the filing of Board charges when 
the agreement says the opposite. The other 
clauses of the agreement do not negate that 
language. We decline to enforce the Board's 
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order as to the Revised Arbitration 
Agreement. 
 
IV. Murphy Oil's Motion to Dismiss and 
NLRA Section 8(a)(1) 
 
Finally, the Board held that Murphy Oil 
violated Section 8(a)(1) by filing its motion 
to dismiss and compel arbitration in the 
Alabama litigation. As noted above, Section 
8(a) prohibits employers from engaging in 
unfair labor practices. Section 8(a)(1) 
provides that an employer commits an unfair 
labor practice by “interfer[ing] with, 
restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the 
exercise” of their Section 7 rights, including 
engaging in protected concerted activity. 
 
The Board said that in filing its dispositive 
motion and “eight separate court pleadings 
and related [documents] ... between 
September 2010 and February 2012,” 
Murphy Oil “acted with an illegal objective 
[in].... ‘seeking to enforce an unlawful 
contract provision’ ” that would chill 
employees' Section 7 rights, and awarded 
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in 
“opposing the ... unlawful motion.” We 
disagree and decline to enforce the fees 
award. 
 
The Board rooted its analysis in part in Bill 
Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 
U.S. 731, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 
(1983). That decision discussed the balance 
between an employer's First Amendment 
right to litigate and an employee's Section 7 
right to engage in concerted activity. In that 
case, a waitress filed a charge with the Board 
after a restaurant terminated her employment; 
she believed she was fired because she 
attempted to organize a union. After the 
Board's General Counsel issued a complaint, 
the waitress and several others picketed the 
restaurant, handing out leaflets and asking 
customers to boycott eating there. Id. In 
response, the restaurant filed a lawsuit in 
state court against the demonstrators alleging 
that they had blocked access to the restaurant, 
created a threat to public safety, and made 
libelous statements about the business and its 
management. The waitress filed a second 
charge with the Board alleging that the 
restaurant initiated the civil suit in retaliation 
for employees' engaging in Section 7 
protected concerted activity, which violated 
Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the NLRA.  
 
The Board held that the restaurant's lawsuit 
constituted an unfair labor practice because it 
was filed for the purpose of discouraging 
employees from seeking relief with the 
Board. The Supreme Court remanded the 
case for further consideration, stating: “The 
right to litigate is an important one,” but it can 
be “used by an employer as a powerful 
instrument of coercion or retaliation.” To be 
enjoinable, the Court said the lawsuit 
prosecuted by the employer must (1) be 
“baseless” or “lack[ing] a reasonable basis in 
fact or law,” and be filed “with the intent of 
retaliating against an employee for the 
exercise of rights protected by” Section 7, or 
(2) have “an objective that is illegal under 
federal law.” 
 
We start by distinguishing this dispute from 
that in Bill Johnson's. The current 
controversy began when three Murphy Oil 
employees filed suit in Alabama. Murphy Oil 
defended itself against the employees' claims 
by seeking to enforce the Arbitration 
Agreement. Murphy Oil was not retaliating 
as Bill Johnson's may have been. Moreover, 
the Board's holding is based solely on 
Murphy Oil's enforcement of an agreement 
that the Board deemed unlawful because it 
required employees to individually arbitrate 
employment-related disputes. Our decision in 
D.R. Horton forecloses that argument in this 
circuit. Though the Board might not need to 
acquiesce in our decisions, it is a bit bold for 
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it to hold that an employer who followed the 
reasoning of our D.R. Horton decision had no 
basis in fact or law or an “illegal objective” 
in doing so. The Board might want to strike a 
more respectful balance between its views 
and those of circuit courts reviewing its 
orders. 
 
Moreover, the timing of Murphy Oil's motion 
to dismiss when compared to the timing of 
the D.R. Horton decisions counsels against 
finding a violation of Section 8(a)(1). The 
relevant timeline of events is as follows: 
 
(1) July 2010: Murphy Oil filed its motion to 
dismiss and sought to compel arbitration in 
the Alabama litigation; 
 
(2) January 2012: the Board in D.R. Horton 
held it to be unlawful to require employees to 
arbitrate employment-related claims 
individually, and the D.R. Horton agreement 
violated the NLRA because it could be 
reasonably construed as prohibiting the filing 
of Board charges; 
 
(3) October 2012: the Board's General 
Counsel amended the complaint against 
Murphy Oil to allege that Murphy Oil's 
motion in the Alabama litigation violated 
Section 8(a)(1); and 
 
(4) December 2013: this court granted D.R. 
Horton's petition for review of the Board's 
order and held that agreements requiring 
individual arbitration of employment-related 
claims are lawful but that the specific 
agreement was unlawful because it could be 
reasonably interpreted as prohibiting the 
filing of Board charges. 
 
In summary, Murphy Oil's motion was filed 
a year and a half before the Board had even 
spoken on the lawfulness of such agreements 
in light of the NLRA. This court later held 
that such agreements were generally lawful. 
Murphy Oil had at least a colorable argument 
that the Arbitration Agreement was valid 
when its defensive motion was made, as its 
response to the lawsuit was not “lack[ing] a 
reasonable basis in fact or law,” and was not 
filed with an illegal objective under federal 
law. Murphy Oil's motion to dismiss and 
compel arbitration did not constitute an 
unfair labor practice because it was not 
“baseless.” We decline to enforce the Board's 
order awarding attorneys' fees and expenses. 
 
* * * 
 
The Board's order that Section 8(a)(1) has 
been violated because an employee would 
reasonably interpret the Arbitration 
Agreement in effect for employees hired 
before March 2012 as prohibiting the filing 
of an unfair labor practice charge is 
ENFORCED. Murphy Oil's petition for 
review of the Board's decision is otherwise 
GRANTED. 
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“SCOTUS To Decide Arbitration Issue; Unclear If Trump Pick Will Be 
On Bench In Time” 
 
Forbes 
Jessica Karmasek 
January 19, 2017 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court last week agreed to 
review the validity of class action waiver 
clauses in employer/employee arbitration 
agreements, and one attorney says its 
decision could have “important implications” 
for businesses. 
In an order list Friday, the nation’s high court 
granted petitions for writ of certiorari, or 
review, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 
Ernst & Young v. Morris and NLRB v. 
Murphy Oil USA Inc. 
Julianna Thomas McCabe is a class action 
litigator and appellate lawyer with national 
experience representing clients in the 
financial services industry. She also chairs 
Carlton Fields’ National Class Actions 
practice group. 
McCabe, who has represented clients at 
arbitration and has litigated the enforceability 
of contractual arbitration clauses under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, told Legal Newsline 
it “made sense” for the Supreme Court to 
consolidate the three cases, noting that all 
three petitions raise an identical issue. 
The court now must consider whether the 
National Labor Relations Act bars 
enforcement under the FAA, of class action 
waiver provisions in an arbitration clause in 
an employment contract. 
“In other words, the question is whether 
employers can utilize arbitration agreements 
within employment contracts that require 
their employees to resolve disputes 
individually, as opposed to collectively,” 
McCabe explained. 
The court’s decision in the cases aims to 
resolve a significant split among federal 
appellate courts. 
The Second, Fifth and Eighth circuit courts 
have held that the FAA requires the 
enforcement of class action waivers in 
employment arbitration agreements. 
The Seventh and the Ninth circuits have 
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that 
such waivers are unenforceable. 
In May, the Seventh Circuit ruled against 
Epic Systems, a Wisconsin-based health-care 
software company. 
Epic required certain groups of employees to 
agree to bring any wage-and-hour claims 
against the company only through individual 
arbitration. The agreement did not permit 
collective arbitration or collective action in 
any other forum. 
155 
  
The Seventh Circuit said in its decision that 
employers can’t prevent class, or collective, 
actions through waivers in mandatory 
arbitration agreements. 
In August, the majority of a three-judge panel 
of the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court’s 
order compelling individual arbitration in a 
class action filed against Ernst & Young by 
its employees. 
The Ninth Circuit sided with the approach of 
the National Labor Relations Board in ruling 
that individual arbitration waiver agreements 
are unenforceable under federal law. 
The employees, Stephen Morris and Kelly 
McDaniel, alleged Ernst & Young, one of the 
“Big Four” audit firms, misclassified 
employees to deny overtime wages in 
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
California labor laws. 
In Murphy Oil, the NLRB had ruled that 
similar arbitration agreements barring the gas 
station chain’s workers from pursuing class 
or collective actions were unlawful. 
However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
board’s ruling. 
The NLRB, an independent agency of the 
U.S. government, is charged with 
investigating and remedying unfair labor 
practices. 
McCabe said it’s too early to predict how the 
court will decide. 
“In recent years, the court has issued a series 
of pro-arbitration opinions, but it has not 
addressed this precise question,” she noted. 
“The court also is missing one of the 
conservative members who voted in the 
majority in each of those prior cases.” 
The current high court is without Justice 
Antonin Scalia, who died in February. He 
served on the high court for nearly 30 years. 
His death has left eight justices on the court, 
split 4-4 between being fairly conservative 
and fairly liberal. 
Scalia authored the Supreme Court’s 5-4 
opinion in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. In 
April 2011, the court ruled that companies 
can enforce contracts that bar class action 
lawsuits. Meaning businesses that include 
arbitration agreements with class action 
waivers can require consumers to bring 
claims only in individual arbitrations, rather 
than in court as part of a class action. 
Experts called the decision a “game-changer” 
for class action litigation. 
McCabe said the court’s current makeup 
could have an impact on the three cases at 
issue. 
“If the justices deadlock 4-4, each case will 
be affirmed as decided by the circuit court 
without an opinion and with no precedential 
value,” she explained. 
“That seems unlikely to happen, however, 
because the court accepted certiorari to 
resolve a split among the circuit courts as to 
whether such arbitration clauses are 
enforceable.” 
A ninth justice may or may not be confirmed 
in time to participate, she noted. 
“It is unclear whether Democrats in the 
Senate will attempt to stall or block a new 
appointee of President-elect Trump,” 
McCabe said. 
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Either way, the cases have “important 
implications” for businesses, she said. 
“The individual resolution of employment 
disputes in an arbitral forum is much more 
cost-effective and private, than the litigation 
of employment disputes in a class action or 
collective format in a judicial forum,” 
McCabe explained. 
In recent years, following Concepcion and 
similar decisions, the use of class action 
waivers in arbitration agreements in various 
types of contracts has significantly increased. 
According to Carlton Fields’ 2016 Class 
Action Survey, the use of arbitration clauses 
barring class actions went from a reported 
16.1 percent to 39.2 percent from 2012 to 
2015. 
McCabe said she expects the three cases to be 
set for oral argument at the end of the current 
session. The Supreme Court holds oral 
argument between October and April, and the 
cases have been allotted a total of one hour 
for argument. 
If the court hears argument by April, a 
decision could come by late June or early 
July, when the court recesses for the summer, 
she said. 
 
 
157 
  
“Murphy Oil’s law: Solicitor General’s office reverses course in 
arbitration cases, supports employers” 
 
SCOTUSblog 
Amy Howe 
June 19, 2017 
 
It is rare for the Office of the Solicitor 
General to change its position in a case before 
the Supreme Court after a change in 
administrations, even when the party in 
control of the White House changes. But that 
is exactly what happened last week, when the 
Trump administration weighed in on an 
important arbitration case: The office urged 
the justices to affirm the same decision that, 
on behalf of the National Labor Relations 
Board, it had previously asked them to 
review and overturn. 
The about-face came in National Labor 
Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, in 
which the justices have agreed to decide 
whether agreements to forgo class actions or 
collective proceedings and instead resolve 
employer-employee disputes through 
individual arbitration are enforceable under 
the Federal Arbitration Act. In its petition for 
review on behalf of the NLRB, filed in 
September 2016, the Solicitor General’s 
office had argued that such agreements are 
not, because the National Labor Relations 
Act protects employees’ ability to engage in 
joint actions regarding the terms or 
conditions of their employment. On January 
13, 2017, just seven days before the 
inauguration of President Donald Trump, the 
Supreme Court granted the NLRB’s petition, 
along with two others filed by employers 
(Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris and Epic 
Systems v. Lewis), and consolidated the three 
cases for one hour of oral argument. 
Under the briefing schedule ordered in the 
case, the employers in all three cases filed 
their briefs on June 9, with briefs from the 
employees and the NLRB to follow on 
August 9. But on Friday (the deadline under 
the court’s rules to do so), the United States 
filed a “friend of the court” brief supporting 
the employers. The petition for review had 
been signed by seven lawyers from the 
NLRB, including its general counsel. Those 
NLRB lawyers were conspicuously absent 
from Friday’s brief, which was signed only 
by lawyers from the Solicitor General’s 
office. Acting Solicitor General Jeffrey Wall 
acknowledged that his office had previously 
filed a petition on behalf of the NLRB, 
“defending the Board’s view that agreements 
of the sort at issue here are unenforceable.” 
But, Wall continued, “since the change in 
administration, the Office reconsidered the 
issue and has reached the opposite 
conclusion.” In particular, Wall explained, 
the NLRB had not given “adequate weight to 
the congressional policy favoring 
enforcement of arbitration agreements that is 
reflected in the” Federal Arbitration Act. 
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In a press release published on the NLRB’s 
website, the NLRB indicated that Wall had 
authorized it to represent itself in the 
Supreme Court proceedings in this case, and 
nothing in the brief of the United States 
suggests that the NLRB has changed its 
position. This means that the NLRB is likely 
to file its own brief, reiterating its original 
position in the case, in early August. And if 
the United States seeks and receives 
permission to argue in the case, as it virtually 
always does in cases in which it files “friend 
of the court” briefs, a lawyer for the United 
States would argue against a lawyer for a U.S. 
agency – a phenomenon perhaps even more 
uncommon than a change in position 
following a change in administration. 
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“5th Circ. Reverses NLRB In Murphy Oil Class Waiver Fight” 
 
Law360 
Y. Peter Kang 
October 26, 2015 
 
The Fifth Circuit on Monday mostly reversed 
a National Labor Relations Board ruling that 
found Murphy Oil arbitration agreements 
barring workers from pursuing class actions 
unlawful, saying it is bound by a December 
2013 decision that rejected the labor board’s 
ruling in a similar case involving D.R. 
Horton. 
A three-judge Fifth Circuit panel shot down 
the NLRB’s arguments that Murphy Oil USA 
Inc.’s arbitration agreement, revised in 
March 2012 after the board’s decision in the 
D.R. Horton case, violated the National 
Labor Relations Act. 
“Murphy Oil committed no unfair labor 
practice by requiring employees to relinquish 
their right to pursue class or collective claims 
in all forums by signing the arbitration 
agreements at issue here,” the Fifth Circuit 
wrote in a 13-page published opinion. 
“Reading the Murphy Oil contract as a 
whole, it would be unreasonable for an 
employee to construe the revised arbitration 
agreement as prohibiting the filing of Board 
charges when the agreement says the 
opposite.” 
But the Fifth Circuit stopped short of granting 
Murphy Oil’s request for the NLRB to be 
held in contempt for not following the 
appeals court’s ruling in the D.R. Horton 
case, saying the labor board may not know 
which circuit court’s law will be applied in 
various appeals of the NLRB’s rulings. 
“We do not celebrate the Board’s failure to 
follow our D.R. Horton reasoning, but neither 
do we condemn its nonacquiescence,” it said. 
The appellate court enforced the NLRB’s 
order with respect to Murphy Oil workers 
who were subject to terms of an arbitration 
agreement before the company made the 
revisions, saying Murphy Oil will need to 
change the agreements for any employee still 
subject to the old contract. 
Monday’s ruling follows a June decision by 
the Fifth Circuit denying the NLRB’s bid for 
en banc review of Murphy Oil’s appeal, 
which effectively killed the agency’s attempt 
to revisit the appellate court’s 2013 rejection 
of the board’s D.R. Horton decision holding 
that mandatory arbitration agreements 
prohibiting workers from pursuing class or 
collective claims violate federal labor law. 
While the NLRB argued that the Fifth Circuit 
should review whether it misapprehended 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent in its 2-1 
decision that struck down the holding, the 
appellate court opted on June 24 not to do so, 
according to court documents. 
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In the Murphy Oil case, the NLRB doubled 
down on its controversial conclusion in D.R. 
Horton, reiterating in an October 2014 
decision that making workers agree to 
individual arbitration of all workplace 
disputes as a condition of employment 
violates the NLRA. 
During oral argument in August, U.S. Circuit 
Judge Edith H. Jones told NLRB counsel not 
to argue the D.R. Horton case. 
“We're bound by it,” Jones said, "and I don't 
think you can expect us to be writing against 
the binding precedent of this court." 
An attorney for Murphy Oil told Law360 on 
Monday that it was the decision they 
expected, but did not elaborate further. 
An NLRB attorney declined to comment. An 
attorney for intervenor Sheila Hobson did not 
immediately respond to a request for 
comment late Monday. 
U.S. Circuit Judges Leslie H. Southwick, 
Edith H. Jones and Jerry E. Smith sat on the 
panel for the Fifth Circuit. 
Murphy Oil is represented by Jeffrey A. 
Schwartz and Daniel D. Schudroff of Jackson 
Lewis PC. 
Worker and charging party Sheila Hobson is 
represented by Glen M. Connor and Richard 
P. Rouco of Quinn Connor Weaver Davies & 
Rouco LLP. 
The NLRB is represented by Kira Dellinger 
Vol, Jeffrey W. Burritt and Linda Dreeben. 
The case is Murphy Oil USA Inc. v. NLRB, 
case number 14-60800, in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
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Patchak v. Zinke 
16-498 
Ruling Below: Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995 (C.A.D.C., 2016) 
Resident of rural community brought action challenging Secretary of the Interior's decision to 
take a parcel of land into trust on behalf of the Gun Lake Indian Tribe for casino use pursuant to 
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). Tribe intervened as defendant. The United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, Richard J. Leon, J., 646 F.Supp.2d 72, dismissed action. 
Resident appealed. The Court of Appeals, Randolph, Senior Circuit Judge, 632 F.3d 702, 
reversed and remanded. On remand, resident and tribe cross-moved for summary judgment. The 
District Court granted intervenor defendant's motion and denied resident's motion based on 
Congress's enactment of the Gun Lake Act, which reaffirmed the Department of the Interior's 
decision to take the land into trust for the tribe and removed jurisdiction from the federal courts 
over any actions relating to such property. Appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, Wilkins, Circuit Judge, affirmed, holding that the Gun Lake Act did not encroach upon 
Article III judicial power of the courts to decide cases and controversies in violation of 
separation of powers doctrine, the Act did not violate resident's First Amendment right to 
petition, the Act did not violate resident's right to due process, even if he had a protected 
property right in his cause of action, and the Act was not an unconstitutional bill of attainder. 
Question Presented: Whether a statute directing the federal courts to “promptly dismiss” a 
pending lawsuit following substantive determinations by the courts (including this court's 
determination that the “suit may proceed”) – without amending the underlying substantive or 
procedural laws – violates the Constitution's separation of powers principles. 
 
David Patchak, Appellant 
v. 
Sally Jewell, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the 
Interior, et al., Appellees 
 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided on July 15, 2016 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
Wilkins, Circuit Judge: 
 
David Patchak brought this suit under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 
702, 705, challenging the authority of the 
Department of the Interior to take title to a 
particular tract of land under the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 465. 
The land, called the Bradley Property, had 
been put into trust for the use of the Match–
E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi 
Indians in Michigan, otherwise known as the 
Gun Lake Band or the Gun Lake Tribe. 
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Following the Supreme Court's 
determination in 2012 that Mr. Patchak had 
prudential standing to bring this lawsuit, 
Congress passed the Gun Lake Trust Land 
Reaffirmation Act (the Gun Lake Act), a 
stand-alone statute reaffirming the 
Department of the Interior's decision to take 
the land in question into trust for the Gun 
Lake Tribe, and removing jurisdiction from 
the federal courts over any actions relating to 
that property. Taking into account this new 
legal landscape, the District Court 
determined on summary judgment that it was 
stripped of its jurisdiction to consider Mr. 
Patchak's claim. Holding additionally that the 
Act was not constitutionally infirm, as Mr. 
Patchak contended, the District Court 
dismissed the case. 
 
Mr. Patchak now appeals the dismissal of his 
suit, as well as a collateral decision regarding 
the District Court's denial of a motion to 
strike a supplement to the administrative 
record. For the reasons stated below, we 
affirm the District Court's determination that 
the Gun Lake Act is constitutionally sound 
and, accordingly, that Mr. Patchak's suit must 
be dismissed. We further conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying Mr. Patchak's motion to strike a 
supplement to the administrative record. 
 
I. 
 
The Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians (the Gun Lake Tribe) is 
an Indian tribe whose members descend from 
a band of Pottawatomi Indians, led by Chief 
Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish, who 
occupied present day western Michigan. See 
Proposed Findings for Acknowledgement of 
the Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians of Michigan. While the 
Tribe had been a party to many treaties with 
the United States government in the 18th and 
19th centuries, it only began pursuing federal 
acknowledgement under the modern 
regulatory regime of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, in 1992. The Tribe was formally 
recognized by the Department of the Interior 
in 1999. In 2001, the Tribe petitioned for a 
tract of land in Wayland Township, 
Michigan—called the Bradley Property—to 
be put into trust under the IRA. The Tribe 
sought to use the land to construct and 
operate a gaming and entertainment facility. 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs approved the 
petition in 2005, placing the Bradley Property 
into trust for the Tribe's use. The Gun Lake 
Casino opened on February 10, 2011. 
 
David Patchak lives in a rural area of 
Wayland Township commonly referred to as 
Shelbyville, in close proximity to the Bradley 
Property. Mr. Patchak asserts that he moved 
to the area because of its unique rural setting, 
and that he values the quiet life afforded him 
there. Mr. Patchak filed the present lawsuit 
against the Secretary of the Interior and the 
Assistant Secretary of the Interior for the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs on August 1, 2008, 
invoking the court's jurisdiction under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Mr. 
Patchak claimed that he would be injured by 
the construction and operation of a casino in 
his community because it would, among 
other things, irreversibly change the rural 
character of the area, increase traffic and 
pollution, and divert local resources away 
from existing residents. Mr. Patchak argued 
that because the Tribe was not formally 
recognized when the IRA was enacted in 
June 1934, the Secretary lacked the authority 
to put the Bradley Property into trust for the 
Gun Lake Tribe. The Gun Lake Tribe 
intervened as a defendant. 
  
In response to Mr. Patchak's complaint, the 
United States and the Tribe claimed that Mr. 
Patchak lacked prudential standing because 
his interest in the Bradley Property was 
“fundamentally at odds with the purpose of 
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the IRA” and he therefore did not fall within 
the IRA's “zone of interests.” The District 
Court agreed, and dismissed the complaint 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Patchak appealed to this Court, and we 
reversed. The Supreme Court agreed, holding 
that Patchak did indeed have prudential 
standing to bring his suit. The case was 
remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
 
In the time between the Supreme Court's 
prudential standing determination and the 
parties' renewed attention to the case, both 
the Department of the Interior and Congress 
weighed in further on the legal status of the 
Gun Lake Tribe and the Bradley Property, 
respectively. First, the Department of the 
Interior issued an Amended Notice of 
Decision approving an application the Tribe 
had submitted for two other parcels of land it 
sought to acquire. As part of this Notice of 
Decision, the Secretary expressly considered, 
and confirmed, its authority to take land into 
trust for the benefit of the Gun Lake Tribe. 
Second, on September 26, 2014, President 
Obama signed the Gun Lake Act into law. 
The substantive text of the Gun Lake Act is 
as follows: 
 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The land taken into trust 
by the United States for the benefit of the 
Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians and described in the 
final Notice of Determination of the 
Department of the Interior is reaffirmed as 
trust land, and the actions of the Secretary of 
the Interior in taking that land into trust are 
ratified and confirmed. 
 
(b) NO CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, an action (including 
an action pending in a Federal court as of the 
date of enactment of this Act) relating to the 
land described in subsection (a) shall not be 
filed or maintained in a Federal court and 
shall be promptly dismissed. 
 
(c) RETENTION OF FUTURE RIGHTS.—
Nothing in this Act alters or diminishes the 
right of the Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish 
Band of Pottawatomi Indians from seeking to 
have any additional land taken into trust by 
the United States for the benefit of the Band. 
Gun Lake Act § 2. 
 
Shortly following the enactment of the Gun 
Lake Act, the parties filed motions for 
summary judgment. The District Court 
determined that, as a result of this legislation, 
it was now stripped of jurisdiction to consider 
Mr. Patchak's claim. Rejecting Mr. Patchak's 
constitutional challenges to the Gun Lake 
Act, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Government and the 
Tribe, and dismissed the case. The District 
Court also denied Mr. Patchak's Motion to 
Strike the Administrative Record 
Supplement, which had challenged the 
addition of the Amended Notice of Decision 
to the record before the court.  
  
Mr. Patchak now appeals those decisions. 
 
II. 
 
The language of the Gun Lake Act makes 
plain that Congress has stripped federal 
courts of subject matter jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of Mr. Patchak's 
complaint, which undisputedly “relat[es] to 
the land described” in Section 2(a) of the Act. 
Accordingly, Patchak's suit “shall not be ... 
maintained ... and shall be promptly 
dismissed.” Of course, this is only so if the 
Gun Lake Act is not otherwise 
constitutionally infirm, as “a statute's use of 
the language of jurisdiction cannot operate as 
a talisman that ipso facto sweeps aside every 
possible constitutional objection.” The 
federal courts have “presumptive jurisdiction 
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... to inquire into the constitutionality of a 
jurisdiction-stripping statute.” 
 
Mr. Patchak's constitutional challenges to the 
Gun Lake Act are pure questions of law that 
we review de novo. 
 
A. 
 
Mr. Patchak first argues that the Gun Lake 
Act encroaches upon the Article III judicial 
power of the courts to decide cases and 
controversies, in violation of well-established 
constitutional principles of the separation of 
powers. Article III imbues in the Judiciary 
“the ‘province and duty ... to say what the law 
is' in particular cases and controversies.” This 
endowment of authority necessarily “blocks 
Congress from ‘requir[ing] federal courts to 
exercise the judicial power in a manner that 
Article III forbids.’ ”  
 
Congress is generally free to direct district 
courts to apply newly enacted legislation in 
pending civil cases. Without question, “a 
statute does not impinge on judicial power 
when it directs courts to apply a new legal 
standard to undisputed facts.” This rule is no 
different when the newly enacted legislation 
in question removes the judiciary's authority 
to review a particular case or class of cases. 
It is well settled that “Congress has the power 
(within limits) to tell the courts what classes 
of cases they may decide.” Congress may not, 
however, “prescribe or superintend how 
[courts] decide those cases.” Congress 
impermissibly encroaches upon the judiciary 
when it “prescribe[s] rules of decision” for a 
pending case. In short, Congress may not 
direct the result of pending litigation unless it 
does so by “supply[ing] new law.” Mr. 
Patchak argues that the Gun Lake Act did not 
provide any new legal standard to apply, but 
rather impermissibly directed the result of his 
lawsuit under pre-existing law. 
 
These principles do not require, as Mr. 
Patchak suggests, that in order to affect 
pending litigation, Congress must directly 
amend the substantive laws upon which the 
suit is based. Indeed, Supreme Court 
precedent belies such a contention. 
 
In Seattle Audubon, for example, the 
Supreme Court considered the impact of new 
legislation on pending cases challenging the 
federal government's efforts to allow the 
harvesting and sale of old-growth timber in 
the Pacific Northwest. The legislation was 
the Northwest Timber Compromise, a 
provision of the Department of the Interior 
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
1990. It established rules to govern the forest 
harvesting at issue in the pending 
consolidated cases, and spoke expressly to 
those suits—even identifying them by 
caption number. If loggers complied with the 
new rules, Congress posited, they would 
thereby satisfy the statutory obligations on 
which the pending environmental litigation 
rested. The Ninth Circuit held that the 
Northwest Timber Compromise 
unconstitutionally dictated the outcome of 
pending litigation without amending the 
underlying laws, but the Supreme Court 
disagreed. The Court held that the legislation 
effectively “replaced the legal standards 
underlying the two original challenges ... 
without directing particular applications 
under either the old or the new standards.” 
Because the provision “compelled changes in 
law,” the Court concluded that the provision 
“affected the adjudication of the [specifically 
identified] cases ... by effectively modifying 
the provisions at issue in those cases.” 
 
The Supreme Court's recent Bank Markazi 
decision likewise applied new legislation to 
pending litigation. That legislation did not 
directly amend or modify the particular 
statute upon which the pending litigation was 
based. Section 502 of the Iran Threat 
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Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
2012 had been passed in order “[t]o place 
beyond dispute” the availability of certain 
assets for satisfaction of judgments rendered 
in certain specifically identified terrorism 
cases. The statute was enacted as a 
freestanding measure, not as an amendment 
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 (FSIA) (which allows American 
nationals to file suit against state sponsors of 
terrorism in United States courts, see 28 
U.S.C. § 1605A), or the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) (which 
authorizes execution of judgments obtained 
under the FSIA's terrorism exception against 
“the blocked assets of [a] terrorist party”). Id. 
Rejecting a challenge similar to the one Mr. 
Patchak pursues here—that the provision 
“did not simply amend pre-existing law,” id. 
at 1325—the Court held that “§ 8772 
changed the law by establishing new 
substantive standards.” As the Court 
explained, “§ 8772 provides a new standard 
clarifying that, if Iran owns certain assets, the 
victims of Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks 
will be permitted to execute against those 
assets.” 
 
Our decision in National Coalition to Save 
Our Mall is also instructive. There, we 
considered a separation-of-powers challenge 
to a statute that withdrew from the federal 
courts subject matter jurisdiction to review 
challenges to specific executive decisions 
relating to the placement of the World War II 
Memorial on the National Mall. In rejecting 
that challenge, we emphasized that there is no 
“prohibition against Congress's changing the 
rule of decision in a pending case, or (more 
narrowly) changing the rule to assure a pro-
government outcome.” And while this Court 
“express[ed] no view” on the question 
whether a court could do so without 
amending the substantive law on which a 
pending claim rested, we did note that the 
provision at issue (Public Law No. 107–11) 
“present[ed] no more difficulty than the 
statute upheld in [Seattle Audubon], as Public 
Law No. 107–11 similarly amend[ed] the 
applicable substantive law.” 
  
Consistent with those decisions, we conclude 
that the Gun Lake Act has amended the 
substantive law applicable to Mr. Patchak's 
claims. That it did so without directly 
amending or modifying the APA or the IRA 
is no matter. Through its ratification and 
confirmation of the Department of the 
Interior's decision to take the Bradley 
Property into trust, expressed in Section 2(a), 
and its clear withdrawal of subject matter 
jurisdiction in Section 2(b), the Gun Lake Act 
has “changed the law.” More to the point, 
Section 2(b) provides a new legal standard 
we are obliged to apply: if an action relates to 
the Bradley Property, it must promptly be 
dismissed. 
  
Mr. Patchak's suit is just such an action. 
That this change has only affected Mr. 
Patchak's lawsuit does not change our 
analysis here, for Congress is not limited to 
enacting generally applicable legislation. 
Particularized legislative action is not 
unconstitutional on that basis alone. “Even 
laws that impose a duty or liability upon a 
single individual or firm are not on that 
account invalid....” 
 
In passing the Gun Lake Act, Congress 
exercised its “broad general powers to 
legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers 
that [the Supreme Court] ha[s] consistently 
described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’ ” 
Accordingly, we ought to defer to the policy 
judgment reflected therein. Such is our role. 
Indeed, “[a]pplying laws implementing 
Congress' policy judgments, with fidelity to 
those judgments, is commonplace for the 
Judiciary.”  
 
B. 
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Mr. Patchak next asserts that the Gun Lake 
Act burdens his First  Amendment right to 
petition. See U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress 
shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of 
the people ... to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances.”). The Petition 
Clause “protects the right of individuals to 
appeal to courts and other forums established 
by the government for resolution of legal 
disputes.” 
 
The right of access to courts is, without 
question, “an aspect of the First Amendment 
right to petition the government.” For 
example, an individual does not have a First 
Amendment right of access to courts in order 
to pursue frivolous litigation. More to the 
point, the right to access federal courts is 
subject to Congress's Article III power to 
define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior 
courts of the United States. Congress may 
withhold jurisdiction from inferior federal 
courts “in the exact degrees and character 
which to Congress may seem proper for the 
public good.”  
 
Moreover, the Gun Lake Act does not 
foreclose Mr. Patchak's right to petition the 
government in all forums; it affects only his 
ability to do so via federal courts. And while 
he argues that other forms of petition—such 
as seeking redress directly from the agency—
would be futile, Patchak concedes that he is 
not entitled to a successful outcome in his 
petition, or even for the government to listen 
or respond to his complaints. Rightfully so. 
“Nothing in the First Amendment or in [the 
Supreme] Court's case law interpreting it 
suggests that the rights to speak, associate, 
and petition require government 
policymakers to listen or respond to 
individuals' communications on public 
issues.”  
 
By stripping federal courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction over challenges to the status of 
the Bradley Property, Congress has made its 
determination as to what is “proper for the 
public good.” There is no constitutional 
infirmity here. 
 
C. 
 
Mr. Patchak also claims that the Gun Lake 
Act implicates his rights under the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Fifth 
Amendment instructs that the federal 
government may not deprive individuals of 
property “without due process of law.” In 
order to determine whether there has been a 
violation of due process rights, we undertake 
a two-part inquiry: first, we must determine 
whether the claimant was deprived of a 
protected interest; and second, if the claimant 
was so deprived, we then consider what 
process the claimant was due.  
 
Mr. Patchak identifies a potentially protected 
property interest in his unadjudicated claim. 
The Supreme Court has “affirmatively 
settled” that a cause of action is a species of 
property requiring due process protection. 
Surely so, as “[t]he hallmark of property ... is 
an individual entitlement grounded in state 
law, which cannot be removed except ‘for 
cause.’ ” Once the legislature confers an 
interest by statute, it may not constitutionally 
authorize the deprivation of that interest 
without implementing appropriate 
procedural safeguards. 
 
But even assuming that there may be a 
property right to pursue a cause of action, in 
a challenge to legislation affecting that very 
suit, the legislative process provides all the 
process that is due. As discussed above, the 
legislature has the power to change the 
underlying laws applicable to a case while it 
is pending and, as a result, to alter the 
outcome of that case.  
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In Logan, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that “[o]f course,” a legislature “remains free 
to create substantive defenses or immunities 
for use in adjudication—or to eliminate its 
statutorily-created causes of action 
altogether—just as it can amend or 
terminate” benefits programs it has put into 
place. Indeed, “[n]o person has a vested 
interest in any rule of law, entitling him to 
insist that it shall remain unchanged for his 
benefit.” Accordingly, while a cause of 
action may be a “species of property” that is 
afforded due process protection, there is no 
deprivation of property without due process 
when legislation changes a previously 
existing and still-pending cause of action. In 
such a circumstance, “the legislative 
determination provides all the process that is 
due.” 
 
We have no reason to except the Gun Lake 
Act from this general approach. Congress 
made a considered determination to ratify the 
Department of the Interior's decision to take 
the Bradley Property into trust for the Gun 
Lake Tribe, and further to remove any 
potential impediments to the finality of that 
decision. It did not violate Mr. Patchak's due 
process rights by doing so. 
 
D. 
 
Mr. Patchak's final constitutional challenge 
to the Gun Lake Act is that it constitutes an 
impermissible Bill of Attainder. Under this 
provision, Congress may not “enact[ ] ‘a law 
that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts 
punishment upon an identifiable individual 
without provision of the protections of a 
judicial trial.’ ” A law is prohibited under the 
Bill of Attainder Clause if two elements are 
met: (1) the statute applies with specificity; 
and (2) the statute imposes punishment. We 
are able to resolve Mr. Patchak's challenge on 
the second element alone, because the Gun 
Lake Act is not punitive. 
In order to decide whether a statute 
impermissibly inflicts punishment, we 
consider each case in “its own highly 
particularized context.” In so doing, we 
pursue a three-part inquiry: 
 
(1) whether the challenged statute falls within 
the historical meaning of legislative 
punishment; 
 
(2) whether the statute, ‘viewed in terms of 
the type and severity of burdens imposed, 
reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive 
legislative purposes'; and 
 
(3) whether the legislative record ‘evinces a 
congressional intent to punish.’ 
 
These factors are considered independently, 
and are weighed together to resolve a bill of 
attainder claim. None of the three factors is 
necessarily dispositive, but this Court has 
noted that the second factor—what is called 
the “functional test”—“invariably appears to 
be the most important of the three.” 
 
Historically, laws invalidated as bills of 
attainder “offer[ed] a ready checklist of 
deprivations and disabilities so 
disproportionately severe and so 
inappropriate to nonpunitive ends that they 
unquestionably have been held to fall within 
the proscription of [Article] I, § 9.” “This 
checklist includes sentences of death, bills of 
pains and penalties, and legislative bars to 
participation in specified employments or 
professions.” Jurisdictional limitations are 
generally not of this type. 
 
The second prong of the inquiry, the 
“functional test,” requires that the legislation 
have “a legitimate nonpunitive purpose” and 
that there is “a rational connection between 
the burden imposed and [the] nonpunitive 
purposes.” In other words, the means 
employed by the statute must be rationally 
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designed to meet its legitimate nonpunitive 
goals. 
 
The Gun Lake Act passes this test. The Gun 
Lake Act serves the legitimate nonpunitive 
purpose of “provid[ing] certainty to the legal 
status of the [Bradley Property], on which the 
Tribe has begun gaming operations as a 
means of economic development for its 
community.” Congress accomplished this 
goal by affirming and ratifying the 
Department of the Interior's initial decision to 
put the land into trust for the Tribe in Section 
2(a), but also by removing jurisdiction over 
matters relating to the land in Section 2(b). In 
point of fact, Congress's intended goal of 
providing certainty with respect to the trust 
land would have been impossible to achieve 
absent the termination of any outstanding 
litigation—specifically, Mr. Patchak's suit. 
The legislative history reflects an 
acknowledgement of this fact, noting that Mr. 
Patchak's suit “places in jeopardy the Tribe's 
only tract of land held in trust and the 
economic development project that the Tribe 
is currently operating on the land.” Whatever 
burden is imposed by Section 2(b), on Mr. 
Patchak or otherwise, the statute is rationally 
designed to meet its legitimate, nonpunitive 
purpose of providing certainty with respect to 
the trust land. 
 
Finally, the legislative record does not evince 
a congressional intent to punish. Mr. Patchak 
has presented no evidence, other than the 
acknowledgement that his case would be 
affected, for his claim that Congress 
purposefully targeted him for retaliation 
through the Gun Lake Act. While it may be 
true that Mr. Patchak was adversely affected 
as a result of the legislation, the record does 
not show that Congress acted with any 
punitive or retaliatory intent. 
 
E. 
 
The Government suggests that there is an 
alternative ground on which we could rule, 
arguing that the Gun Lake Act provides an 
exemption to the APA's waiver of sovereign 
immunity. While the Government did not 
make this argument in the proceedings 
below, sovereign immunity is a threshold 
jurisdictional question that speaks to the 
court's authority to hear a given case, and so 
we would be well within bounds to consider 
the question. “Indeed, the ‘terms of the 
United States' consent to be sued in any court 
define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the 
suit.” Nevertheless, because we conclude that 
the Gun Lake Act is not constitutionally 
infirm, and that subject matter jurisdiction 
over Mr. Patchak's claim has thus validly 
been withdrawn, we need not consider the 
matter further. 
 
III. 
 
In a separate challenge to the proceedings 
below, Mr. Patchak contends that the District 
Court erred by permitting the administrative 
record to be supplemented. We review the 
District Court's denial of Mr. Patchak's 
Motion to Strike the Administrative Record 
Supplement for abuse of discretion. 
 
Although this case may not present 
circumstances typically permitting the 
agency to supplement the record, see id. the 
District Court's failure to strike the 
supplemental information provided to it was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
  
The District Court denied Mr. Patchak's 
Motion to Strike Supplemental Record “[f]or 
the reasons set forth in the Memorandum 
Opinion” entered on the same date, the 
District Court's determination, at issue in this 
appeal, that it was without jurisdiction to 
consider the suit and that the case was to be 
dismissed in its entirety. The District Court 
only mentioned the record supplement in the 
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Procedural Background section of its opinion 
in order to indicate the “events [that] have 
altered the legal landscape” in the time since 
the case was remanded from the Supreme 
Court. The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by referencing that development in 
this way. Nor did it abuse its discretion by 
denying a motion to strike a supplement to 
the record at the same time that it was 
dismissing the case in its entirety for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's 
decisions below are affirmed. 
 
So ordered. 
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“Justices May Rein In Congress' Ability To Upend Lawsuits” 
 
Law360 
Andrew Westney 
May 1, 2017 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
consider whether a federal law meant to end 
a suit challenging a Michigan tribal casino 
project is an abuse of congressional authority, 
a move that comes as the Trump 
administration's attacks on the judiciary have 
raised more general separation of powers 
concerns. 
The high court granted certiorari Monday to 
a petition by David Patchak, who claims the 
D.C. Circuit's upholding of the Gun Lake Act 
— which led to the dismissal of his suit over 
the U.S. Department of the Interior's taking 
of a parcel of land into trust for the Match-E-
Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi 
Indians' casino — could give Congress the 
power to stop any lawsuit it wants to. 
The court's decision to address the separation 
of powers issue could put teeth in a long-
standing high court precedent meant to 
prevent Congress from making inroads on 
judicial authority, attorneys say. 
And the justices will weigh the limits of 
congressional power "at an interesting time, 
when the question of judicial deference to 
other branches is very much on people's 
minds," Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton 
LLP partner Jonathan Meyer said. 
The battle between Trump's executive 
authority and the courts' power has been at 
the center of debate over the president's travel 
ban, with Attorney General Jeff Sessions' 
recent disparaging comment on a Hawaii 
federal judge's block of the ban following 
earlier remarks by the president critical of the 
federal judiciary. 
The Patchak case will now turn public 
attention to another axis of the federal 
balance of power, as the justices examine 
"how much deference can be granted to the 
legislative branch and how far they can go in 
approaching judicial function," Meyer said. 
The current petition actually marks the 
second time Patchak's case has reached the 
high court, after the justices ruled in 2012 that 
Patchak had standing and the suit could go 
forward. 
Following remand of the case to the district 
court, Congress passed the Gun Lake Act, 
which was signed into law by President 
Barack Obama in 2014. Among its 
provisions, the statute affirmed the DOI's 
decision to take the tribal land into trust under 
the Indian Reorganization Act and stripped 
Patchak and any other potential claimants of 
the ability to challenge that decision in 
federal court. 
At the center of Patchak's petition is whether 
the Supreme Court's 1871 decision in U.S. v. 
Klein, which ruled a law unconstitutional 
171 
  
because it directed a decision in a pending 
case without amending any law, means the 
Gun Lake Act is invalid. 
That issue was tackled by the high court just 
last year in its Bank Markazi v. Peterson 
decision, in which the court upheld a 2012 
federal law that retroactively made assets 
linked to Bank Markazi, the Iranian central 
bank, subject to a judgment in favor of 
families of the victims of the 1983 Marine 
Corps barracks bombing in Beirut. 
But while the DOI relied on the Bank 
Markazi ruling in its opposition to Patchak's 
petition, the justices' decision to take his case 
may indicate that they're ready to draw a line 
against Congress treading on the courts' turf, 
attorneys say. 
According to the petition, the law at issue in 
the Bank Markazi case didn't create a 
separation of powers violation because it 
created new substantive legal standards that 
it allowed a lower court to apply, rather than 
simply requiring the dismissal of litigation. 
"If Congress allows the Gun Lake Act to 
stand, it's hard to imagine what principled 
limitation there is on Congress' power to 
undertake similar legislation, which 
effectively dictates the outcome of the case 
after it's already been considered," Scott E. 
Gant of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, who 
represents Patchak in the case, told Law360. 
While federal laws intended to stop ongoing 
litigation haven't been that common 
historically, a Supreme Court affirmation of 
the Gun Lake Act might mean they "get a lot 
less rare in a hurry," according to University 
of Texas School of Law professor Stephen I. 
Vladeck, who worked on an amicus brief in 
the case submitted by several federal courts 
scholars. 
"We're in an age of rather unprecedented 
attacks on the federal courts, including by the 
sitting president, and so it seems like an 
especially dangerous time for the courts to be 
giving more power to the political branches," 
Vladeck said. 
And a dissent in the Bank Markazi case by 
Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor, hinted at dissatisfaction 
among at least some of the justices that the 
decision could be interpreted overly broadly 
to allow Congress to direct courts to make 
specific decisions, attorneys say. 
Congress' passage of the Gun Lake Act to 
snuff out Patchak's suit after the high court's 
first ruling in the case may have increased the 
justices' willingness to hear the suit again, 
and may not bode well for the government 
and the Gun Lake Tribe, attorneys say. 
But if the government does win the case, that 
could set a template for Congress to pass 
more legislation targeting suits, Mayer 
Brown LLP special counsel Charles A. 
Rothfeld said. 
"You can imagine all kinds of situations 
where interest groups or individuals who 
have particular disputes going on will go to 
Congress, and Congress could tell the courts 
to say, 'Alright, suit dismissed, no 
jurisdiction,'" he said. 
"If you have the resources to do that, I think 
people will increasingly take that tack," 
Rothfeld said. 
Native American tribes will also be watching 
the case closely, partly out of concern that the 
172 
  
Supreme Court could raise questions around 
Congress' plenary power with respect to 
tribes, according to Native American Rights 
Fund senior staff attorney Richard Guest. 
While the Patchak ruling should focus purely 
on the separation of powers question, "I don't 
think we want to get into the scope of the 
authority of Congress to act to the benefit of 
Indian tribes," Guest said. "I think we're in 
dangerous territory if we're opening up this 
case for the justices to opine on that." 
And a ruling against the Gun Lake Tribe 
would allow Patchak to press his underlying 
claims that the DOI's acquisition of trust land 
for the tribe's casino is in conflict with the 
Supreme Court's 2009 Carcieri v. Salazar 
decision, Guest added. 
"That's the issue that the tribes are extremely 
interested in seeing resolved favorably," he 
said. 
Patchak is represented by Scott E. Gant of 
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP. 
The government is represented by Jeffrey B. 
Wall, Jeffrey H. Wood, William B. Lazarus, 
E. Ann Peterson and Lane N. McFadden of 
the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band is 
represented by Conly J. Schulte and Nicole 
E. Ducheneaux of Fredericks Peebles & 
Morgan LLP. 
The case is Patchak v. Zinke et al., case 
number 16-498, in the Supreme Court of the 
United States.
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“Law Blocking Tribal Casino Fight Constitutional, DC Circ. Says” 
 
Law360 
Andrew Westney 
July 15, 2016 
 
The D.C. Circuit on Friday upheld the 
dismissal of a Michigan man's challenge to a 
tribe's casino project on neighboring land, 
ruling that a federal law specifically passed to 
prevent a federal court from hearing the case 
is constitutional.  
A unanimous circuit court panel ruled that the 
Gun Lake Act — •signed into law in 2014 to 
remove a district court’s jurisdictional 
authority over David Patchak’s then-pending 
case and affirm the U.S. Department of the 
Interior’s decision to a parcel of land known 
as the Bradley Property into trust for the 
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians’ Gun Lake Casino — 
didn’t violate his right to petition in court or 
his due process rights. 
Writing for a three-judge panel, Circuit Judge 
Robert L. Wilkins said that the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s April ruling in Bank Markazi v. 
Peterson and other high court decisions 
backed Congress’ authority to set a new 
standard to apply to pending litigation 
without directly amending the substantive 
laws upon which the suit is based. 
The section of the Gun Lake Act taking 
jurisdiction away from the federal court 
“provides a new legal standard we are 
obliged to apply: If an action relates to the 
Bradley Property, it must promptly be 
dismissed,” the panel said. “Mr. Patchak’s 
suit is just such an action.” 
And since Congress had the power to change 
the laws applicable to the case, Patchak 
wasn’t deprived of his due process rights in 
pursuing claims that the casino would 
negatively alter the rural character around its 
location, including his own property, the 
panel said. 
“Even assuming that there may be a property 
right to pursue a cause of action, in a 
challenge to legislation affecting that very 
suit, the legislative process provides all the 
process that is due,” according to the opinion. 
The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band 
selected almost 150 acres in western 
Michigan to be purchased and placed into a 
trust by the DOI in accordance with the 
Indian Reorganization Act, and proceeded to 
build the Gun Lake Casino, following federal 
recognition of the tribe in 1998. 
Patchak, who lives near the casino, sued then-
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar in 2008 
under the Administrative Procedure Act on 
the grounds that because the tribe was 
allegedly unrecognized at the time Congress 
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passed the IRA in 1934, the land acquisition 
was unlawful. 
President Barack Obama signed the Gun 
Lake Act into law in 2014. Among its 
provisions, the statute affirms the agency’s 
decision to take the tribal land into IRA trust 
and strips potential claimants of the ability to 
challenge that decision in federal court. 
At oral arguments in May, the federal 
government told the court that the Supreme 
Court’s Bank Markazi ruling on 
compensation for victims of Iranian-
sponsored terrorism bolstered its argument 
that the Gun Lake Act isn’t unconstitutional. 
The government argued that the decision, 
which held that families of the victims of the 
1983 Beirut Marine Corps barracks bombing 
should be allowed to collect a $1.75 billion 
award against Iran’s central bank, supported 
the principle that Congress may retroactively 
change a law applicable to pending litigation. 
The D.C. Circuit panel said the Bank Markazi 
decision, like Patchak’s suit, applied new 
legislation to pending litigation without 
directly modifying the statute the suit was 
based on. The Gun Lake Act didn’t directly 
amend or modify the Administrative 
Procedures Act or the Indian Reorganization 
Act, under which Patchak brought his claims, 
but still “amended the substantive law” that 
applied to the suit, the panel said. 
The law didn’t violate Patchak’s First 
Amendment right to petition because 
Congress is allowed to deprive lower federal 
courts of jurisdiction as it sees fit, and 
Patchak still has the ability to petition the 
government administratively even if he 
contends that effort would be futile, the panel 
said. 
In order to show a violation of due process 
rights, Patchak would have had to show he 
was deprived of a protected interest and then 
the court would have to assess whether he got 
the process he was due, according to the 
opinion. While Patchak could potentially 
claim a property interest, he wasn’t owed a 
court hearing after Congress passed the Gun 
Lake Act, the panel said. 
And the law isn’t a bill of attainder that 
impermissibly targets an individual through 
legislation without the protection of a trial 
because it isn’t punitive, the panel said. 
In a footnote, the panel said that Patchak’s 
claims relied heavily on how the Supreme 
Court interpreted the IRA in its 2009 decision 
in Carcieri v. Salazar, but that the court didn’t 
need to reach the merits of those claims. 
Sharon Y. Eubanks of Bordas & Bordas 
PLLC, who represents Patchak, said in a 
statement Friday that her client is 
disappointed in the ruling but "this already 
long battle is anything but over." 
Patchak is weighing whether to petition the 
U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case, and 
"another fee to trust acquisition on adjacent 
property may allow Mr. Patchak to finally 
have a court look at the issue of whether the 
tribe is even authorized to acquire land for a 
casino, based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Carcieri," Eubanks said in the 
statement. 
Representatives for the other parties were not 
immediately available for comment Friday. 
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Patchak is represented by Sharon Y. Eubanks 
of Bordas & Bordas PLLC. 
The government is represented by Lane N. 
McFadden and John C. Cruden of the U.S. 
Department of Justice, and James V. 
DeBergh of the U.S. Department of the 
Interior. 
The Gun Lake Tribe is represented by Conly 
J. Schulte and Nicole E. Ducheneaux of 
Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP. 
The case is Patchak v. Jewell et al., case 
number 15-5200, in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
